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1. Introduction 
 
One of the consequences of the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and the re-
establishment of the independent Lithuanian state in 1990 was the revival of the old 
historical animosities between Poland and Lithuania, particularly on the issue of the 
interwar conflict over Vilnius. The contestation of the two national narratives of the 
past, buried under the ideological dogmatism of the “friendship of the socialist nations” 
during the Soviet era, suddenly re-emerged to the surface of political discussions once 
the processes of democratization had begun to gain momentum. After Poland took over 
Vilnius and its surrounding area in 1920, the two countries officially remained in a state 
of war until 1938. Soon afterwards, the World War II began, bringing about the terrors 
of totalitarianism and the Soviet occupation in the case of Lithuania, while Poland 
became a Soviet Satellite state. The mutual dialogue on common historical past and 
memory remained frozen for 50 years. 
Poland strongly supported Lithuania’s independence in the turbulent years of the 
late 80s-early 90s. However, the common task to agree on the contents of a bilateral 
treaty in the early 1990s turned out to be a challenging endeavor, requiring extensive 
negotiations and difficult compromises on both sides. A strong contributing factor to the 
uneasiness of the negotiation process was a series of autonomy resolutions in 1989-
1991, proclaimed by the Polish political activists in the south-eastern Lithuania, who, 
paradoxically, with the backing of the Soviet authorities, sought to establish an 
autonomous region, which was possibly to remain within the borders of the Soviet 
Union. On 23 May 1990, the Šal?ininkai district declared itself a Polish National 
Territorial District where the Soviet constitution had to remain in force. On 7 October 
1990, delegates from Vilnius, Šal?ininkai, Trakai and Šven?ionys districts proclaimed a 
Polish  National  Territorial  District  in  the  Republic  of  Lithuania.  A  referendum  was  
planned in March 1991, in which the accession of the autonomous Polish territory to the 
Soviet Union was to be decided. Gorbachev in the meantime threatened that if Lithuania 
gained independence, Vilnius and its surrounding region would be granted to Russia or 
Belarus1. As a result, if in January 1991 Lithuanian government initially showed the 
intention to establish a cultural autonomy for ethnic Poles, already in September 1991 it 
                                                             
1 Lieven, Anatol, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence. New 
Haven: Yale University press, 1994, 167; Czayna, Thomas, Ethnic Poles in Lithuania and Belarus: 
Current Situation and Migration Potential. Santa Monica: Rand Monograph, 1993, 15. 
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dissolved the Polish local councils in Vilnius and Šal?ininkai districts and imposed 
direct rule. A widespread perception of Lithuanian Poles being against the Lithuanian 
independence and in a communist alliance with the Soviet Union emerged, although one 
should bear in mind that Poland officially did not support the autonomist aims of the 
Polish political activists in Lithuania. However, the events revealed the existence of 
latent problems in relations between the Lithuanians and the Polish minority – the 
mutual distrust, confrontation, emotionally charged contestation of Vilnius, dormant 
throughout the Soviet rule, were all reawakened and re-enlivened, bringing about the 
grim collective memories of the interwar period. 
Hence, what caused most controversy during the negotiations on the bilateral 
Polish-Lithuanian treaty was, unsurprisingly, the question of historical past and how it 
should be addressed in the text of the treaty. Prior to the signature of the 1994 Treaty, 
eleven deputies of the Lithuanian parliament urged Minister of Foreign Affairs Algirdas 
Saudargas not to sign the declaration of January 19922, demanding that Poland condemn 
the act of aggression, led by General ?eligowski in 1920, and claiming that if this 
provision was not included in the bilateral treaty, the results of aggression would be 
legalized3. Lithuanian side sought that Poland would officially acknowledge the fact of 
occupation and confirm that the annexation of Vilnius and its surrounding area was an 
illegal act, in breach of the international law. The president of Poland Lech Wa??sa 
stated that Poland had no claims on Lithuanian territory4. But the Lithuanians still 
insisted that the treaty could not be signed without an additional declaration on history, 
whilst Poland repeatedly responded that historical debates should proceed after the 
treaty had been signed. Ultimately, Lithuania agreed to exclude the historical issues 
from  the  treaty  and  the  accompanying  declaration.  The  treaty  was  signed  on  22  
February 1994. 
Nevertheless, the issue of historical past was not only briefly mentioned in the text 
of the treaty, but kept its salience in the preamble which states as follows: 
                                                             
2 An additional declaration on the historical past was supposed to complement the main document of the 
treaty. 
3 ”Saudargas urged not to sign Lithuanian-Polish declaration”, Tass World Service in English, 12 January 
1992, in: Snyder, Tim, ”National Myths and International Relations: Poland and Lithuania, 1989-1994”. 
East European Politics and Societies, Volume 9, No.2, Spring 1995, pp. 317-343, 326. 
4 ”Poland ’has no claims’ on Lithuanian territory”, Radio Vilnius, 18 April 1992, in: Snyder, Tim, 
”National Myths and International Relations: Poland and Lithuania, 1989-1994”.  East European Politics 
and Societies, Volume 9, No.2, Spring 1995, 327. 
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“The Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Poland, hereinafter referred to as the 
"Contracting Parties", […] 
 
Mindful of the complex history of our peoples and the centuries-old closeness of 
Lithuanians and Poles, and bearing in mind the possibility that the two peoples may have a 
different interpretation of their common history, 
 
Stressing that awareness of the good and bad pages in the history of our States should help 
to strengthen mutual understanding between the Lithuanian and Polish peoples in a 
democratic Europe which is in the process of uniting, 
 
Expressing their sorrow at the conflicts between the two States at the end of the First 
World War when, after long years of oppression, Lithuanians and Poles began to build a 
new, independent life, and condemning the violence which occurred in the mutual relations 
between the two peoples, […] 
 
Solemnly confirming to one another the integrity today and in the future of their current 
territories with capitals in Vilnius and Warsaw, irrespective of the way in which their 
borders were established in the past, […] 
 
Have agreed as follows”. 
 
Lithuanians, initially determined to achieve Poland’s condemnation of the takeover 
of Vilnius in 1920, compromised and accepted a much vaguer statement on the 
“possibility of different interpretations of the common history”. Additionally, the 
articles concerning the provisions to the Polish and Lithuanian minorities in the two 
countries were complemented by a statement on the teaching of history and culture: 
 
“Article 15 
The Contracting Parties shall, each in its own territory, preserve the ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious identity of the persons referred to in article 13, paragraph 2, and 
create conditions for its development. In particular, the Parties shall: […] 
 
– Take into consideration the history and culture of the groups referred to in article 13, 
paragraph 2, in connection with the teaching of history and culture at educational 
institutions”. 
 
The latter statement reveals that both states consider the teaching of history and 
culture to be one of the crucial state-controlled functions of identity-building. Both 
countries agreed to take into account the history and culture of the minority groups – the 
Lithuanian minority in Poland and the Polish minority in Lithuania – in their respective 
history curriculum in educational institutions due to a shared perspective that history 
teaching in high schools serves the role of maintaining one’s national identity through a 
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national historical narrative, which might be exclusive to minorities and their peculiar or 
contradictory understanding of history. Lithuanian Poles, in this regard, represent a 
national minority, which is exposed to two conflicting national narratives of the 
common past – Polish and Lithuanian. As they are members of the Polish nation, their 
understanding of the common Polish-Lithuanian history is likely to be conditioned by 
the Polish historical narrative, acquired as part of the collective memory of the family 
and various social groups which have an exclusively Polish character (for instance, 
Polish choirs, youth and student clubs, scout associations, etc.) On the other hand, they 
encounter Lithuanian historical narrative of the Polish-Lithuanian past throughout the 
secondary school history education, where the curriculum, even if taught in Polish, 
largely represents the Lithuanian point of view, as the textbooks in Polish are mere 
translation of the Lithuanian ones.  
However, one may also wonder whether there exists an exclusive Lithuanian Polish 
collective memory which represents yet another point of view, not identical to either 
Polish or Lithuanian one. In this regard, this constitutes an attempt to step beyond the 
simplistic “national perspective” and to overcome the equation of the nation-state and 
collective memory. In effect, the focus on the distinct collective memories of the Polish 
minority members allows to transcend methodological nationalism by questioning the 
confinement of collective memory within the borders of the nation-state, problematizing 
the taken-for-granted coherence of national collective memory and recognizing the 
internal diversity of these supposedly unified collective storylines. Therefore, the main 
research question could be formulated as follows: In what ways do the interpretation 
and perception of the common Polish-Lithuanian history by the Polish minority 
members reiterate or diverge from Polish and Lithuanian national historical 
narratives? What are the differences in the messages and normative evaluations offered 
in the different accounts of the historical past? What implications does this have with 
regard to the Polish minority claims and institutional responses to those claims? 
 This explains the choice of structuring the analysis into two parts: first, the 
historical narratives and national memory of the common Polish-Lithuanian history are 
explored, as presented in history textbooks and national historiographies; second, the 
collective memory of the Polish minority members is examined via analysis of 
qualitative interviews by aiming to identify how it can be related to or differentiated 
from the Polish and Lithuanian national historical narratives. In the case of the former, 
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we are dealing with publicly available national representations of collective memory, 
whereas the perceptions of history emerging from the interviews represent collectively 
framed individual memory, whether it is acquired from textbooks, historical records or 
family communication. 
The study should thus generate knowledge about the patterns and elements of 
collective remembrance among the Polish minority members, offer insights into 
thematic and normative contents of Polish and Lithuanian historical narratives, and also 
allow for a better understanding of the links between collective memory, minority 
identity and political manifestations of competing social memories. While the last two 
decades have seen the attempts to examine the Lithuanian collective memory5, literature 
on the social memory of Lithuania’s Polish minority has remained scarce, offering 
random and unsystematic insights within the framework of a more general analysis of 
the Lithuanian collective memory. 
I present my argument by structuring the thesis in the following way. First, an 
overview of the relevant concepts and themes within the field of social memory studies 
is offered, concentrating on the issues of collective memory and identity, social memory 
transfer and competing memory narratives. The following chapter describes 
methodology,  employed  in  the  data  analysis,  and  considers  the  relevant  ethical  issues  
that occurred in the process of conducting research. The subsequent chapter explores 
Polish and Lithuanian secondary education history curriculum, as presented in 
textbooks;  in  order  to  achieve  a  more  complex  depiction  of  the  national  historical  
narratives, it is complemented with the portrayal of chosen historical events or epochs 
in the national historiographies. By focusing on three historical periods of the common 
Polish-Lithuanian history, the main thematic and normative elements of both national 
narratives are highlighted, allowing for their juxtaposition and comparison. The fourth 
chapter presents the analysis of thirteen qualitative interviews with the Polish minority 
members, conducted in Lithuania in December 2009 – January 2010, and is followed by 
a discussion of the findings in the last chapter. 
 
                                                             
5 Insightful studies on Lithuanian collective memory have been carried out by Šutinien?, Irena, ”Socialin? 
atmintis ir šiuolaikin? lietuvi? tautin? tapatyb?“, Lithuanian Ethnology: Studies in Social Anthropology & 
Ethnology, 2008; ?epaitien?, Rasa “Sovietme?io atmintis – tarp atmetimo ir nostalgijos”, Lituanistica, 
2007, No.4 (72); Rubavi?ius, Vytautas, “Neišgyvendinamo sovietme?io patirtis: socialin? atmintis ir 
tapatumo politika”,  in: Lietuvi? tautos tapatyb?: tarp realyb?s ir utopijos.Vilnius: Kult?ros, filosofijos ir 
meno institutas, 2007; Langer, Johannes, Current Discourses on the Holocaust in Lithuania: The Impact 
of Collective Memory, 2010. 
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2. Literature review: collective memory studies 
 
Collective memory studies, being still in its “charismatic phase”6, do not give in 
easily to intellectual organization and standardization of theoretical and methodological 
approaches. It is a highly complex field, encompassing a broad array of disciplines: 
sociology, history, political science, social psychology, anthropology, literary and 
media studies, philosophy. Its interdisciplinarity explains the vast diversity of subjects, 
methods and approaches, used within the field of collective memory studies. Since the 
upsurge in academic and public interest in collective memory issues in the 1980s7, 
scholars have examined the role of collective memory in multiple aspects. They have 
addressed the practices of commemoration, the role of memory in ethnic conflicts and 
reconciliation, political use and the institutionalization of collective memory, the links 
between group identity and social remembering, the role of myths, as pseudo-history, in 
organizing and legitimizing the present, etc. The multitude of topics has been 
commented as resulting from memory studies being more practiced than theorized8. 
However, recent years have seen more attempts to bring some organization into the 
field, overview and structure the multitude of themes, conceptual tools and methods 
used9. 
Some of this major conceptual confusion in the field stems from the fact that the 
concept of “collective memory” itself has been used interchangeably with that of 
“cultural memory” and “social memory” by different scholars. Throughout my thesis, 
however, I tend to use the term “collective memory”, which dominates the majority of 
debates in recent years and which, according to Olick, “directs our attention to issues at 
the heart of contemporary political and social life”, despite its breadth and 
                                                             
6 Olick, Jeffrey K., “Between Chaos and Diversity: Is Social Memory Studies a Field?”. International 
Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, June 2009, vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 249-252, 251. 
7 Olick, Jeffrey K. and Robbins, Joyce, ”Social Memory Studies: From ”Collective Memory” to the 
Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices”. Annual Review of Sociology, August 1998, vol. 24, pp.105-
140, 107. 
8 Confino, Alon, “Memory and the History of Mentalities”, in: Erll, Astrid and Nünning, Ansgar (eds.), 
Cultural Memory Studies. An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook. Berlin, New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, 2008, 79. 
9 Olick, Jeffrey et al., The Collective Memory Reader; Erll, Astrid and Nünning, Ansgar (eds.), Cultural 
Memory Studies. An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook; the journal of Memory Studies, 
published since January 2008. 
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imprecision10. Collective memory can be understood as a broad umbrella definition that 
encompasses several conceptual elements: Collective memory can be perceived as 
“collective representations (publicly available symbols, meanings, narratives, and 
rituals), deep cultural structures (generative systems of rules or patterns for producing 
representations), social frameworks (groups and patterns of interaction), and culturally 
and socially framed individual memories”11. However, I will use the term “collective 
memory” primarily referring to it in the two following ways: as collective 
representations of national memory (i.e. publicly articulated narratives, meanings and 
images of collective past in history textbooks) and as socially framed individual 
memories (i.e. historical memory of Polish minority members, where individual 
remembering is framed by the social context of their identity). Both of these involve the 
element of selectivity, inherent in the creation of accounts of the past which inescapably 
responds to present knowledge and motivations12. 
The pioneering work in social memory studies is Maurice Halbwachs’s “Les 
Cadres Sociaux de la Mémoire”, published in Paris in 1925. Halbwachs characterized 
collective memory in relation to history, wherein the former is understood as the past 
which actively maintains and organizes our identities and the latter is the past which is 
remembered, but does not sustain a meaningful relation to our identities any longer13. 
The  two  concepts  –  collective  memory  and  history  –  should  not  be  perceived  as  
mutually exclusive, or as two alternative categories to describe the past: Collective 
memory is not alternative to history – it is largely shaped by it. Another crucial 
distinction identified by Halbwachs was between autobiographical memory and 
historical memory. The recollection of the past which we personally experienced 
constituted the former, whereas the historical memory entailed the recollection of the 
past of which we learnt indirectly – from historical records14. Both, however, are to be 
regarded as part of collective memory, irrespective of whether the process of 
                                                             
10 Olick, Jeffrey K., “From Collective Memory to the Sociology of Mnemonic Practices and Products”, 
in: Erll, Astrid and Nünning, Ansgar (eds.), Cultural Memory Studies. An International and 
Interdisciplinary Handbook. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, 152. 
11 Ibid, 157-158. 
12 Erll, Astrid, “Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction”, in: Erll, Astrid and Nünning, Ansgar (eds.), 
Cultural Memory Studies. An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook. Berlin, New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, 2008, 5. 
13 Olick and Robbins, 111. 
14 Coser, Lewis A., “Introduction”, in: Halbwachs, Maurice, On Collective Memory. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992, 23; Olick and Robbins, 111. 
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remembering entailed a socially framed recollection of personal experience or one 
recovered by acquaintance with historical records. 
A crucial aspect of Halbwach’s theory, manifesting the influence of his teacher 
Durkheim, was the externality of collective memory, presupposing one’s membership in 
a  certain  group which  enabled  us  of  recollecting  the  past:  “it  is  in  society  that  people  
normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and 
localize their memories”.15 It is always the individual who remembers, but the process 
of reconstructing the past is dependent upon placing one’s individual thought within a 
social framework of memory of a certain group and adopting its perspective on the past. 
On the other hand, we should distinguish between socially framed individual memories 
and the representations of memories by institutions, the media or different social 
groups, even if these two types of collective memory are highly interdependent. As a 
result, collective remembering involves numerous different memories, social 
frameworks of recollection as well as collective representations of the past, making it a 
highly complex and segmented process. 
Out of diversity of work on social memory that addresses the multiple issues in the 
field,  this  chapter  offers  an  overview  of  those  themes  and  concepts  that  are  the  most  
important and relevant for the purpose of my thesis. First, by highlighting the 
interdependency of collective memory and identity formation, the mechanisms, 
practices and sites of memory transfer are explored. A more specific impact of history 
textbooks as means of transmitting social memory is examined in the subsequent part. 
The issues of selective remembrance and competing memories are explored in the last 
section. 
 
2.1 Mnemonic communities and memory transfer 
 
Halbwach’s and his followers’ insight about the impact of social memory on 
sustaining group identity by adopting group’s perspective on the past unveils the link 
between identity and memory by showing how the process of remembering, requiring 
individuals to employ a social memory framework of a certain group, performs a 
function of their initiation into a “community of memory”. As formulated by Bellah and 
                                                             
15 Halbwachs, Maurice, On Collective Memory. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1992, 38. 
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co-authors, “Communities […] have a history – in an important sense are constituted by 
their  past  – and for this reason we can speak of a real  community as a ‘community of 
memory’, one that does not forget its past. In order not to forget that past, a community 
is involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narrative.”16 This relates to the role of 
the commemoration sites, practices and rituals, which all serve to maintain national 
identities by retelling a national historical narrative of the past. Annual celebrations of 
independence, war memorials, commemoration of national heroes, representations of 
national histories in the media aim at recapitulating the relevance of national histories, 
as the basis for the “communities of memory”, to our national identities. As Smith 
notes, “The return to the past is necessary because of our need for immortality through 
the memory of posterity which the seeming finality of death threatens.[…] Hence our 
myths, memories and symbols must be constantly renewed and continually re-told, to 
ensure our survival”17. In this sense, national histories serve the role of ethnic 
mythology and symbolism, which unify and integrate the nation as well as provide its 
members with a sense of belonging and create solidarity, based in common descent and 
shared memories. “What matters, then”, argues Smith, “is not the authenticity of the 
historical record, much less any attempt at ‘objective’ methods of historicizing, but the 
poetic, didactic and integrative purposes which that record is felt to disclose”18. 
Following the same line of reasoning, Duara adds that “national history secures for the 
contested and contingent nation the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving 
through time”19.  
On the other hand, a “community of memory” does not necessarily imply a 
national community. Thus we can refer to a multiplicity of communities of memory, or 
social groups, which may overlap, form compound groups and maintain identities, 
based on diverse identity categories. Manifold, often competing, social memories 
typically represent different social groups which affect the way we remember the past – 
in this sense, we can speak of remembrance environments, which may be constituted, 
among other, by the family, the profession, the ethnic group, the religious community or 
                                                             
16 Neelly, Robert et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985, 153. 
17 Smith, Anthony D., The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, 208. 
18 Ibid, 25. 
19 Prasenjit, Duara, Rescuing history from the nation : questioning narratives of modern China. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995, 4. 
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the nation20.  As  a  result,  memories  link  individuals  to  a  variety  of  different  
remembrance environments which all shape our recollection and perception of the past. 
Zerubavel defines these remembrance environments as “mnemonic communities”, 
which incorporate new members by essentially familiarizing them with the 
community’s past, which the new members did not have to experience personally in 
order to remember it: “being social presupposes the ability to experience events that had 
happened to groups and communities to which we belong long before we joined them as 
if  they  were  part  of  our  own  past”21. The most typical example of such mnemonic 
socialization is the national history education in schools, which aims to teach a certain 
account of the past, made universal within the boundaries of a national community by 
means of the unified and coherent national curriculum administered by the state. Out of 
all multiple communities of memory, however, the family constitutes the primary 
environment of mnemonic socialization, which still influences our recollections of the 
past even after we have entered new mnemonic communities and adopted their 
mnemonic traditions22. 
Belonging to a specific generation may as well leave an imprint of shared 
collective memories stemming from certain common experiences, which typically will 
differ from the collective memories of other generations. Mannheim is the originator of 
the idea that social and political events of one’s youth leave a generational imprint23. 
Schuman and Scott draw on Mannheim’s theory by asking different age groups to 
identify national or world events and changes that occurred over the past fifty years and 
were  particularly  important  as  well  as  to  comment  why  these  particular  events  or  
changes were chosen24. The gathered data show a clear generational pattern, wherein the 
events perceived as most important refer back to the late adolescence or early adulthood 
of the respondents. The authors further suggest that when shared memories of an event 
or a social change are analyzed, one should distinguish between personalized 
recollections of the event – such as loss of hearing on a World War II military 
assignment – and collective memories, exemplified by a large part of the Vietnam 
                                                             
20 Zerubavel, Eviatar, ”Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past”. Qualitative Sociology, Vol. 
19, No.3, 1996, pp. 283-300, 284. 
21 Ibid, 290. 
22 Ibid, 286. 
23 Mannheim, Karl, “The problem of generations”, in: Mannheim, Karl, Essays in the Sociology of 
Culture. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952(1928), pp.276-322. 
24 Schuman, Howard and Scott, Jacqueline, “Generations and Collective Memories”. American 
Sociological Review, June 1989, vol. 54, No. 3, pp.359-381, 362. 
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generation remembering the Vietnam war as the time of distrust and division25. On the 
other hand, collective memories need not be necessarily experienced personally and can 
be transmitted to new generations as part of the collective memories of a social group. 
The crucial aspect of tracing such collective memories is, however, not so much the fact 
of remembrance itself, but the subjective meaning ascribed to the remembered event, as 
this is likely to be the factor which might shape and instruct the present behavior. As 
Schuman and Scott’s study showed, larger political meaning was attributed to World 
War II by the Vietnam generation, which perceived World War II as a “victorious war”, 
rather than by those who actually experienced World War II26. This, in turn, sheds light 
on how the currently present circumstances may shape the interpretation and 
significance  ascribed  to  the  past  events.  Further,  what  Schuman  and  Scott  achieve  to  
demonstrate is that the recollection of certain events and the importance given to them 
mostly depend on the intersection of personal and national history, whereas only some 
people make their judgments of the past solely following the perspective of historians27. 
Šutinien?, in a similar study on the Lithuanian collective memory, asked different 
age groups from different ethnic backgrounds to name up to two national or world 
events and changes since the 1930s which they consider to be most important28. A 
qualitative dimension of the study revealed the reasons that made people choose those 
particular events or changes. The “generational imprint” was proven only partly. The re-
establishment of independence was identified to be by far the most important event to 
all age groups as well as all ethnic groups (Lithuanians, Russians, Poles). However, the 
most recent events – the re-establishment of independence and the accession to EU – 
were more important to younger age cohorts, whereas the older generations more often 
named the 1940 Soviet occupation and Stalinist repressions. In the case of the younger 
generations, the social memory of the events related to the regaining of independence, 
Šutinien? argues, is still mostly transmitted through mnemonic socialization and rules of 
remembering within the family. Younger respondents typically underlined that the 
importance of independence was experienced and later recollected within the context of 
family  –  as  part  of  childhood  memories  and  family  stories.  The  latter  point  is  in  
accordance with the aforementioned Zerubavel‘s insight on the importance of the family 
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as the primary community of mnemonic socialization, which shapes people‘s ways of 
remembering the past later in life. Further, Šutinien? shows how collective national 
memory and Lithuanian identity are closely knit with the image of roots and the idea of 
a fatherland, family histories and genealogies. National historical narrative was typically 
personalized by linking it to family histories and one’s perceived rootedness in the 
fatherland, i.e. where one’s parents and grandparents were born and lived. This confirms 
Schuman and Scott’s finding that the recollection of important events is in most cases 
dependent on intersection of personal and national history, which in this case could be 
complemented by family history as an extension of one’s personal history. 
A useful conceptual tool for the analysis of the processes through which collective 
memory, with its peculiar symbols, narratives and meanings, is transmitted within 
intergenerational community of memory is Nora’s lieux de mémoire,  or  “sites  of  
memory”. The seminal multivolume study of French collective memory – Les Lieux de 
Mémoire – carried out under Nora’s supervision, provides insights into the vast and 
diverse array of practices, rituals, traditions, publicly available symbols, narratives and 
other representations of French collective memory. As a result, lieux de mémoire could 
be constituted by concretely experienced museums, memorials, cemeteries, 
anniversaries and, likewise, by more vague concepts of local memory, lineage, 
generation or landscape29. In order to organize the multitude of sites of memory, Nora 
suggests distinguishing between material, functional and symbolic aspects of different 
lieux de mémoire30. The first group would encompass mostly monumental memory 
sites, such as statues, monuments, museums, various architectural works of epochal 
importance. The functional memory sites would include veterans’ associations, 
manuals, dictionaries or testaments, which either aim to preserve an incommunicable 
experience of the past or have a pedagogical purpose. Lastly, among symbolic memory 
sites, one could identify official national ceremonies, rituals of pilgrimage, places of 
burial or sanctuaries.  
Ultimately, Nora’s lieux de mémoire encompass all those mnemonic practices, 
rituals, symbols, images and narratives which serve the role of maintaining and reviving 
identities. Memory sites and the meanings attached to them, whether they reflect the 
original ways of remembrance or are revived and reinterpreted in the recurring cycles of 
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collective memory, are inherent to group identity. Hutchinson, for instance, argues that 
warfare may generate powerful myths which can be formed and reconstituted long after 
the actual events had taken place and which are capable of engendering unity of identity 
within a group by providing a shared framework for explaining and evaluating the 
present events. Commemorative practices and rituals, through which these myths are 
reworked, are of crucial importance here, for they enable a constant and cyclical revival 
of group identities, often by converting the remembrance of war heroes into an 
institutionalized public commemoration of fallen soldiers. Collective memories of 
defeat may be maintained for multiple generations and, as a result, generate campaigns 
of retrieval of lost territories or opposition to the externally imposed treaties31. In times 
of crisis and by means of historical analogies, myths can be retrieved and reinterpreted, 
adjusted to explain the present situation and to guide collective action. 
Zerubavel identifies multiple bridging mechanisms that relate the experiences in 
the past with the present circumstances. Ceremonies in the same places of the perceived 
war sacrifice, visits to the relics or memorabilia of warfare, imitation and replication of 
heroes and martial traditions, re-enactment of battles, historical analogies referring to 
the past traumatic experiences and discursive continuity between the present and the 
past experiences – all constitute national mnemonic practices which reiterate the 
important moral message conveyed by the meanings assigned to the past experiences32.  
This argument may be extended to explain, drawing on Osborne, how repetitive, 
quotidian practices as well as commemorations, rituals and conventions of framing of 
such mnemonic practices may impart certain places, sites or landscapes with 
emotionally loaded symbolism, making those locations crucial to one’s self-definition33. 
Landscapes, in particular, may become visual prompts for collective remembering and 
define group’s identity when they are personified as homeland or fatherland, the land of 
great ancestors34. In a similar vein, Tilley argues that “places, like persons, have 
biographies in as much as they are formed, used, and transformed in relation to practice 
[…] stories acquire part of their mythic value and historical relevance if they are rooted 
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in the concrete details of locales in the landscape, acquiring material reference points 
that can be visited, seen and touched”35. As a result, places and landscapes, as culturally 
loaded geographies, are turned into mythologized constructs of collective memory, 
evoke strong emotional attachment and become part of our identity and memory. The 
link between identity and landscape is further clarified by Sack who notes that 
landscapes are “replete with markers of the past – graves and cemeteries, monuments, 
archaeological sites, place names, religious and holy centers – that help us remember 
and give meaning to our lives”36.  The  identity  of  a  place  is  tied  to  certain  group  
narratives and the underlying social patterns or frameworks of remembrance which 
represent a subjective group’s perspective on the history of the place.  
In  this  regard,  a  good case  in  point  is  the  city  of  Vilnius  as  well  as  the  imagined  
landscape of Lithuania which since late 19th-early 20th century were imbued with 
conflicting mythologies and narratives, representative of contradictory modern 
Lithuanian  and  Polish  nationalisms  as  well  as  the  old  traditional  patriotism  of  the  
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (the latter expressed by the Polish-speaking 
Lithuanian gentry loyal to the political tradition of the Commonwealth wherein 
nationhood was not based on ethnicity or language, but on social class and status). 
These competing political and cultural visions projected histories with their specific 
heroes, villains, victories, defeats, events to be remembered and forgotten; they ascribed 
different meanings and symbolism to the same events of the past, thus, inevitably 
engendering distinct communities of memory and conjuring up contradictory projects 
for the future of those communities. Yet a common feature to all of these different 
national ideologies was the fact that they integrated a highly mythologized idea of 
Vilnius and Lithuania into their peculiar historical memory and personified it as a 
sacred homeland, as the heart of group’s national and cultural life, as the inherited land 
of their forefathers, functioning as an anchor of each group’s sense of national identity. 
To construct such coherent national narratives of the past, particularly in the light 
of changing boundaries and regimes, requires selective choice and consideration of what 
has to be remembered or forgotten and what meanings should be assigned to and moral 
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lessons drawn from the various elements of those narratives. These issues will be 
further elaborated in the following section. 
 
2.2 Remembering and forgetting: competing memories and political use of 
collective memory 
 
As Ernest Renan first famously pointed out, ”forgetting […] is a crucial factor in 
the creation of a nation”37. He believed that while forgetting certain elements of the past 
contributed to the national unity, historical studies, on the other hand, endangered this 
unity by revealing the forgotten pasts of violence and terror that preceded that national 
unity. Renan’s insight is valuable for two reasons. The more obvious outcome of his 
statement lies in the fact that national collective memory is selective – only certain 
events of the past are to be consciously remembered, while others remain unnoticed or 
ignored, often perceived as threatening the legitimacy of an established national 
narrative of the past.  
Nevertheless, what Renan also implies is the crucial distinction between memory 
and history, which, though aiming to define two similar mechanisms of recollecting the 
past, should not be confined. History, according to Renan and his followers, even if it 
can be derived from memory, should not be reduced to memory38. Ideally, history 
should be corrective of memory, aiming to disentangle the obscurities of the past and, 
consequently, potentially delegitimizing certain memories, purifying the national 
memory39. This reflects, as Olick argues, the position held by traditional historians who 
would place history and memory in a clear-cut distinction, making a claim that only 
history is interested in the pursuit of truth40. According to this vision, historical research 
and knowledge should validate memory claims as well as uncover “forgotten” historical 
facts.  The  growing  contemporary  split  between  memory  and  history  has  been  stressed  
by Nora. Memory – multiple, collective and yet individual – is an essentially permanent 
evolution, an actual phenomenon that links us to the eternal present, remaining 
“unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and 
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appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived”41. History, 
on the other hand, is a reconstruction, representation of the past that, being suspicious of 
memory, calls for analysis, criticism and, as a result, claims universal authority42. This 
process of critical search for “true” history, as Nora insightfully pointed out, has taken a 
step forward when a growing realization occurred that history, aiming to denounce 
hypocritical mythologies of the past, is equally susceptible to alien impulses within 
itself, that it is not exempt from the possibility of being “the victim of memories which 
it has sought to master”43. 
This proves how complex and interdependent the relation between history and 
memory is, as the assumed source of legitimacy – historiography – is itself malleable to 
nation-building projects, prioritizing coherence and glory of the national past over 
controversial facts and conflicting memories. A historical account is always a product of 
an  arbitrary  selection  of  sources  and  interpretation.  The  realization  of  this  leads  to  an  
evolution of critical history, where historiography becomes the object of history itself, 
causing, at the same time, blurring of the distinction between history and memory and 
an ever more clear-cut dissociation between them. Having admitted the susceptibility of 
historical research and knowledge to nation-building imperatives, we should, 
nevertheless, avoid collapsing it into national memory and completely ignoring its 
potential role as a corrective of memory. The conceptual distinction should not be lost 
for analytical reasons. 
In this sense, historical accounts which aim to uncover uncomfortable historical 
facts of national histories, which place the coherent national historical narrative in a 
more critical and multi-faceted perspective are to be regarded as corrective of collective 
memory. Weeks makes such an attempt at “reminding” of the forgotten Jewish and 
Polish past of Vilnius, when he describes how Vilnius was turned into a Soviet 
Lithuanian capital during the early years of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania44. He 
shows how the city’s multiethnic past was actively forgotten by excluding references to 
existence of non-Lithuanian and non-Russian population of the city before the Soviet 
takeover, by taking down monuments commemorating the Jewish community and its 
mass  destruction  by  Nazis  and  their  Lithuanian  collaborators,  by  erasing  street  names  
                                                             
41 Nora, “Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, 8-9. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid, 10. 
44 Weeks, Theodore R., “Remembering and Forgetting: Creating A Soviet Lithuanian Capital. Vilnius 
1944-1949”. Journal of Baltic Studies,  2008, vol. 39, No.4, pp.517-533. 
17 
 
that would remind of famous local Jews or Poles, and framing the Lithuanian 
participation in the Holocaust as a dirty deed of a very few despicable “Lithuanian-
German nationalists”, who, conveniently for the Soviet regime, were also portrayed as 
anti-Soviet partisans. This way the regime could both justify its brutal repression of the 
anti-Soviet resistance, active in Lithuania until 1953, and appease the Lithuanian 
population by not examining the Holocaust events too carefully45.  
The crucial issue at stake in such confrontations of social memory held by different 
groups is legitimation of memory. Historical narratives represented in history textbooks 
or evoked in presidential speeches constitute national collective memory which is 
conceived of as legitimate and is often supposed to convey important moral lessons. In 
the context of selective construction of national histories which are supposed to 
communicate a unified and coherent vision of the nation’s past, present and future, 
forgetting can be perceived as exclusion of certain memories, particularly of those 
maintained by minority groups, which may advance a competing historical narrative, 
not represented as a part of the national collective memory and thus lacking the same 
legitimacy status. The latter thus becomes the target of competing historical narratives, 
for a particular interpretation of the past carries a normative dimension, a certain 
national “morality” that may be transmitted to future generations, this way linking them 
to an intergenerational “community of memory”. 
Memories may overlap within different social groups or generations, but they are 
as much likely to differ to an extent that it may generate tensions or conflicts between 
those groups. The most obvious example of such social memory conflict would be a 
national community of memory attempting to impose its memory narrative on all its 
members, linked to it primarily by means of citizenship, whilst some of these members 
would happen to belong to a minority group, whose recollections of the past would 
stand in a sharp contrast to the majority’s memories. What the “correct” way of 
interpreting the past is, which event should mark the beginning of a historical narrative, 
which events or persons should be remembered or discarded as irrelevant to group’s 
history – all these disputes can be considered as mnemonic battles, fought within and 
between communities over the social legacy of the past46. 
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Taking the argument one step further, the political and social significance of such 
memory battles and competing historical narratives should be explored, which, in turn, 
raises the question why certain memories, narratives, symbols representing the past find 
such wide resonance among people, what is peculiar to those interpretations which 
makes them powerful enough to mobilize people, to encourage them to think and act in 
a certain way. The intensity of memory contestation between different groups in some 
cases  remains  contained  and  does  not  grow  into  a  violent  conflict.  In  other  cases,  
however, collective memory and its various public representations may appear to play a 
major role in exacerbating ethnic warfare. Historical past or, to put it more precisely, the 
group-specific way these past events are framed and interpreted, can play an important 
role in the present-day politics and minority claims-making. Historical narratives can 
provide legitimacy to the political strategies of action undertaken by politicians, 
maintain identity boundaries, support and direct demands and the means to attain them. 
Brubaker offers an example from the conflict between Croatia and Serbia on how 
Serbian nationalists were able to mobilize the Croatian Serbs by constructing the image 
of the independent Croatia through the prism of the past, by reviving the old memories 
and  stories  about  the  atrocities  Croats  inflicted  upon  Serbs  in  the  wartime  Ustasha  
regime47. The power of the nationalist vocabulary which generated the opposition to the 
Croatian independence was grounded in the persistence of the memories of the past and 
the  fact  that  the  trauma  of  wartime  atrocities  was  transmitted  from  one  generation  to  
another. 
What heightens or diminishes tensions, Ross argues, is the shifting inclusiveness or 
exclusiveness of cultural narratives enacted by changing attitudes and behaviours48. He 
identifies psychocultural narratives as a resource that groups and individuals may 
employ to make claims, mobilize support and strengthen identity boundaries. He defines 
psychocultural narratives as “the aggregation of interpretations into accounts of a 
group’s origin, history, and conflicts with outsiders, including its symbolic and ritual 
behaviours”49. Cultural expressions and narratives, being at the core of group identity, 
provide particular frames, interpretive lenses through which groups and individuals 
define their interests and appropriate strategies of action as well as predict expectations 
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and motives of other actors. Ultimately, what Ross succeeds to demonstrate is how 
group identity is articulated through different collective memories expressed publicly 
through various rituals, practices, narratives and symbols and how this, in turn, may be 
received by other groups as a threat and lead to increasing tensions. In this regard, 
explanations of the rise of ethnic tensions and conflicts should emphasize the 
importance of  
"taking seriously participants' own accounts to identify emotionally significant 
elements that must be part of any settlement; making sense of why and how the 
narratives are emotionally powerful; examining how the narratives shape beliefs that 
facilitate the choice of some actions over others; analyzing the power of collective 
memories in linking individuals to larger social and political identities; emphasizing 
the widespread use of imaginative and politically effective culturally grounded 
expressions and enactments to make claims, build commitment, and mobilize action".50 
As  a  result,  Ross  argues  that  “psychocultural  examinations  of  ethnic  conflict  can  
inform us about the ways the parties understand unfolding events, the core issues that 
are at stake, and the way they express their fears”51. Psychocultural narratives could be 
invoked as metaphors and lessons drawn from the past events, as collective memories of 
the past or messages and symbols written into the works of art, literature and music. 
Parallelly, the focal point of a conflict may be sacred sites, places, landscapes, such as 
battlefields, monuments or memorials, because of their significance to a group’s identity 
and collective memory52. 
Snyder, in his insightful study of the national transformations within the territorial 
boundaries of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, illustrates Ross’s argument 
by showing how Vilnius with its multiple identities – Jewish Vilne, Polish Wilno, 
Lithuanian Vilnius, Belarusian Vil’nia – became such sacred site and the centre of a 
conflict, bearing strong emotional significance to different groups53. This was especially 
visible in the Polish-Lithuanian confrontation, wherein both Poles and Lithuanians 
attempted to appropriate the city as exclusively “theirs” – as a historical capital of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania, founded by the Lithuanian Grand Duke Gediminas and 
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symbolic of Lithuania’s continuity of statehood, or the nostalgia evoking centre of 
Polish culture.  
On the other hand, in the 1990s Lithuania and, in particular, Poland managed to 
attain  “sovereignty  over  memory”,  to  use  Snyder’s  terms.  The  crucial  shift  was  in  the  
inclusiveness of the Polish historical narrative, brought about largely by Polish 
intellectuals associated with the Paris monthly Kultura, who redefined Polish views on 
the eastern neighbours by critically reflecting on the assumed Polish superiority in the 
eastern territories and by highlighting that “we should learn the histories of Lithuania, 
Belarus and Ukraine, understand that they treated episodes of their pasts with the same 
sorts of biases Poles applied to their own past, and appreciate that the eastern 
neighbours’ views of past relations could check Polish prejudices”54. Instead of drawing 
on the diverging collective memories as a resource for political contestation, Polish and 
Lithuanian leaders managed to neutralise their attitudes to the past by emphasizing 
shared concerns and superordinate goals and this way preventing the bilateral relations 
from becoming an arena of historical debate. However, genuine reconciliation has not 
been achieved, as the latest developments in Polish-Lithuanian relations suggest55. 
Torsti’s study of the memory conflict surrounding the case of the Bronze soldier in 
Estonia presents yet another example of contradictory historical narratives that ascribe 
different meanings to an objectified representation of collective memory56. What for 
Estonians ultimately constituted a symbol of Soviet occupation, the Russian part of the 
population regarded as a “Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn” commemorating the 
Soviet  victory  against  Nazi  Germany.  The  decision  of  Estonian  authorities  to  relocate  
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the statue of the Bronze soldier caused violent riots and protests of Estonian Russians. 
More importantly, the clash of two “historical cultures”, to use Torsti’s terms, provoked 
a major campaign of history politics by Russian government, religious leaders and 
associations, in which the images of the past were used to support Russian perspective 
on the present situation: the relocation of the statue was portrayed as the glorification of 
the  collaboration  with  Nazi  Germany and  an  attempt  to  rewrite  history57. This case is 
illustrative in two regards: it is a good example of an emotionally charged collective 
memory conflict, where a monument and the message it carries becomes the focal point 
of contestation and where each contending side believes that recognizing the arguments 
of  the  other  side  negates  their  own;  at  the  same  time,  it  offers  insights  into  how  
historical narratives and symbols are employed to serve political interests. 
The issue of memory conflicts is a good starting point for a closer examination of 
how history education in schools contributes to the formation and maintenance of 
certain historical narratives. 
 
2.3 The role of school history education in transmitting collective memory 
 
As mentioned earlier, collective memory, i.e. shared meanings, narratives and 
symbols, constitutive of collective memory, are acquired within certain social groups 
and shaped by their peculiar rules and patterns of remembering. In this regard, history 
education at school is one of the key social milieus wherein, by learning about national 
history, students are not only supposed to acquire knowledge about the history of their 
country,  but  also  to  obtain  a  sense  of  national  belonging  to  a  community  of  memory  
connected by a shared historical narrative. The links between mass education and 
identity building were noted by many analysts of nationalism: Hobsbawm highlighted 
the crucial role of the school system in mediating the image and heritage of the nation 
and establishing universal national identification throughout the state territory58; Smith, 
in a similar vein, pointed out that, by adopting an educator role in the 19th century, the 
state was capable of mass inculcation of standardized, patriotic culture, this way paving 
the way for the creation of culturally unified nation-state59. 
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To claim this, however, should not lead to a conclusion that collective memory and 
national historical narrative, associated with it, is an invariably rigid, stable and 
uncontested “thing”. Quite the contrary, collective memory should rather be regarded as 
a process involving multiple competing voices, memories and contradictory meanings 
assigned  to  the  same  events.  However,  this  diversity  of  perspectives  and  evaluations  
does not necessarily enter the pages of history textbooks or the history teaching process 
on the whole. Rather, history curriculum is more often perceived as an identity building 
tool which should mediate a coherent and unified master historical narrative and shape 
students’ interpretations of the past forming the basis for uniform national 
identification.  
Ahonen, drawing on examples of Estonia and Germany, illustrates the argument by 
demonstrating how history textbooks, conveying certain group-specific historical 
narratives, tend to exclude minority groups and their vision of history, this way 
engaging in identity politics60.  As  a  result,  Estonian  textbooks  published  in  the  
aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union took a distinctly nationalistic approach, 
excluding minority narratives from the curriculum. Whereas in the Soviet official 
narrative, the loss of Estonia’s independence was portrayed as an extension of the happy 
family  of  the  Soviet  peoples,  the  new  Estonian  history  curriculum  largely  portrayed  
Russian-speakers in Estonia as evil occupants, who brought the development of 
Estonian nation-state into a setback61. In this regard, Hvostov comments that “a Russian 
speaker, given a choice, would adopt the Russian view on history, inasmuch as the 
Estonian view makes him or her feel excluded”62. Likewise, the Soviet grand narrative 
has never acquired the status of a legitimate, “truthful” storyline among Estonians, 
which, as a consequence turned the family circle into an important remembrance 
environment where the pre-Soviet Estonian historical narrative was maintained and 
mediated63. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s case presents the opposite extreme point of identity 
politics by means of history curriculum. State decentralization into ethnically 
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differentiated entities and cantons led to a parallel segregation of history curricula with 
multiple respective storylines representing each ethno-national group and its specific 
perspective on the past. This resulted in a situation wherein Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats 
would all have different ethnic-oriented curricula and textbooks64. Territories with the 
majority of Serbs would use Serbian curriculum and textbooks; those with Croatian 
majority would adopt the curriculum of the neighboring Croatian state. Interestingly, the 
new textbooks had one crucial aspect in common with the old socialist textbooks of the 
Yugoslav times. While the latter glorified Tito’s partisans, achievements of socialism 
and brotherhood of nations, the former praise the struggle of each national group and 
emphasize its victimhood, but both are essentially conveying a “doctrine consisting of 
unassailable and officially sanctioned truth”, both exclude contrasting interpretations, 
minority views and serve primarily as instruments of ethno-nationally bounded 
indoctrination65. This, in turn, makes the unified political community with a shared 
national identity based on citizenship impossible to achieve. 
Juxtaposition of Estonian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian examples, though 
representing  two  divergent  efforts  at  nation-building,  proves  the  ineffectiveness  of  
monolithic, singular master national narratives that exclude contradictory storyline, 
perspectives and experiences of minority groups. By excluding any views that deviate 
from the established storyline and failing to build an encompassing, open to contending 
views and critical national narrative, such ethno-nationally bounded narratives lead to 
deepening of dividing lines, alienation of the excluded groups from the national 
“community of memory” and, potentially, to conflict escalation.  
On the other hand, one might also emphasize the agency factor in the history 
teaching process. Létourneau and Moisan, for instance, argue that the deeply nostalgic 
and melancholic historical memory of young Quebeckers was shaped not so much by 
the contents of textbooks as by teachers’ incapacity “to provide young people with 
nuanced concepts, representations, and interpretations based on adequate, up-to-date 
knowledge of the subject matter being taught”66. In order to deviate from an established 
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narrative scheme, a teacher needs to be interpretively competent and to have enough 
factual knowledge and intellectual courage to criticize conventional versions of 
history67. Ideally, teachers should equip their students with “factual and interpretive 
means to construct a story of the past that takes the world’s complexities, ambivalences 
and paradoxes […] into account” without leaving them vulnerable to ideologically 
driven and abusive efforts at remaking the past68. If these skills or competences are 
lacking, a much safer option is to stay in familiar territory and rely on the existing 
legitimized storyline. Nonetheless, textbook content, even if it does not directly imply a 
narrow nationalistic perspective, can accommodate and nurture such simplistic national 
historical  narratives,  as  the  case  of  Quebec  shows69. School history education is a 
complex process of mediating publicly legitimized historical narratives, which, though 
typically emerging from the textbooks, may be considerably altered by teachers and 
their interpretation of the past. As a result, the continuity of the ethno-nationally 
oriented narratives may persist, rendering new, critical textbook storylines that advance 
multiple perspectives on the past seem “untruthful” or incomplete.  
Still, the influence of teachers as the authoritative figures to inculcate certain 
visions of the past should not be overemphasized as the following example from 
Northern Ireland suggests. Barton and McCully describe a history lesson where a 
teacher asked the pupils to discuss the impact of the Easter 1916 Rising on Irish politics 
in the next six years70.  In  the  discussion,  students  were  able  to  step  out  of  their  own  
political positions in order to understand the meaning of the events from different 
perspectives. When teacher attempted to connect these events with the more recent 
violent Republican struggle of the 1990s, it was observed that “an emotional wall” 
ascended with students refusing to engage with the exercise and draw parallels between 
the two71. 
Another crucial factor to be taken into account when we consider how well the 
message in the textbooks is received relates to whether the narrative at school in an 
accord with the collective memory of one’s family or other important identity-relevant 
social groups. A research on young people’s ideas about school history and identity in 
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the Netherlands and England showed that respondents from ethnic minority 
backgrounds were much more likely to profess pride in the history of their families 
(71.5% in the Netherlands and 68.5% in England) than in the history of the national past 
(21.3% in the Netherlands and 30.5% in England), despite the fact that many claimed 
that  it  is  important  to  have  a  knowledge  of  Dutch  or  British  history  (59.1%  in  the  
Netherlands and 71.6% in England)72. In the Netherlands, next to the history of the 
family,  the  history  of  one’s  religion  and  of  the  village,  city  or  region,  where  one  was  
born, was also strongly identified as important among pupils of ethnic minority 
background73. Quite strikingly, the findings of the study demonstrated that national 
history was far less relevant to non-indigenous pupils who identified primarily by 
country of origin of their parents or religion. Moreover, it showed that imposition of a 
homogenous master national narrative does not necessarily lead to an improved social 
cohesion and the overall stronger national identity. However, school history curriculum 
often tends to concentrate on the main political narrative of the national past, leaving 
little or no possibilities to explore family histories as an additional component of 
curriculum. As a result, if the patterns and rules of remembrance, meanings ascribed to 
the recollected events in the family are in dissonance with the narratives conveyed at 
school, a memory conflict is likely to emerge, the scope and expression of which 
depends a great deal on whether there is enough political will to reflexively and 
critically re-examine the past and to make the legitimized national narrative more 
inclusive to the non-majority groups and their particular histories. 
In effect, history textbook writing and history teaching are likely to mirror 
currently existing views on the past, present needs and motivations, which makes them 
highly politically relevant enterprises, both in terms of national identity politics and 
from  the  perspective  of  international  relations.  Openness  to  the  exploration  of  
uncomfortable aspects of the past and dialogue between different groups in society 
should prevail in order to escape the risky outcomes of memory wars. 
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3. Theoretical and Methodological Choices 
 
This chapter offers an overview of theoretical and methodological stances taken 
during the research process. First, I introduce general ontological and epistemological 
principles in interpretive political research and their relevance in this specific study. The 
following two sections present the materials used and methods adopted in the analysis. 
Lastly, I identify the main ethical concerns that emerged throughout the research 
process. 
 
3.1 Interpretive political science 
 
The dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative methodologies typically 
denotes a distinction between positivist and interpretive philosophical presuppositions, 
where the former is accompanied by large-n studies combined with statistical analysis 
and the latter is characteristic of small-n studies using ethnographic approaches and 
non-statistical, interpretive methods. This bipolar counterdistinction, however, has been 
challenged by those who observed that the requirements of positivist science have been 
increasingly entering meaning-focused qualitative studies, calling to conform to the 
validity and reliability criteria74. As a result, Yanow suggested a tripartite division 
between quantitative, positivist-qualitative and traditional qualitative methods75. 
The latter, based on constructivist ontology and interpretive epistemology, have 
also been termed “interpretive methods” or “constructivist-interpretive methods”. 
Constructivist ontology, in opposition to positivist holdings, here implies the primacy of 
social context, discourses and traditions in construction of meanings attached to 
language, actions, institutions or physical artifacts. Thus, a moderate constructivist 
perspective is adopted which underlines the socially constructed character of meanings, 
facts and ideas ascribed to social reality, yet at the same time acknowledging that not all 
aspects of reality is a social construct. Such moderate social constructivist views are 
pursued by Hacking76. In a similar vein, Searle has distinguished between those features 
of the world that are intrinsic to nature and those features that exist because of the 
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intentionality of the users or observers77. The latter features are ontologically subjective, 
as their existence depends solely on observers and users; yet epistemically they add 
objective features to reality78. 
At the same time, meaning-focused interpretive (hermeneutic) epistemology 
highlights the need to identify such discourses or traditions and understand the ways in 
which they shape meanings and interpretations. In addition, it indicates the possibility 
of multiple meanings of language, actions, institutions or physical artifacts, derived 
from different perspectives and interpretations of the same facts79. As researchers’ 
explanation itself constitutes interpretation of the meanings that actors interpretively 
assign to social phenomena, this, in turn, establishes a double hermeneutic80.  
Yanow describes the task of interpretive researchers as follows: “Interpretive 
researchers accord legitimacy to the local knowledge possessed by actors in the 
situations under study of their own circumstances, language, etc., exploring apparent 
discrepancies between word and deed across various sub-sites within the research 
setting […]. And it both is open to the possibility of multiple interpretations of events 
and analyzes these multiplicities”81. In other words, interpretive approaches to political 
studies would set off to explore meanings, beliefs or ideas that people hold in a 
particular context and their respective influence on actions, policies and practices. Two 
basic  preceding  assumptions  here  would  be  that,  first,  beliefs  and  practices  are  
constitutive of each other; second, meanings or beliefs are holistic, i.e. they are part of 
the wider web of meanings and beliefs which provides the reasons for holding them82. 
In the context of this study, two presuppositions serve as the starting point: firstly, 
historical narratives and, more broadly, collective memory are socially and historically 
constructed; second, a particular representation and understanding of the common 
Polish-Lithuanian history has its repercussions on actions and practices, on the ways in 
which different actors or institutions perceive majority-minority (or bilateral relations) 
and what is at stake in these respective conflicts of perspective.  
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The interpretive approach is then applied to two-fold analysis. First, the 
representations of national historical narratives conveyed in school textbooks are 
studied as historically-constructed official storylines about the past constituted by 
interconnected beliefs, meanings, symbols and normative imperatives. This conforms to 
the general tendencies in the history textbook research within the discipline of political 
science, where researchers have been mostly focusing on stereotypes and ideology in 
school messages, concurrent political histories developed by different textbooks as well 
as links among power, social requirements, and history teaching83. Second, interview 
analysis demonstrates to what extent such official national narratives are internalized, 
reinterpreted or rejected by members of target community, which allows for 
acknowledgement of agency, even if it still remains conditioned by a certain social 
context. Thus, collective memory or historical narratives are understood here as 
traditions which are handed over from generation to generation, whether in a family or 
national context, and which are not fixed, but rather constantly evolving and 
transforming due to the influence of agency84. 
 
3.2 Textbook analysis: methods and materials 
 
I have chosen to study textbooks which have been in use for the past twenty years, 
i.e those which were published after 1990. The reasons behind my focus on the more 
contemporary editions of history textbooks lie in the fact that the storylines of textbooks 
published prior to 1990 had been strongly shaped by ideological imperatives, the 
analysis  of  which  does  not  fall  under  the  scope  of  this  thesis.  This,  in  turn,  is  
methodologically problematic, as the qualitative interviews, which are the source on the 
collectively framed memories of the Polish minority members, have been mostly 
conducted with people who belong to the older generation and, thus, have not studied 
history from the analysed textbooks. There have been only three interviews conducted 
with young Poles in their 20s. However, the average age of the remaining interviewees 
is 40-50 years old, thus, they attended secondary education in the 1970s or 1980s. As a 
result, this implies that their interpretations of the past should have been shaped by the 
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textbooks of the Soviet era. However, previous research on the Lithuanian textbooks of 
the Soviet period demonstrates that, despite strong ideological framing of history 
events, the portrayal of interwar Lithuanian-Polish relations retained the same basic 
accents and narrative structure, which were present already in the Lithuanian interwar 
textbooks and which were transferred, with some changes, to the textbooks published 
after the re-establishment of Lithuanian independence85. For instance, the Polish-
Lithuanian antagonism of the interwar period was portrayed as a conflict of two 
“burgeois-nationalistic” states, as opposed to the newly defined socialist peoples of 
Poland and Lithuania which belonged to the common “friendly socialist family”. Thus, 
normative accents were displaced, but the storyline retained the same structure of 
epochal development.  
As a result, I would argue that the basic narrative structure of the Soviet Lithuanian 
textbooks was filled out by historical narratives, which were socially maintained in 
private, informally communicated and transferred, and perceived as legitimate or 
truthful in opposition to the Soviet storyline. Evidence of this statement could be the 
fact that after Lithuania re-established its independence, many Lithuanians considered it 
necessary  to  buy  a  copy  of  the  formerly  forbidden  “History  of  Lithuania”  by  the  
prominent interwar historian Šapoka, which embodied the truthful and official 
Lithuanian historical narrative. This suggests that historical narratives of the interwar 
period retained some of their relevance and legitimacy into the 1990s. With the fall of 
the Soviet Union and ideological control, the school history curriculum could again 
return to its pre-Soviet storyline, allowing informally transferred narratives enter the 
newly published textbooks. The continuity of the narrative, in turn, enables a viable 
juxtaposition of textbook storylines and the narratives emerging from the interviews. 
However,  I  see  it  crucial  to  highlight  here  that,  by  claiming  that  ideologically  driven  
Soviet textbooks were seen as illegitimate and untruthful, I am not implying that these 
textbooks could have no influence on collective memory at all or that they were 
perceived in this way universally. 
I sought to include textbooks of different authors and publishing houses into both 
Lithuanian and Polish samples. Those textbooks which had several consequent editions 
formed the basis of the sample. Nevertheless, I also read through the more recently 
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published textbooks in order to trace any possible shifts in the textbook narrative. I 
focused exceptionally on textbooks for 9-12th grades which offer a more detailed and 
nuanced historical descriptions. Lithuanian textbooks used in the analysis were: 
“Lietuvos istorija 11-12 klas?ms“ by Kamuntavi?ius et al., “Lietuva ir Pasaulis. Istorijos 
vadov?lis XII klasei“ by Ge?as et al. and two textbooks by Makauskas – ”Lietuvos 
istorija. Pirmoji knyga” and “Lietuvos istorija. Antroji knyga”. Polish textbook sample 
is larger due to higher thematic differentiation within a series of separate textbooks. As 
the analysis encompasses events from different historical periods, I had to consequently 
read through more textbooks. Polish sample includes a textbook series by Kami?ski, 
?niegocki and Pa?ko (“Historia 1”, two parts of “Historia 2”, “Historia 3”), “Polskie 
dzieje” by Dybkowska, ?aryn and ?aryn, “Cz?owiek i Historia. Cz??? 4” by 
Kochanowski and Matusik, “?ladami przesz???ci” by Roszak and “Historia dla 
Maturzysty” by Radziwi?? and Roszkowski. I read through only those chapters or 
sections of textbooks that describe the three historical events or epochs of the common 
Polish-Lithuanian history. The three chosen events/epochs are: i) the 1569 Lublin 
Union, ii) the Polish-Lithuanian uprisings and Lithuanian national revival in the 19th 
century, and iii) the Polish-Lithuanian conflict over Vilnius in the 20th century. I have 
myself translated the relevant passages from Polish and Lithuanian textbooks, quoted in 
the textbook analysis, into English. 
It has to be underlined once again that only the Lithuanian textbooks, translated 
into Polish and approved by the Lithuanian Ministry of Education and Science, are used 
in history lessons in Polish secondary schools in Lithuania. In some cases, as revealed 
by the interviewed informants, these are used in parallel with the textbooks in the 
Lithuanian language in order to gain a better understanding of certain concepts, 
especially in the 10th-12th grades when students are preparing for the national school-
leaving examinations86. Polish textbooks, based on the Polish national school history 
curriculum, on the other hand, are not allowed to be used in Lithuanian Polish schools, 
although, as again revealed by a few informants, it was not uncommon to use Polish 
textbooks, published in Poland, in the 1990s as an additional teaching material to the 
main Lithuanian textbooks87.  
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Textbook analysis was carried out following methodological recommendations 
outlined in “UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision”, 
which has been edited by the leading institution in textbook research – Georg Eckert 
Institute for International Textbook Research. I applied qualitative content analysis, 
which essentially aims to explain what the text tells us, whether it is in accordance with 
academic research and sufficiently covers the topic88. As a result, I did not focus on the 
more quantitative aspects of the textbook narratives, which are concerned with the 
quantifiable repetitions or frequencies of words or topics. The aim was rather to identify 
the message, values and interpretations that the text conveys. Qualitative approach to 
content analysis is typically described as a close reading of texts which involves 
“rearticulation (interpretation) of given texts into new (analytical, deconstructive, 
emancipatory, or critical) narratives that are accepted within particular scholarly 
communities that are sometimes opposed to positivist traditions of inquiry”89. 
Systematic analysis of the texts reduces the complexity of the overall textual data into a 
short description of its main features90. As Kracauer underlines, what counts alone in 
qualitative content analysis is “the selection and rational organization of such categories 
as condense the substantive meanings of the given text, with a view of testing pertinent 
assumptions and hypotheses”91.  
Nevertheless, qualitative content analysis, as Berelson notes, is often quasi-
quantitative and contains some quantitative statements in rough form or assigns relative 
frequencies to certain categories or themes92. Similarly, Holsti argues that qualitative 
analysis may be supplemented with some quantitative aspects of the text in order to 
ensure better insight into the meaning of the data93. This is characteristic of the textbook 
analysis carried out here as well, as in some instances I specify the number of pages a 
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textbook topic covers or use quantitative terms, such as “repeatedly”, “usually” or 
“emphasis”.  
I explored the representations of three specific historical events/epochs of common 
Polish-Lithuanian history. Representations are understood here as broad organizing 
categories which encompass various themes and patterns appearing in the text. Theme, 
i.e.  an  assertion  about  some  subject,  is  a  key  unit  of  content  analysis  in  research  on  
propaganda, values, attitudes and beliefs94 and,  thus,  it  suits  the  research  focus  on  
interpretations and narratives related to historical memory. The analysis is structured in 
separate nationally differentiated sections, which include both the textbook analysis and 
academic historical narratives. I considered it necessary to supplement the actual 
textbook analysis by placing textbook narratives of common Polish-Lithuanian history 
into wider historiographical context and demonstrating how the same historical events 
or epochs were represented by professional historians in both countries. To some extent, 
this allows to evaluate whether the findings of academic history research are reflected in 
textbook narratives. 
Textbook analysis serves several functions here. Most importantly, it delineates 
official historical narratives represented in Polish and Lithuanian textbooks and 
identifies messages and normative values conveyed in those narratives. Comparison of 
the two accounts enables better understanding of which elements and meanings of the 
two official storylines are in dissonance, where the crucial contradictions in the 
portrayal and evaluation lie. The findings are relevant in two regards: first, it will enable 
comparison of two national textbook storylines with the collective memory of the Polish 
minority members; second, through identification of similarities and dissonances 
between these three (Polish, Lithuanian, Polish minority) collective memories we can 
achieve a better understanding of the role they serve in minority politics, majority-
minority relations as well as bilateral Polish-Lithuanian relations. 
 
3.3 Interview analysis: methods and materials 
 
The idea to conduct interviews with the Polish minority members in Lithuania was 
guided by realization that analysis of representations of national memory in history 
textbooks could not be completed without exploration of their reception by people who 
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encounter those memory narratives in their daily lives. In other words, I sought to 
examine collective memory by linking its representation and reception, cultural tradition 
of official remembering and socially framed individual memory, in order to see whether 
these representations are shared and identified with by the people who are their target. 
Failing to explore how the memory constructed at the official political level is received 
by the people, Confino argues, remains one of the main methodological problems in 
collective memory studies95. The official public representation of the past should not be 
equaled to the actual collective memory without exploring the reception of these official 
narratives. Reception of certain representations of the past here implies the extent to 
which memories steer emotions, are relevant in meaningfully explaining one’s socio-
cultural context, or motivate people to act. The limited scope of thesis as well as scarce 
previous research on the Polish minority, as mnemonic community, determined my 
choice to focus on the reception of official national historical narratives only in the case 
of  the  Polish  minority.  In  case  of  a  further  research,  I  would  aim  to  include  the  
Lithuanian minority in Poland into the overall research design in order to have a more 
symmetrical study on the relation between minority collective memory and the national 
historical narratives conveyed by the history textbooks. 
The interview format was semi-structured and did not include any direct questions 
about interviewees’ interpretations or opinions about the past. My concern was to find 
out not only what respondents thought about the past, but how relevant and emotionally 
engaging these memories were, how well they were received by the respondents. 
Therefore, instead of bringing the memory issue directly and this way facilitating 
externally forced responses about the past (which otherwise may be irrelevant or 
unimportant to the interviewees), I asked them to comment and share their opinions on 
the five most problematic and publicly debated claims of the Polish minority: restitution 
of property in Vilnius region, public use of the Polish language in Vilnius region (street 
names, information signs), restrictions against Polish education, spelling of Polish 
names in Polish orthography, restriction of electoral rights. These open-ended questions 
then served as an interview guide, although the order of the topics discussed varied 
across different interviews. In almost all cases, the interview topic spontaneously shifted 
to the issues of history and contradictions in the evaluation of the past. At this point of 
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the interviews, I was using various forms of probing to encourage the interviewees to 
elaborate on their ideas and stances. In effect, this enabled to access respondents’ views 
about the past, the relevance of which was not imposed externally by the interviewer. 
Moreover, it demonstrated that historical memory is employed to make sense of and 
explain the current political situation or even legitimate minority claims. In addition, in 
case of further research I would probably seek to approach the textbook topic more 
explicitly and ask the informants to comment on their experiences of using the school 
textbooks in order to gain wider insight into the reception of the textbook narrative. The 
partial shift from the content to the teachers’ and students’ use and reception of the 
textbooks is identified by some as one of the methodological transformations within 
history textbook research, where individuals are “considered active negotiators of the 
messages and the meanings”.96 
The fact that none of the three historical events/periods of the common Polish-
Lithuanian history, on which I focused in the textbook analysis, were directly 
experienced by my interviewees allowed to avoid confusion between collective and 
autobiographical memory. As Kansteiner noted, “memories are at their most collective 
when they transcend the time and space of the events’ original occurrence. As such, 
they take on a powerful life of their own, “unencumbered” by actual individual 
memory, and become the basis of all collective remembering as disembodied, 
omnipresent, low-intensity memory”97. 
I have conducted 13 interviews with the Polish minority members in December 
2009-January 2010. The principal aim in selecting interviewees was to ensure 
representativeness of the sample. As a result, the snowball sampling technique was not 
considered suitable, as this would have created the risk of interviewing people with 
similar characteristics who belong to a common network and represent views specific to 
that network. I sought that the sample includes respondents who hold both low-status 
and high-status in the Polish community. Nevertheless, since I was interested in how 
particular interpretation of the past shaped and supported the minority claims-making, 
there was a bias in the sample toward respondents holding high-status in their respective 
organizations or the Polish minority on the whole. Including low-status respondents in 
the sample, on the other hand, served as a control mechanism, allowing to better grasp 
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whether the views espoused by the high-status interviewees were relevant and 
correspondent in describing the views of the low-status respondents. There were three 
interviewees who were 22 and 29 years old and who attended high school already after 
the re-establishment of Lithuanian independence and who, as a result, studied history 
from the most recently published history textbooks, approved by the Lithuanian 
Ministry of Education and Science. The remaining 10 interviewees were mostly in their 
40s or 50s. The more detailed structure of the sample is outlined in the table below. 
All the interviews were conducted in Lithuanian. An exception was one interview 
carried out with a history teacher (I9), who in some instances throughout the interview 
felt it easier to express himself by speaking Russian rather than Lithuanian. As a result, 
Russian, Lithuanian and some Polish were used in parallel. To a lesser extent, 
communication in Lithuanian appeared to be slightly challenging in two other 
interviews with a political activist (I1) who, in terms of his professional background, 
was  a  history  teacher,  and  with  a  retired  political  activist  (I10).  In  all  these  cases,  the  
interviewees were in their 60s or 70s and had had their higher education done in 
Russian, which was likely to affect their Lithuanian language proficiency. Typically, 
when they could not remember a certain word or expression in Lithuanian, they would 
use a Russian word which I then translated into Lithuanian. With these exceptions, all 
the other interviewees were used to using Lithuanian in their daily lives and did not 
experience any major difficulties in expressing themselves. 
 
Table 1: Individual interviews with Polish minority members 
 Occupation Sex/Age 
I1 history teacher/political 
activist 
M/71 
I2 researcher F/61 
I3 journalist/researcher F/47 
I4 economist M/49 
I5 entrepreneur M/41 
I6 politician M/57 
I7 journalist F/52 
I8 researcher M/55 
I9 history teacher M/64 
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I10 political activist/pensioner M/66 
I11 civil servant F/29 
I12 student F/22 
I13 student F/22 
 
The interviews were transcribed in the language which was used in the interviews 
and analyzed using Atlas.ti software. The analysis of the interview transcripts was made 
in Lithuanian and only those passages which I saw relevant to quote were then 
translated into English. In effect, the translation itself often required a certain level of 
interpretation due to specific linguistic expressions, the meaning of which is hard to 
capture and convey in English.  
The method applied in the interview analysis was qualitative content analysis. The 
more general characteristics of this method were outlined in the previous section. One 
of  the  goals  of  the  qualitative  interview  analysis  was  to  determine  to  what  extent  
collective memory of the Polish minority members reiterates national narratives 
conveyed by the textbooks. Thus, the data coding process was shaped by predetermined 
categories of the three aforementioned historical events of the common Polish-
Lithuanian history. In order to avoid biased reading of the data and possibly 
overlooking relevant but unsupportive evidence, some codes and categories were 
derived from the text. 
Lastly, the main themes of the narratives emerging from the Lithuanian and Polish 
textbooks, historiographies and the interviews with regard to the three historical periods 
are summarized in the Table 2 (page 108). The key elements, themes and perspectives 
of the historical narratives, juxtaposed in the table, have been identified separately in 
each specific section of the textbook, historiography and interview analysis, which, in 
turn, allows for a better evaluation of the overlapping patterns and/or mismatches 
between the textbook storylines, historiographical perspectives and interviewees’ 
understanding of the past. 
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3.4 Ethical issues 
 
Ethical concerns in research involving human subjects have usually focused on 
several main issues: acquiring informed consent of the interviewees, ensuring their right 
to privacy, avoidance of social and personal harm, and building trust without engaging 
in deception98. As Gregory notes, “[a] person has been fully informed if he has had 
explained to him anything that reasonably and foreseeably might influence the decision 
whether or not to agree to be a participant in the research99. Thus, if all the relevant 
information was provided and if a person arrived at a decision to take part in the 
research without any unwarranted pressures, it is typically assumed that the requirement 
of voluntary informed consent has been met.  In the case of interviews with the Polish 
minority members, every interviewee was acquainted with the topic, aims and purpose 
of my research twice: first, when I was approaching the potential interviewees over the 
phone conversation or e-mail correspondence; and, second, I introduced my research 
project once again before every interview took place. However, the way in which I 
presented my research topic had an inherent covert element, as I avoided making an 
explicit assertion that what interested me most were the interviewees’ views about the 
past and the common Polish-Lithuanian history. As it was indicated in the previous 
section, such interview strategy was chosen in order to avoid external imposition of the 
importance of historical memory issues to the interviewees. 
Ensuring confidentiality emerged as another key concern, as some of my 
interviewees expressed views that contradicted the practices or attitudes of their 
respective workplaces or organizations that they represented. To guarantee anonymity 
was equally essential in those cases where the interviewee held a high-status position 
both within his/her organization and the Polish minority in general, i.e. when the 
interviewees were publicly recognizable figures. In effect, the issue of confidentiality 
was related to the issue of interviewees’ protection from any kind of harm, which they 
might have experienced had I undermined the principle of confidentiality. 
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99 Gregroy, Ian, Ethics in Research. London and  New York: Continuum, 2003, 37-38.  
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An unexpected ethical concern which emerged during the interviewing process was 
the tendency of some interviewees to treat me as an advocate of the Polish minority 
claims.  In  other  words,  a  few  interviewees  more  or  less  explicitly  expressed  their  
expectations that I would engage in the “Polish cause” and defend the interests of the 
Polish minority. This has been partly generated by my interviewing strategy, as I was 
approaching the issue of historical memory indirectly, by first asking the interviewees to 
comment on the Polish minority claims-making. Thus, throughout the research process, 
it was particularly important to ensure that I do not take sides with any of the groups 
and that I avoid deliberate bias or misrepresentation, whether while collecting or 
working with and analyzing the data, interviewing or conducting textbook analysis. 
In addition, the fact that the interviews were conducted in Lithuanian, with a few 
aforementioned cases were Russian and/or Polish were used parallely, can be regarded 
as constituting an unequal power relation between the researcher and the interviewees, 
due to the linguistic advantage of the former. The asymmetry in linguistic abilities was 
most pronounced in the three interviews with informants in their 60s or 70s (I1, I9, I10), 
whereas  the  rest  of  informants  appeared  to  be  able  to  easily  express  themselves  in  
Lithuanian. The use of the majority (hegemonic) language, not a mother tongue to the 
informants, may potentially create challenges to establishing a good rapport in the 
interview setting, complicate the interviewer’s ability to elicit authentic, nuanced 
responses and to interpret the informants’ statements with some level of deeper cultural 
understanding. The parallel use of Russian (in which the informants were fluent) and, to 
a lesser extent, of native Polish in the three aforementioned interviews allowed to 
minimize the linguistic obstacles, posed by the use of the Lithuanian language, and to 
increase mutual understanding between the interviewees and the researcher. 
Although some of the interviewees were particularly trustful of me and showed 
willingness to share their personal life-stories and experiences, the issue of building 
trust with the interviewees generally appeared rather significant, due the fact that I 
myself was Lithuanian and thus could be perceived as a representative of the opposing 
narrative or perspective toward the issues of the Polish minority. Thus, in order to 
encourage the interviewees to open up and elaborate on their views, I was typically 
more active as an interviewer in the beginning of the interview, disclosing some of my 
attitudes toward the discussed topic and this way trying to prevent defensive or reserved 
answers. Nevertheless, this strategy at facilitating trust was adopted only in the initial 
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stage of the interview to make the interviewees feel more comfortable and forthcoming. 
Later throughout the interview, I would take a more passive role in order to avoid too 
much leading on my part. 
 
4. Lithuanian and Polish historical narratives 
 
Polish-Lithuanian history contains highly disputed issues which, up to the present 
day, keep the debates between Polish and Lithuanian historians running. However, these 
contradictory views on shared history take their relevance not only within the field of 
academic history. They are also evoked in the national political discourses, popular 
representations of history in the media or official historical narratives in school 
textbooks. In order to delineate the key themes and elements of the Polish and 
Lithuanian narratives of the common past, I explore, first, the contents of history 
textbooks, which have been in use over the past 20 years in both countries. 
Consequently, this is combined with the portrayal of chosen historical events or epochs 
in the respective national historiographies. 
The following sections will present the Lithuanian and Polish historical narratives 
of three historical periods of common history: i) the 1569 Lublin Union, ii) the Polish-
Lithuanian uprisings and Lithuanian national revival in the 19th century, and iii) the 
Polish-Lithuanian conflict over Vilnius in the 20th century. 
 
4.1 Lithuanian historical rendering of the Lublin Union 
 
In the history of the Polish-Lithuanian relations, the 1569 Lublin Union is of key 
importance. It marks the beginning of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – a 
completely new stage in the development of relations between the Kingdom of Poland 
and  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania.  Lublin  Union  as  well  as  the  broader  process  of  
Polish-Lithuanian unionization had been popularly described by their contemporaries by 
the metaphor of a “sacred marriage”. Crucially, the Lublin Union created conditions for 
major linguistic and national identity transformations in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 
especially with regard to the Lithuanian gentry, who, over the course of the existence of 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, increasingly adopted Polish language and 
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culture. This section, thus, will delineate the main themes and elements in the portrayal 
of the Lublin Union in Lithuanian history textbooks. 
Unionization with Poland in the Lithuanian history textbooks is generally depicted 
as “the lesser of the two evils”. It is stressed that, in the 16th century, Lithuanian nobility 
was mostly against any closer relations with Poland other than those necessary to ensure 
basic state security in the region100. However, the intensifying wars with Moscow 
caused the attitudes of the Lithuanian nobility to change. The Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania, increasingly threatened by Moscow in the Livonian war, was in need of the 
Union with Poland in order to resist the attacks in the northern frontier. The Lithuanian 
delegates faced a complicated decision –  to unionize with Poland and possibly lose the 
sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or to reject the terms of unification set by 
Poland and to be possibly defeated in the Livonian war by Moscow.  
A lot of emphasis is placed on showing the contradictions that emerged between 
Poland and Lithuania in the negotiation process as well as the disadvantaged situation of 
Lithuania vis-à-vis Poland. The negotiations of Lithuanian and Polish delegations, 
which began already in 1562, were complicated by the initial disagreement of the two 
states over the terms of the Union. As neither side wanted to compromise on their 
stance, negotiations were repeatedly breaking off. The most commonplace storyline 
indicates the following contradiction: Lithuanians proposed a project of the Union of 
two equal states, whereas Polish delegates sought for the incorporation of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania into the Polish Kingdom. On the 1 of March, 1569, negotiations 
broke off – due to the incompatibility of the stances the Lithuanian delegation left 
Lublin. As an attempt to force Lithuanians to restore the negotiations, the Diet of 
Poland and Žygimantas Augustas (Sigismund II August), the King of Poland and the 
Grand Duke of Lithuania, decided to incorporate more than half of territories of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Volhynia, Bratslav and Kiev) into the Polish Kingdom. In 
one  of  the  history  textbooks  for  the  11th and 12th grades, the decision by Žygimantas 
Augustas is depicted as the result of ”Poles“, or the Polish parliament, putting pressure 
on the King with the aim to break down Lithuanian perseverance and weaken the Grand 
Duchy, by stripping off a large share of its territories and making it unable to defend 
itself against Moscow101. Likewise, another textbook of Lithuanian history also 
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emphasizes that due to the relentless position of the Lithuanian delegation during the 
negotiations, Polish parliament, “using coercion against Lithuanians, demanded 
Žygimantas Augustas” to annex a large share of the territories of the Grand Duchy to 
Poland102. 
 Despite the fact that textbooks usually mention that the Grand Duchy had its own 
interests in unionizing with Poland – namely, acquiring its help in the war with 
Moscow, it is implied that the Grand Duchy was largely forced into the union by both 
the external circumstances and Poland. This is, for instance, exemplified by highlighting 
that Poland, after several unsuccessful attempts to agree with Lithuanians on the terms 
of the union, began a military conscription in order to begin a war against the Grand 
Duchy, which, as a result, broke the stubbornness of the Lithuanian delegation and, 
thus, the union was created that same year103. 
In effect, textbooks recognize that the Lublin Union, a troublesome choice for the 
Grand Duchy, was, at the same time, necessary and inevitable. Nevertheless, there is an 
obvious tendency to emphasize that it was an inescapable tragedy of the Grand Duchy, 
forced on it by unfavorable geopolitical situation, to the advantage of the Poles who, by 
manipulating it, could impose their terms of the Union with Lithuania.  
If we turn to examine the representations of the Lublin Union in the Lithuanian 
historiography, the same “melancholic” evaluation of the event is reflected in the 
evaluations of many Lithuanian historians. For instance, Bumblauskas emphasizes that, 
in the end of negotiations, on 28 June, Jonas Jeronimaitis Chodkevi?ius, who led the 
Lithuanian delegation, in his speech in the Lublin parliament, addressed Žygimantas 
Augustas with these words: “The Brightest King! Your Majesty knows that the question 
of this Union has been thoroughly discussed by the senators and nobles of the Grand 
Duchy. They find themselves in such conditions where they are forced to do what 
deeply wounds their conscience. Ordered by Your Majesty, we had to surrender with 
great pain and grief. We cannot express in words how sorrowful it is for us. Because 
we, loyal sons of our fatherland, are committed to care for it as much as we are able to. 
If we cannot defend it now, it is because we are forced to surrender to the obstacles, 
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destiny and time”104. The latter excerpt reflects those sentiments of regret with which 
the Lublin Union is often viewed in Lithuanian historiography. 
Equally important in the evaluations of the Lublin Union in Lithuanian textbooks is 
that  they  offer  numerous  evidence  of  the  fact  that  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania  
retained its separate political identity and self-consciousness as well as separate 
institutions, despite the fact that the declaration of the Union stated that the two 
countries became a single indivisible political body – a Republic, which merged two 
states and nations into one state and society. Thus, textbooks highlight that after the 
establishment of the Commonwealth, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania retained its 
separate state title, territory, the executive branch of government, the treasury and the 
army105. At the same time, however, Lithuania acquired only 1/3 of seats in the common 
Polish-Lithuanian Diet and only 1/5 of seats in the Senate. In a similar vein, it is 
stressed that the newly elected King of Poland was declared to be the Grand Duke of 
Lithuania only after he had swore an oath to the Pacta conventa, or a document which 
listed the conditions raised by the Lithuanian nobility for the King to be accepted as the 
Grand Duke106. Yet another argument to prove the separateness of Poland and the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania after the Lublin Union lies on the fact that the two countries “could 
not merge into one political body because the Grand Duchy was guarded by the first, 
second and third Statutes of Lithuania, which secured a separate statehood of 
Lithuania”107. The Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, written in the 16th century, 
were codifications of the legislation, valid in the Polish-Lithuanian state, even if they 
included laws that were in conflict with the terms of the Union by emphasizing integrity 
and sovereign statehood of the Grand Duchy. Lastly, somewhat regrettably, Lithuanian 
history textbooks mention that the residence of the Grand Duke Žygimantas Augustas in 
the 16th century became the centre of Polonization of the Lithuanian elite, whereas 
Žygimantas Augustas was himself the first of the Lithuanian dynasty who did not speak 
Lithuanian anymore108.  
As  a  result,  the  ability  of  the  Lithuanian  state  not  to  be  absorbed  by  Poland  
politically has been often presented in Lithuanian historiography, though with some 
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exceptions, as the greatest achievement of the Grand Duchy throughout its union with 
Poland, despite the gradual and overwhelming cultural Polonization of its elite. Yet, 
even if the underlying theme in the depiction of the Lublin Union is that it did not 
terminate the statehood and separate identity of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the 
history textbook acknowledges that “a nation was understood in political, not ethnic 
terms. For instance, Lithuanian nation consisted of all nobility that resided in the 
territory of the Grand Duchy – of Lithuanian or Rus’ian origin, irrespective of religious 
or ethnic differences”.109 
Other examples of the efforts to stress that the Lublin Union did not actually merge 
the states and nations into one indivisible political body, or that the Lithuanian nobility 
retained multiple loyalties, are offered by contemporary Lithuanian historians 
Tereškinas, Gudavi?ius, Bumblauskas. Tereškinas places emphasis on the multicultural, 
multiethnic and multiconfessional character of the Commonwealth, which encouraged 
decentralization of the state as well as emergence of multiple solidarities, loyalties and 
identities within the same state110. Despite the collective sense of “brotherhood” and 
belonging to one political nation, nobility of the Polish-Lithuanian state faced many 
different  allegiances.  In  this  regard,  the  nobility  of  the  Grand  Duchy  might  have  
identified with the “noble nation” of the Commonwealth, but this did not weaken the 
self-conscious awareness of belonging to a distinct and separate community of the 
nobility of the Grand Duchy, as opposed to the nobility of the Kingdom of Poland. 
Tereškinas criticizes historians who attempt to explain conceptions of nationhood of the 
early modern period using the language-based categories of nation and ethnicity of the 
nineteenth century111. Thus, a nobleman could at the same time be a “Lithuanian”, that 
is  a member of the community of citizens of the Grand Duchy, and a “Pole”,  that  is  a 
member of the “noble nation” of the Commonwealth. Citizenship derived from 
territorial and political descent, land tenure and historical traditions112.  Ethnicity  or  
language did not play any decisive role in shaping self-perceptions of the nobility, in the 
way that they influenced the formation of national identities in the era of nationalism.  
Bumblauskas highlights that the Lithuanian nobility retained a sense of separate 
political identity, based on the traditions of the Grand Duchy, despite the gradual and 
                                                             
109 Kamuntavi?ius et al, 134. 
110 Tereškinas, Art?ras, Imperfect Comminities: Identity, Discourse and Nation int he Seventeenth-century 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Vilnius: Lietuvi? literat?ros ir tautosakos institutas, 2005, 45. 
111 Ibid, 47-48. 
112 Ibid, 49. 
44 
 
overwhelming cultural Polonization. This is, for instance, exemplified by the statement 
of Mutual Pledge of the Two Nations, which, in 1791, accompanied the Constitution of 
the 3rd of May and which, more than 200 years after the Lublin Union, still stressed the 
dualistic character of the Commonwealth113. 
Gudavi?ius advances a similar argument which, nevertheless, acknowledges the 
positive outcomes of the unionization with Poland in the form of  intensification of 
Lithuania‘s Europeanization. Gudavi?ius introduced a pioneering approach by offering 
to consider the gradual cultural Polonization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania after its 
unification with Poland as the consequence of Lithuania‘s Europeanization process and, 
thus, as a positive and inevitable development which brought Lithuania closer to the 
Western civilizational field. Gudavi?ius claims that Poland in the fourtheenth century 
was to Lithuania what Germany was to Poland in the tenth century – the source of the 
Western civilization114. Rather than seeing the influence of Polish culture and language 
as a regrettable process of cultural colonization causing the loss of Lithuanian 
sovereignty and identity, he highlights the role of the Polish language as a medium 
through which the advancement of Western culture reached Lithuania, located far from 
the centres of Western culture. At the same time, as the Polish language became the 
medium of communication in the Commonwealth, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its 
society retained a sense of separate identity, distinct interests and traditions. In other 
words, the spread of the Polish language and culture did not erase the separate self-
consciousness. 
The latter ideas mark an important development in Lithuanian historiography in the 
1990s – the turn from the ethnocentric and nationalist to more civic accounts of the 
Lithuanian history. The accounts of Lithuanian history written after 1990 are somewhat 
in opposition to the earlier historiographical tradition, exemplified in the works of 
Šapoka, Daukantas, Narbutas, written in the second half of the 19th – first half of the 
20th century, where exceptionally negative attitude towards the Lublin Union and the 
creation of the Commonwealth are maintained, seen as the loss of independence of the 
Grand Duchy, forced on Lithuania by the Polish nobility. In these accounts, Lublin 
Union denotes the end of the grandeur and traditions of the Grand Duchy, which were 
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revived again only in the 19th century in the form of Lithuanian ethnic national revival. 
In effect, these historiographical accounts tended to diminish the significance of the 
whole historical period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – from the Lublin 
Union until the national revival in the second half of the 19th century – perceived as 
irrelevant in the construction and sustenance of national identity. 
This raises a question whether these new critical civic accounts of historical past, 
offered by a new generation of historians, entered the school history curriculum and 
textbooks. As we have seen, textbooks still convey a rather dim picture of unionization 
with Poland. In 2005-2006, a survey on forms of expression of the Lithuanian identity 
through social memory showed that, for Lithuanians, the least important historical 
period to their national identity is the history of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth115. Only 4% of the respondents considered the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth meaningful to their national identity. Meanwhile, the history of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania before unionization with Poland was a much stronger and 
relevant element of national identity. 25,6% of respondents considered the history of the 
Grand Duchy before the rule of the Grand Duke Vytautas (period until 1392) to be 
important to their national identity and 14% identified the rule of the Grand Duke 
Vytautas and the subsequent period until the Lublin Union (1392-1569) to be the most 
important.116 This proves that Lublin Union and the ensuing history of shared Polish-
Lithuanian state is still regarded by many Lithuanians as “not theirs”, as not ethnically 
and authentically “Lithuanian” history which Lithuanians would be proud of, but rather 
as a regrettable “dark age” of Lithuanian history, overshadowed by Polish cultural 
domination. Thus, despite the fact that nationalist historiographical tradition nowadays 
receives strong competition from more civic accounts of Lithuanian history, collective 
national memory is still largely shaped by the long-established grand national historical 
narrative.  One should also take into account that for fifty years of Soviet occupation 
there had not been any serious discussions and reconsiderations of shared Polish-
Lithuanian history, which at least partly explains why such nationalist interpretations of 
the past, from the era of Lithuanian national revival (late 19th century) and the first 
interwar republic of Lithuania (1918-1940), may still have strong impact on people’s 
views.  
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In this regard, Bumblauskas explains such generally negative Lithuanian 
interpretation of the establishment of the Commonwealth by noting two key factors: 
first, the common Polish-Lithuanian history is traditionally judged through the prism of 
the Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict; second, unification with Poland is seen to be the 
reason of Polonization of Lithuanian culture. The latter view evolved in the late 19th-
early 20th century within the rising Lithuanian nationalist movement and is supposed to 
be  exemplified  by  the  case  of  Adam  Mickiewicz117, a Polish-Lithuanian patriot, who 
wrote in Polish and, thus, for Lithuanian national activists was a symbol of Poland's 
cultural imperialism and the loss of the old Lithuanian traditions upheld before the 
union with Poland118. However, Bumblauskas also emphasizes that such pessimistic 
Lithuanian renderings of the past partly stem from the fact that Polish historical 
tradition still tends to portray Lithuania prior to the Lublin Union as only “Jogaila's 
Poland”119, or that the Commonwealth of the Polish Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania is often named as “the Polish Commonwealth”, ignoring the equal status of 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Commonwealth and denoting the Union in terms 
of incorporation of Lithuania into the Polish Kingdom120.  
Thus, in popular Lithuanian historical consciousness, the process of rapprochement 
between Poland and Lithuania is, first and foremost, associated with Poland’s territorial 
interests rather than its civilizational mission in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The 
expansion of cultural Polonization is regretted. However, increasingly, other dimensions 
and wider consequences of Polonization are recognized and reflected on. As a result, 
some historians suggest that the process of Polonization of Lithuanian nobility could be 
seen as Lithuania’s integration into the Western civilizational field. This is also 
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somewhat reflected in the more recently published history textbook where the 
evaluation  of  the  cultural  Polonization  of  the  Grand  Duchy  is  not  so  categorically  
negative and is rather left to wider discussions, even if with a slight implication of 
regret about the loss of the Lithuanian language: “it’s a separate question, how to 
evaluate the expansion of the Polish culture and language in the centre of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania. Was the expulsion of the Lithuanian language (exclusion, more 
precisely) from the public life of the state a historical necessity, a bliss or a curse? Let’s 
leave these unanswered questions to discuss for present and future generations, which 
speak and feel in Lithuanian. This question is a real lesson of history”121. Lastly, a 
persistently highlighted element in portraying the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is 
the state dualism, the separateness and sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 
the union with Poland. History textbooks and works of Lithuanian historians 
consistently emphasize the duality of the state and offer lots of evidence that the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania did not merge with Poland and retained its separate national 
identity, despite the overwhelming Polish cultural domination. 
 
4.2 Polish historical rendering of the Lublin Union 
 
The rapprochement of the Polish Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 
which started already in the 14th century, receives as much attention in the Polish history 
textbooks as in Lithuanian ones. However, the very first important difference is that 
Polish history textbooks give much more importance to the discussion of the 1385 
Krewo Union and its meaning in the development of Polish-Lithuanian relations, which 
preceded the establishment of closer bilateral relations after the 1569 Lublin Union. The 
emphasis is placed on the fact that the Krewo Union marks the establishment of the 
Jagiellonian dynasty, as the Grand Duke of Lithuania Jogaila (Jagie??o) also became the 
King  of  Poland.  Polish  textbooks  generally  agree  that  the  Krewo Union  did  not  entail  
the incorporation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into Poland, that it was only a 
personal union, embodied solely by the common king and grand duke. Nevertheless, it 
is  stressed  that  the  original  intention  behind  the  initiation  of  the  Krewo  Union  was  
Lithuania’s incorporation to Poland. The latter can be exemplified by the following 
sentence from a Polish history textbook: “Jagie??o, in exchange for marrying Jadwiga 
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and the nomination of the King of Poland promised to baptize himself and all his 
people, incorporate Lithuania to the Crown and retake all the lost Polish territories”122. 
The words “baptize” and “incorporate” are bolded in the textbook, while later, as an 
exercise, students are asked to study a text, written by a Polish historian, and identify 
the fragments which prove that originally, by Krewo Union, it was intended to annex 
Lithuania to Poland. The text in question, written by a Polish historian Ochma?ski, 
however, states that the Latin word “applicare”, used in the Union text to denote the 
incorporation, remained just a “dead sign on the paper”, whereas in reality the Grand 
Duchy was a sovereign and separate state, governed by Lithuanians, who regarded Poles 
as  foreigners,  belonging  to  a  different  nation123. Thus, Polish textbooks, on the one 
hand, confirm and are in agreement with Lithuanian ones that the Krewo Union did not 
signify the incorporation of Lithuania into Poland in reality; on the other hand, they give 
a lot of stress on the fact that the actual text of the union implied the incorporation.  
Further, even if both Lithuanian and Polish textbooks seem to agree that after the 
Krewo Union the Grand Duchy of Lithuania maintained its sovereignty, Polish 
textbooks,  nevertheless,  typically  identify  post-Krewo  Lithuania  as  one  of  the  
“Jagiellonian states”, meaning that it was ruled by a member of the Jagiellonian 
dynasty124. In other words, the fact of Lithuania’s sovereignty is somewhat 
overshadowed by highlighting that the Polish Jagiellonian dynasty’s rule spanned over 
it, even if, paradoxically, the Polish dynasty was actually stemming from the Gediminid 
dynasty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 
If post-Krewo Lithuania is considered as a Jagiellonian state, tied to Poland only by 
the personal union, the Lublin union is distinguished as a “real union”, ascribing to it an 
entirely different level of the Polish-Lithuanian unionization125.  The  “real  union”  was  
embodied in the establishment of a common parliament, senate, sovereign, foreign 
policy and currency. Textbooks usually include a short excerpt from the original text of 
the Lublin Union. One should take note of the fact that the textbooks which were in use 
for the past 8-10 years generally present also those paragraphs of the union text, which 
determine the maintenance of separate institutions and political identity of the Grand 
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Duchy of Lithuania, whereas the newly published ones focus solely on those paragraphs 
that state the indivisibility and homogeneity of the newly established Rzeczpospolita 
Obojga Narodów,  or  “Republic  of  Both  Nations”.  An  example  comes  from  the  new  
series of textbooks “?ladami przesz???ci”, which will replace the older textbooks in a 
few coming years due to an undergoing reform of history teaching in Polish high 
schools. 
The  comparison  of  older  and  more  recent  history  textbooks  also  reveals  that  the  
latter clearly portray the Lublin Union as the end of the independence and separate 
statehood of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, whereas the older textbooks take note of the 
separate political identity of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the dualism of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which persisted even after the Lublin Union. For 
instance, in the new textbook “?ladami przesz???ci”, the maps of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth highlight only the common outer border of the Republic, without 
showing the remaining inner border between the “two nations”126. Moreover, past the 
chapter on the Lublin Union, the textbook refers to the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth not only as “Republic”, but increasingly as “Polish state”, “Polish 
lands” or even “Poland”127. In addition, Vilnius is only mentioned as one of the many 
centers of the Republic and not once it is referred to as the capital of the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania128. The latter fact is crucial in terms of how the identity and national 
belonging of Vilnius is constructed – if Lithuanian textbooks unanimously stress that 
Vilnius was a capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and a heart of Lithuanian lands, 
founded by the Grand Duke Gediminas (father of King and Grand Duke Jagie??o), 
Polish textbooks regard Vilnius (Wilno) as just one of the bigger cities in the “Polish 
state”. Another crucial remark concerns the meaning of “Polishness” and the national 
identity constellations of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which are not in any 
way commented on in Polish textbooks, whereas in Lithuanian textbooks, as we could 
see, it was stressed that the understanding of one’s national identity in the Polish-
Lithuanian state and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was based on political, rather than 
ethnic or linguistic criteria. 
The negotiation process between the Polish and Lithuanian delegations before the 
signature of the union receives very little attention in Polish textbooks. It is typically 
                                                             
126 Roszak, Stanis?aw,??ladami przesz???ci 2. Warszawa: Nowa Era, 2010, 203, 211, 233. 
127 Ibid, 203, 205. 
128 Ibid, 205. 
50 
 
only very briefly mentioned that the Lithuanian delegation, consisting of the powerful 
lords, was against the unionization with Poland. This stands in stark contrast to the 
Lithuanian textbooks which cover extensively and with a lot of precision the negotiation 
process, the positions of both sides and reluctance of the Lithuanian delegation to agree 
with the terms of the union set by Poland. Such attitudes of the influential Lithuanian 
lords are explained by the Polish textbooks as motivated by fear of losing their 
privileged position in the state. This reasoning again stands in opposition to the 
Lithuanian version of explanation, which stresses the efforts of Lithuanian lords to 
protect the sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its independence from 
Poland, rather than their personal interests of power. Interestingly, Polish textbooks 
admit that the Polish parliament, during the negotiations, demanded annexation of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania into Poland which they understood as the full and final 
implementation  of  the  Krewo  Union129.  Furthermore,  the  decision  of  Sigismund  II  
August to annex a large share of the Lithuanian territories to Poland, as a means for 
pressuring the Lithuanian delegation to accept the union, is portrayed as a legally valid 
move by the sovereign and “legal inheritor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania”130, which 
again contradicts the Lithuanian point of view – namely, the strongly highlighted fact 
that the decision broke the legal statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and was 
legally invalid131.  
Lastly, the evaluation of the consequences of the union differs in the older and 
more recent series of textbooks. The newly published “?ladami przesz???ci” proudly 
states that the Lublin Union created one of the largest states in Central and Eastern 
Europe and that because of the union the territory of the Polish Kingdom significantly 
expanded (after the annexation of the Lithuanian lands by Sigismund II August); that 
the Polish language and customs grew in importance in Lithuania and Ukraine and the 
positions of the Polish lords significantly strengthened due to the newly acquired lands 
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in the territories of the Grand Duchy132. Meanwhile the older version of textbooks 
combines a more general list of consequences with an evaluation of the union offered by 
a keynote Polish historian Juliusz Bardach, who, not only stresses that the annexation of 
a part of Lithuanian territories to Poland was regarded by Lithuanians as unfair, but, 
crucially, claims that “linguistic and cultural Polonization did not lead to the loss of 
political self-consciousness. Lithuanians – which then were understood as all the 
inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, irrespective of ethnic and religious 
differences – maintained, from the Lublin Union until the end of the Republic’s 
existence, the law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, its political and legal 
subjectivity”133. Thus, the older textbooks, by highlighting that the Grand Duchy 
retained its political self-consciousness and separate political identity are in agreement 
with the dominant perspective in the Lithuanian history textbooks and historiography. 
In the new series of textbooks, however, the duality of the Commonwealth as well as 
the political subjectivity of Lithuania do not receive any attention. 
Perspectives on the Lublin Union and the characteristics of the state that it created 
in Polish historiography are manifold. Unsurprisingly, there is a stark divergence 
between the popular historical viewpoints in the Polish historiography of the 19th 
century and those of the 20th century. As a representative example of the former could 
be Józef Jaroszewicz and Józef Szujski134. They tended to overlook the articles of the 
Union which implied that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania continued to exist as a separate 
political  entity.  As  a  result,  the  equal  standing  of  Lithuania  in  the  common  state  was  
largely ignored. Analogous historical narrative was maintained by Oswald Balzer in the 
beginning of the twentieth century who argued that after the Lublin Union the Polish-
Lithuanian state had become one legally undifferentiated entity135. 
A new perspective on the political nature of the Polish-Lithuanian state has been 
presented by the post-war generation of Polish historians. Henryk Wisner is one of the 
Polish historians who are in agreement with the Lithuanian historians on the issue of the 
separateness and sovereignty of the two states after the establishment of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569. He acknowledges that the Lublin Union did not 
mean  the  end  of  the  Lithuanian  sovereignty  and  that  the  newly  formed  Republic  was  
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comprised of a single nation of the lower gentry, but of two separate states, distrustful 
of each other136. This distrust was maintained first and foremost by the Lithuanian 
magnate families who were against the union with Poland, seeing it as a danger to the 
sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Wisner quotes Kristupas Radvila 
Perk?nas, a prominent Lithuanian nobleman (Krzysztof Radziwi?? “the Thunderbolt”), 
who commented on the Lublin Union after twenty years had passed since the 
establishment of the Commonwealth: “What else could we do? Being threatened by the 
enemies and having lost our lands here, the only remedy to our pains is that we see the 
king who comes from our bloodline”137. What Kristupas Radvila Perk?nas implied here 
was that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was increasingly facing the threat of Moscow 
and at the same time it lost a large part of its territory to the Kingdom of Poland when 
the King and the Grand Duke Žygimantas Augustas annexed it to the Kingdom of 
Poland, trying to force the Lithuanian noblemen to accept the Union with Poland. 
Wisner stresses that the establishment of the Commonwealth was based on constraining 
the alternative options of the Lithuanian gentry rather than on the mutual voluntary 
acceptance of the negotiated terms. Furthermore, he highlights the fact that the gradual 
cultural polonization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania did not entail the takeover of the 
Polish identity, the loss of the self-conscious understanding of being a separate state and 
society and the obliteration of Lithuania‘s history prior to the union with Poland138. 
Despite the fact that Polish became the official state language and the language of 
communication and literature in the Republic, there remained two distinct states – the 
Polish Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania –  each of them possesing their own 
political identity and “native” citizenry, as opposed to the “foreigners” of the other 
confederate state. 
Samsonowicz is yet another Polish historian who attempts to show the duality of 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the equal standing of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania in its union with Poland. He argues that despite the gradual Polonization of 
the Lithuanian gentry and its acceptance of Polish customs and offices after 1569, it still 
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retained continuing consciousness of a separate identity139. Moreover, he rejects the idea 
that the 1385 Krewo union marks the incorporation of Lithuania into the Kingdom of 
Poland and maintains that the latter was completely unrealistic due to the fact that 
Lithuania was several times the size of Poland, retained its political vigour and 
awareness of its sovereignty140. Furthermore, Samsonowicz highlights the differences of 
culture and language as well as a long-standing tradition of mutual hostility – all 
hampering the realization of the Polish-Lithuanian union141. 
Similarly, Ryszard Szczygie? argues that despite the fact that the documents of the 
union began by stating the homogeneity and indivisibility of the newly created state and 
the merger of two nations into one nation and society, in reality the two states kept their 
separate territory, institutions, law, treasury and army142. Szczygie? equally stresses the 
efforts of the Lithuanian delegation during the negotiation period to preserve statehood 
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its equality in the union with Poland and even 
describes the decision of Žygimantas Augustas to annex a share of Lithuanian territory 
to Poland as an act of coercion and ”revolt against law and government”, for the legal 
system of the Grand Duchy forbid the monarch to arbitrarily impose changes on the 
territory of the state143. 
Another crucial element in the post-war Polish historiography regarding the 
considerations  of  the  Lublin  Union  relates  to  the  question  whether  the  Union  was  the  
result of a mutual voluntarily accepted compromise or, either, an act of violence against 
the Grand Duchy which was forced by Poland to accept the terms of the Union set by 
Poland. There seems to be an agreement among the majority of Polish historians that the 
closer union with Poland was firstly demanded and initiated by the Lithuanian gentry 
who sought to acquire more liberties and rights and were opposed to powerful anti-
unionist magnates of the Grand Duchy, who until then held the control of  the political 
power in the state. For instance, Oskar Halecki stresses that Lithuanian gentry were 
increasingly opposing the oligarchic magnates and began to demand closer 
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collaboration with the “Polish brothers”144. Pajewski argues that “apart from the limited 
group of magnates, all Lithuania desired union with Poland. Moreover, if at Lublin 
violence had really been committed with respect to Lithuania, […] the years following 
1569 would have witnessed a powerful separatist movement in Lithuania. On the 
contrary,  we  see  exactly  the  opposite  process  –  that  of  ever-closer  fusion  of  the  two  
States”145. Likewise, Szczygie? complies with his counterparts by highlighting that the 
terms of union were achieved not by imposing demands or threatening, but was a result 
of long-term debates and negotiations, mutually and voluntarily accepted146. Moreover, 
Zamoyski portrays the anti-unionist standpoint of the Lithuanian magnates as motivated 
by personal interest of power rather by the efforts to maintain Grand Duchy’s statehood, 
as exemplified by Mykolas Radvila Juodasis, who, belonging to the most powerful 
magnate family at the time, contemplated plans of acquiring the grand-ducal throne and 
turning the Grand Duchy into his own fief147. The latter point of view, as we could see, 
is included in the Polish history curriculum. Thus, overall, Polish historiography tends 
to stress that the Polish-Lithuanian union was mutually accepted voluntary compromise 
rather than an act of coercion or violence on the part of Poland. 
To summarize the main points of the Polish historical narrative on the 
rapprochement with Lithuania, Krewo Union emerges as an equally important event to 
the Lublin Union, as it marks the beginning of the Jagiellonian dynasty, considered as 
Polish, and the expansion of its rule in Central and Eastern Europe. The Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania,  in  this  context,  becomes  regarded  as  simply  one  of  the  Jagiellonian  states,  
tied by the personal union to Poland. Some divergence is visible between the dominant 
narrative in the textbooks and in the historiography with regard to how much emphasis 
is placed on the duality of the Commonwealth and the separateness and political self-
consciousness of the Grand Duchy in the union with Poland. Especially, if we look to 
the more recently published history textbooks, there is very little attention paid to the 
duality  of  the  Commonwealth.  More  than  that,  the  Republic  of  Both  Nations  is  often  
simply identified as the Polish Republic, consisting of Polish lands, where Wilno 
(Vilnius) is just one of the many bigger centers of the Polish Republic.  
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The older textbooks, on the other hand, offer a more careful presentation of the 
characteristics of the Polish-Lithuanian state and society. The issue of Lithuania’s 
“incorporation” to Poland is described by showing the divergences between the 
statements in the union text and in the actual life of the Commonwealth, by pointing to 
the fact that the Grand Duchy not only retained separate offices and institutions, army 
and treasury, but likewise maintained a separate political self-consciousness and a sense 
of statehood, even in the face of the overwhelming cultural and linguistic Polonization. 
In that sense, Polish and Lithuanian historical narratives, presented in the textbooks, do 
not stand in a stark incongruence. However, Lithuanian textbooks tend to consistently 
place much stronger emphasis on the duality of the Commonwealth, separateness and 
sovereignty of the Grand Duchy, its political identity as well as its distinctive national 
identity constellations. Bearing in mind the “young” nature of the Lithuanian 
nationalism, such emphasis in Lithuanian textbooks just reflects how history serves the 
nationalist aspirations, which in turn affect the interpretation of national history. 
Lastly, Polish historiography draws attention to the opposition to the union from 
the Lithuanian magnates, but this merely denotes the political power struggles between 
the different strata of the nobility rather than some sort of conscious efforts to preserve 
Grand Duchy’s independence. The Lublin Union is considered to be the result of mutual 
agreement, negotiation and increasing demands of the lower Lithuanian gentry rather 
than of coercive measures undertaken by Poland. 
 
4.3 Lithuanian rendering of the Polish-Lithuanian uprisings and 
Lithuanian national revival in the 19th century 
 
At  the  end  of  the  18th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was 
partitioned by Russia, Prussia and Austria. Most of the territory of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania fell under the domination of tsarist Russia, with only one region – Užnemun? 
(The Other Side of Nemunas) – being annexed to Prussia. The territories belonging to 
the Kingdom of Poland were divided between Prussia and Austria and later transformed 
into the Duchy of Warsaw by Napoleon I in 1807. The Duchy of Warsaw was taken by 
Russian troops in 1813 and, after the defeat of Napoleon I by the Russian Empire, re-
established as the Congress Kingdom of Poland. The new Congress Poland was de facto 
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controlled by Russia until 1831, when following the Polish-Lithuanian uprising of 
1830-1831, it was annexed to the Russian Empire.  
In Lithuanian history textbooks, the two main highlights in the description of the 
19th century are the two Polish-Lithuanian uprisings againt tsarist Russia and the 
emerging movement of Lithuanian national revival. Both themes serve the purpose of 
showing that, despite the tight control of Russia, the old identities and loyalties to the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were still strongly present and, at the same time, new 
ethnicity-based national identities were gradually emerging.  
Lithuanian history textbooks, unsurprisingly, place the importance of the 19th 
century on the fact that a modern Lithuanian nation was born, as a result of identity 
transformation process, influenced by the uprisings, abolition of serfdom in 1861 and 
Russification as well as de-Polonization programs undertaken in Lithuania by tsarist 
Russia. It is crucial to note that even if Lithuanian textbooks emphasize that the goal of 
tsarist Russia was to de-Polonize, to Rusify and to create a new peasant strata, loyal to 
the tsarist rule and of a Russian identity, it is not examined too extensively why actually 
tsarist Russia fought the Polish influences so fiercely in Lithuania. When trying to 
create a coherent history of the Lithuanian nation, the authors of the history textbooks 
have avoided identifying a strong presence of Polish culture and language among 
Lithuanian patriots and intelligentsia. It is generally briefly mentioned that the 
Lithuanian gentry did not speak Lithuanian, but the latter fact is then counterbalanced 
by showing evidence of a strong, separate from Polish, political identity of Lithuanian 
gentry, based on the traditions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Meanwhile, every 
instance of an attempt to maintain and strengthen Lithuania’s independence from the 
Polish  (and  Russian)  influences  is  emphasized.  Thus,  for  instance,  a  project  of  the  
Grand Duchy’s restoration (under the Russian control), prepared and addressed to the 
tsar Alexander I by Lithuanian nobility in 1811, is mentioned several times and an 
excerpt from the original document is included, as a proof that already in the beginning 
of the 19th century a separate Lithuanian identity was evolving and served as a basis for 
demands of autonomy from tsarist Russia148. 
Moreover, the description of the Polish-Lithuanian uprisings against tsarist Russia 
acknowledges that Lithuanian uprisings were closely coordinated or managed by 
uprising leaders in Poland. The main goal of both the uprising of 1830-1831 and that of 
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1863-1864 was to regain independence from the Russian Empire. It is noted that rebels 
did not have a clear idea of the state model they wanted to recreate or that there was 
lack of agreement between different factions of rebels as to what kind of state they 
sought to establish after having emancipated the Polish-Lithuanian territories from 
tsarist rule. Lithuanian textbooks, however, state that Polish generals of the uprising 
tried to take control of the uprisings in Lithuania, to make Lithuanian leaders of the 
uprisings obey them and envisioned Lithuania being incorporated into Poland in case 
the uprisings would have been successful149. The latter point if further emphasized by 
mentioning twice a quote of a prominent leader of the Lithuanian rebels in 1863-1864, 
Konstantinas Kalinauskas, who claimed that “we cannot leave the destiny of Lithuania 
to the stupid Polish heads”, this way protesting the decision to make the Lithuanian 
uprising committee subordinate to Polish leadership150. Thus, a generally positive image 
of common Polish-Lithuanian efforts to fight back Russia is made gloomier by pointing 
at supposedly overbearing Polish interference in Lithuanian affairs, which further 
contributes to an overall image of Poland as seeking to culturally and politically 
dominate, or treating Lithuania as a “younger brother”. 
In the uprising of 1830-1831, the main state model envisaged among the 
Lithuanian rebels for liberated Lithuania, according to Lithuanian history textbooks, 
was  a  state,  restored  with  the  borders  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  1772,  which  would  
subsequently seek a union with Poland. In the uprising of 1863-1864, there were several 
conflicting state models promoted by different factions of rebels. Aristocracy and upper 
nobility were advancing an idea of Lithuania as a province of Poland. However, the 
group, which was in charge of organizing the Lithuanian uprising of 1863-1864, 
consisted of lower gentry and was either in favor of an independent Lithuanian state or a 
federation with Poland, in which Lithuania would be an equal partner. Key features of 
its program were abolition of serfdom and granting citizenship rights to the peasantry. 
In this regard, the Lithuanian leaders of the uprising advanced more radical claims than 
their Polish counterparts. However, ensuring equal rights to the peasantry was seen by 
the Lithuanian leaders as the only way to draw peasantry to actively engage in the 
uprising and crucial for the outcomes of the uprising. 
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The distinction between the nobility/gentry and the peasantry in the 19th century in 
terms of their identity receives considerable attention in Lithuanian history textbooks. It 
is noted that the idea of Lithuanian identity and state for the majority of the nobility and 
some  of  the  gentry  was  based  on  the  traditions  and  laws  of  the  Grand  Duchy,  close  
affiliation with Poland and the Polish language as a mother-tongue. In the first half of 
the 19th century, gentry and nobility had a strong national identity linked to the tradition 
of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but it did not in any way entail Lithuanian 
language as a significant element of identity. Meanwhile, in the first half of the 19th 
century, Lithuanian-speaking peasants had not yet acquired any considerable level of 
political self-consciousness.  
In  the  second  half  of  the  19th century,  however,  the  old  understanding  of  
nationhood, as belonging to the nation of the Grand Duchy and the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, was accompanied by a new, ethnic, understanding of a nation – as a 
sum of vernacular tongue speakers – which emerged from the Lithuanian national 
revival movement. Gaidis notes that, at the dawn of the modern Lithuanian nation, 
gentry and nobility faced a complicated decision – to hold onto the old traditions of the 
Grand Duchy and pay the price of exclusion or to engage with the ideas of modern 
nationalism and lose a significant share of one’s identity and individuality151. Over the 
10 past years, a new generation of Lithuanian historians began to raise and discuss the 
distinction between two Lithuanian identities or two separate understandings of 
Lithuanian nationhood, which emerged in the second half of the 19th century and existed 
until  the  early  years  of  the  20th century. The distinction is usually described as that 
between “Old Lithuanians” (senalietuviai) and “Young Lithuanians” (jaunalietuviai). 
However, in a history textbook for the 12th grade students, the “Old Lithuanians” and 
their political aims to re-establish the union with Poland are considered as yet another 
obstacle, next to the “Russian chauvinism”, to the emergence of the Lithuanian national 
movement152. It is broadly acknowledged that the aims and actions of the gentry nation, 
to which “Old Lithuanians” belonged, were part of a complicated process of formation 
of Lithuanian nationhood. Nevertheless, the evaluation of their political programs is 
rather negative, for even if the Lithuanian gentry thought of themselves as having 
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Lithuanian origin (gente lituanus), their political aims represented Polish national 
interests (natione Polonus)153. Using this line of argumentation in the textbook, the 
ambiguous identity of the “Old Lithuanians” is denied the membership to the 
Lithuanian nation. 
“Old Lithuanians” denote the Polish-speaking gentry, loyal to the tradition of a 
Polish-Lithuanian state, either in a form of federation or unitary state, nevertheless, 
considering themselves to be Lithuanian. Within the group of the “Old Lithuanians” 
there were various attitudes to the Lithuanian national movement as well as different 
understandings of what a future Lithuanian state should be. Some pictured it to be a 
province of Poland and were quite disapproving of the modern Lithuanian nationalism, 
as, likewise, of the modern Polish nationalism, for they saw such developments of 
nationhood to be alien and misfitting the local realities and traditions of statehood. 
Some were not opposed to the newly emerging Lithuanian national revival, but were not 
involved or contributing to it either, and were in favor of a federation. Lastly, there were 
those who actively supported the Lithuanian national movement, both financially and 
by spreading their ideas through local newspapers. For instance, Konstancija Skirmunt, 
a prominent publicist of the pro-Lithuanian gentry, argued that “we are not strangers 
here, we are locals, differences between us and peasants are not national, but linguistic 
[…]. Both sides have to seek for a compromise. Therefore, bilingualism should be seen 
as a foundation for domestic relations in our state”154. However, the numbers of the 
gentry who supported the Lithuanian national movement were low and further 
decreasing, as many realized they would lose their superior social status in a modern 
Lithuanian  state.  Moreover,  many already  felt  to  be  a  part  of  a  modern  Polish  nation,  
despite the fact that they often relied extensively on the glorious past of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania to further their argument in debates on the future state model of 
Lithuania155.  In  other  words,  the  imagery  of  the  Grand Duchy of  Lithuania  was  often  
used as a powerful resource of proving the superiority of tradition that was behind the 
claims of the gentry. However, in many cases, its main interest was maintaining one’s 
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social standing in society and drifting towards closer affiliation with the Polish nation, 
which was further reinforced by the often strong anti-Polish sentiments of the “Young 
Lithuanians”. 
Crucial transformations took place in the second half of the 19th century. A modern 
Lithuanian national movement emerged along the development of the peasant 
intelligentsia, oriented in its political aims to the territory of the ethnographic Lithuania. 
The “Young Lithuanians” and their national movement, more generally, have received a 
lot of attention in Lithuanian historiography. In history textbooks of Lithuanian history, 
as well, around 50 pages are usually devoted to different aspects of development of 
modern Lithuanian nation and state from 1863 to 1918, when the first Republic of 
Lithuania was established. The creation and programs of the first Lithuanian political 
parties at the turn of the century are discussed quite extensively, which despite different 
ideologies all shared the same two goals – to restore Lithuanian independence or at least 
autonomy and to promote “Lithuanity” and the Lithuanian language.  
Interestingly, the textbook also mentions, for instance, that Christian Democrats 
were fighting against Polonization, sought to strengthen and consolidate “Lithuanity”, 
often cooperated with and were supported by the government156. However, the notion of 
“government” and the possible motives of the government’s support of Christian 
Democrats’ engagement in the fight against Polonization are not further discussed. Only 
in  another  section  of  the  chapter  we  can  find  two  sentences  noting  that  tsarist  Russia  
sought to provoke conflict and stir negative sentiments of young, less developed nations 
against stronger ones, because the latter were seen as “dangerous”, and that this Russian 
policy was applied to the case of Polish and Lithuanian nationalisms157. Once again, 
there is no further explanation why Polish nationalism was taken to be dangerous by the 
tsarist government and why it sought to provoke conflict between the Polish and 
Lithuanian nationalisms. Therefore, students are not encouraged to critically think about 
the reasons and consequences of such programs of de-Polonization by the Christian 
Democrats  or  the  Nationalist  party,  or  why  Christian  Democrats  were  so  eager  to  
cooperate with the tsarist government. Rather, the latter parties are portrayed as fierce 
and brave forces promoting the Lithuanian culture and language, without making any 
direct links to the fact that de-Polonization programs were actually actively promoted 
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and even  possibly  rewarded  by  the  tsarist  Russian  rule,  or  that  the  main  goal  of  such  
policies was to weaken Lithuanian nationalism by isolating it from the Polish-speaking 
gentry and, in this way, depriving it from the rich cultural and political traditions which 
the gentry could offer. 
According to Bumblauskas, the “Old Lithuanians” were not willing to understand 
and support the wishes of the “Young Lithuanians” to strengthen the positions of 
Lithuanian language and culture and to solve the social problems of an emerging 
modern society, thus, rejecting the idea of a sovereign Lithuania and rather supporting 
Polish nationalism158. Meanwhile, “Young Lithuanians”, by holding on to strict anti-
Polish views, pushed the “Old Lithuanians” into the arms of Polish nationalists and 
deprived them of their autochthonous status in Lithuania159. 
Another crucial aspect of how the clash of Lithuanian and Polish nationalisms is 
depicted in Lithuanian history textbooks is evident in the fact that the faction of “Old 
Lithuanians”, who supported Lithuanian national revival and who established a political 
party in 1905, are identified as Polish160. It is also mentioned that the idea of national 
cooperation between Lithuanians, Poles and Belarusians in the form of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania, which was promoted by this party, was not supported neither by 
Polish, nor Lithuanian nationalists. In the era of modern nationalism, such ideas 
advanced by the intelligentsia of the “Old Lithuanians” were bound to fail. Lastly, the 
conflict between the two nationalisms is described as rather mellow and non-aggressive 
without making any distinctions between Poles in Poland and the “local” Poles in 
Lithuania161. It is consistently emphasized, however, that, in the beginning of the 20 th 
century, the Lithuanian national movement aimed not only to liberate modern 
Lithuanian nation from the Russian rule, but also to clearly dissociate itself from the 
Polish nationalism and the idea of unionization with Poland162. 
Moreover, a few key remarks on how the relations between Poles and the newly 
revived Lithuanian nation are depicted in the Lithuanian history textbooks come from a 
more recently published textbook of Lithuanian history for the 11th and  12th grades. 
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Here,  under  the  title  “The  emergence  of  a  Polish-Lithuanian  conflict”,  we  find  the  
description of the Polish reaction to the intensifying Lithuanian national movement in 
the second half  of the 19th century: “the imperative of national and linguistic equality, 
raised by illegal Lithuanian newspapers, as well as their negative views on the 
denationalizing measures taken by the Polish clergy received a public reaction from 
Poles. In 1884, “Dziennik Pozna?ski”, in the polemics with ”Aušra”, expressed the 
traditional Polish point of view: Lithuanians are only non-Polish speaking Poles”163. 
Moreover, the textbook presents quite a detailed view of how the Poles and the 
Polonized gentry considered the Lithuanian national movement to be something 
abnormal, inconceivable and undesirable and called it a “separatism” or, more 
commonly, a “litvomania”, associating it with a disease or a disorder, whereas 
Lithuanian language was regarded as yet not enough “cultured” language, not a 
language of civilization and culture, which the Polish language was already164. 
Emphasis is uniformly placed on the negative Polish reactions to the emerging 
Lithuanian national revival without any acknowledgement of the existing diversity of 
views toward Lithuanian nationalism among the Polish-speaking population, which is 
indicated by academic research. 
”Aušra” (“Dawn”), the first Lithuanian newspaper, began to be published in 1883 
by Jonas Basanavi?ius and had an immense effect on stregthening Lithuanian identity, 
national pride, encouraging debates on the future of the Lithuanian nation and politics. 
”Aušra” and many other similar Lithuanian newspapers, published illegally under the 
tsarist  rule,  were typically critical  of the Polonized Lithuanian gentry and clergy, who 
were blamed for Polonizing Lithuanians, forgetting and demeaning Lithuanian 
language. The Lublin Union for them signified the deeply regretted end of Lithuanian 
traditions, culture, language which were dominated over by Polish cultural imperialism. 
“Varpas” (“Bell”), published by Vincas Kudirka, usually reminded its readers of the 
common Polish-Lithuanian state in the past and the value of good neighbourly relations 
with Poles in future, but equally stressed that the necessary condition for good relations 
with Poland was the provision that the Lithuanian nation, speaking Lithuanian, 
continues to exist and thrives165. Interestingly, Vincas Kudirka, the author of the 
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Lithuanian national anthem, was born in a Lithuanian peasant family and in his early 
life was deeply ashamed of and hid his peasant family background. In a history textbook 
for the 11th and 12th grades we find an excerpt from Kudirka’s reflections on his identity 
transformation:  
“the instinct of survival demanded me to never speak Lithuanian and watch out that 
nobody would find out that my father wears peasant clothes and speaks only Lithuanian. 
[…]  I  became  a  Pole  and  at  once  a  gentleman  –  aligned  myself  with  the  Polish  spirit.  I  
failed, but I was innocent, I did not understand back then, while those, who understood, did 
not warn me. Today, when reminiscing about those times in the past, I am convinced that 
1) people who reject their nation and give themselves to the killing influence of foreign 
nations experience great spiritual damage and, 2) after all, what a strong basis for 
nationality is the native language”.166 
The latter textbook, out of all the Lithuanian history textbooks, offers the most 
detailed and critical point of view towards Polish cultural domination and the refusal to 
accept the sovereignty and separateness of the Lithuanian nation. This emphasis, which 
is not so strong in other textbooks, may be partly caused by the fact that the author of 
this particular textbook is a Polish Lithuanian, who was born and studied history in 
Poland. Therefore, having in mind the minority background of the author, the 
significance of preserving one‘s national identity, culture and language receives much 
more weight in this textbook than in those, written by Lithuanian authors, who grew up 
and studied in Lithuania. 
To summarize, the 19th century is of an extraordinary importance in the Lithuanian 
narrative of nationhood and independence. As a separate era, it is portrayed with most 
detail and attention in Lithuanian history textbooks. Most importantly, the roots of the 
conflict between Lithuanian and Polish nationalisms take place in the 19th century, 
which different textbooks mention with varied levels of extensiveness. Unsurprisingly, 
national pride is implied when describing the Lithuanian national revival and its all key 
figures and their achievements. The distinction between the “Old Lithuanians” and the 
“Young Lithuanians”, which both could be seen as part of the Lithuanian nation, even if 
the  former  spoke  Polish  and  dreamt  of  a  federation  or  union  with  Poland,  is  actively  
raised by the new generation of historians. However, this idea has not yet become 
prominent in Lithuanian history textbooks and the general tendency is simply to denote 
the “Old Lithuanians” as Poles due to their cultural and linguistic leaning toward 
                                                             
166 Ibid, 48. 
64 
 
Poland. As a result, the understanding of Lithuanian identity remains strictly ethnically 
and linguistically bounded. Further, there is still relatively little attention paid to the 
aims of and reasoning behind the de-Polonization program by the tsarist Russian 
regime. Lastly, the separateness, self-consciousness and continuity of the Lithuanian 
nation vis-à-vis the Polish nation is consistently emphasized. 
 
4.4 Polish rendering of the Polish-Lithuanian uprisings and Lithuanian national 
revival in the 19th century 
  
Throughout the 19th century, Poland, partitioned among Russia, Prussia and 
Austria, was absent from the map of Europe. Nevertheless, the 19th century is typically 
considered in Polish historiography as an era of great transformations, when Polish 
Romanticism, Positivism and modern Polish nationalism emerged, whereas the two 
uprisings against the tsarist rule demonstrated the unity of nation and its determination 
to acquire freedom from the foreign government. 
Polish history textbooks depict the different stages and the sequence of events 
during the uprising of 1830 and that of 1863 in an exceptionally detailed way. 
Interestingly, when we compare the Lithuanian and Polish history textbooks’ accounts 
of the uprisings, the latter ones focus much more on the course of the events, battles and 
army maneuvers, whereas the Lithuanian textbooks, along the narrower sequence of 
events, offer a rather extensive discussion of the uprising goals, the future state models 
that the rebels envisioned, national loyalties and identities of the uprising leaders and 
the relative separateness of the uprising in Lithuania (at least in 1863-1864) from that in 
Poland. Polish history textbooks, on the other hand, do not linger too much on the latter 
topics. The goal of the uprising – independent Poland – is taken as self-obvious and the 
borders of such independent Poland or national identity constellations of the citizens of 
this future state are also not specified in any clear way. 
However, the border question becomes clearer if we look at how Polish textbooks 
deal with the topic of the territorial scope of the uprisings. Uprising in Lithuania (as 
well as in western Belarus), in both 1830-1831 and 1863-1864, is largely considered to 
be a part of the Polish uprising. Little distinction between the two, as it was the case in 
the Lithuanian textbooks, is made and, unsurprisingly, there is no mention of the fact 
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that in 1864 the leaders of the Lithuanian uprising sought to be independent from the 
leaders of the uprising in Poland.   
In Polish textbooks, the two uprisings of the 19th century are undoubtedly portrayed 
as a source of great national pride, which demonstrated the unity and patriotic 
determination of the Polish nation. According to one of the textbooks, the struggle for 
independence was fought not only in the Kingdom of Poland, but also in the western 
provinces of the Russian Empire (Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine)167. Once again, what the 
textbook fails to mention is what kind of status these western province of Russia were to 
get in the independent Poland – would they be part of Poland in the form of a 
federation, following the tradition of the Commonwealth, or were the uprising leaders in 
these territories seeking for a united Poland. As we could already see, the leadership of 
the uprising in Lithuania did not have a very clear state model in mind either when they 
were fighting against the tsarist rule. The main goal was to gain freedom and, after 
having achieved this, the effort would have been made to restore the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania which would seek for a union or federation with Poland. However, it also 
should be taken into account that different factions within the leadership of the uprising 
advanced different goals. 
According to Lukowski and Zawadzki, “the Polish radicals and democrats saw in 
the  Lithuanian-,  Belorussian-  and  Ukrainian-speaking  serfs  of  the  western  gubernii 
future equal citizens of a democratic Polish nation embracing all the lands that had 
constituted the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772. In that sense they identified 
Polish  territorial  claims  in  the  east  with  the  universal  cause  of  liberty”168. Another 
national formula of the independent Poland, envisioned by the uprising leadership, is 
offered by Zamoyski: “It had been said that the boundaries of the putative future Poland 
would draw themselves with the blood of insurgents. In Lithuania, they corresponded to 
the borders of 1772, with mass participation by all classes”169. Thus, the Polish nation, 
as such, was conceived of as a predominantly multicultural community united by the 
romanticized cause of liberation, which, as implied by these and other authors, was the 
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main motivation behind “Poland’s desire to reunite the whole of the national 
territory”170. 
This noble intention of the Polish nation, however, soon had to face some 
difficulties, as the result of the emerging national movements in the western provinces 
of  Russia.  Halecki  described  the  rise  of  the  national  revival  in  the  former  eastern  
borderlands of the Commonwealth as the “grave problem”171, which stood in the way of 
the Polish plans to reestablish a multicultural Poland. Together with the intensifying 
national movements of Lithuanians, Ukrainians and, to some extent, Belorussians (or 
“Ruthenians”), the hopes to restore the Jagiellonian union were fading and the ideas of 
creating an ethnic Poland, without the eastern territories, began to gain ground.  
One cannot fail but notice that the emergence of these national movements is 
discussed in Polish historiography with a sense of regret and resentment. Zamoyski, in 
particular, places the national movement in Lithuania and elsewhere in a stark 
opposition to the Polish patriotism, describing it as a “modern Darwinian strain of 
nationalism among the peoples of the former Commonwealth, rejecting the 
inclusiveness and toleration of the Commonwealth in favour of an exclusive 
ethnocentric conformism”172. Polish nationalism, exemplified in the National 
Democrats with their leader Roman Dmowski and his doctrine of “national egoism”, is 
not subsumed by Zamoyski under the “Darwinian strain of nationalism”. The latter 
political group, known for claiming that minorities are only alien bodies within the 
nation, which have to assimilate, does not bypass Zamoyski’s attention. However, 
Dmowski’s poltical ideology is only described as being “practical, logical and 
implacable”173.  
Next to the rise of the national movements, another outcome of the failed uprisings 
seems to cause even more regret in Polish historiography, and that is “the extermination 
of the Polish element” in the eastern borderlands of the Commonwealth. Tsarist 
government, immediately after the uprisings, started to implement severe de-
Polonization measures, which, according to Wereszycki, included, among others, 
confiscation of a large number of Polish estates, entire villages inhabited by Poles being 
exiled to Siberia, elimination of the Polish language from official correspondence, 
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schools174. Polish population, culture and their influence in the eastern borderlands were 
considered by the Russian government as the main revolutionary element, which had to 
be repressed and replaced by intense Russification of these territories in order to create a 
new peasant  strata  loyal  to  the  regime.  As  the  aftermath  of  such  measures,  the  Polish  
population in these areas significantly decreased which to Wereszycki as well as to 
Halecki signifies a tragedy that resulted in the eradication of the centuries-old cultural 
influence of Poles in these areas175. Lithuanian nationalism, in this context, taking into 
account its anti-Polish character, is considered to be the “dominant force which 
eliminated the Polish element”176. 
Lukowski and Zawadzki are among the few authors who take notice of the fact that 
the Russian government was equally hostile to the awakening of national cultures in the 
western provinces of the Russian Empire and took various restrictions against the use of 
the Lithuanian language, Latin alphabet and the illegal publishing and smuggling of 
Lithuanian books from East Prussia177. They highlight the character of Lithuanian 
nationalism, which, though indebted to “Polish Romanticism and the support of several 
eminent bi-cultural bishops and writers, acquired strong anti-Polish characteristics, born 
out of a resentment toward the cultural Polonization of most of the szlachta178 and of the 
educated classes in the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania”179. This, however, is 
contextualixed by bringing the attention to the growing popularity of the National 
Democrats in Poland, who completely rejected the Romantic idea of a pluralist Poland 
and demanded that minorities should submit to cultural and linguistic Polonization180. 
The explanation of the role of national revival of the peoples of the Commonwealth in 
the “eradication of the Polish element”, thus, becomes more interdependent with the 
other historical circumstances. 
Furthermore, Zamoyski questions the “perverse” claims of Lithuanian nationalism 
to the heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania by emphasizing that the majority of its 
population was Belorussian or Ukrainian, whereas the elites were mostly Polish181. 
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Vilnius (Wilno), according to him, represents the core of the problem: “its population 
overwhelmingly Polish and only 2% spoke Lithuanian, yet it was claimed, on historical 
grounds, by the Lithuanians as well as by the Belorussians, who brushed aside Polish 
claims, and ignored the fact that one-third of its population was Jewish”182. In disputes 
over the symbolic ownership of former capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and one 
of the centers of the Polish cultural life, this line of reasoning, based on the 
demographically predominant position of Poles in Vilnius, persisted well into the 20th 
century, as we will see in the following sections. 
To conclude, the national movements of Lithuania, Ukraine or Belarus receive very 
little attention in the history curriculum of the secondary school education in Poland, 
while in historiography the dominant approach of describing Lithuanian nationalism is 
by associating it with the much regretted destruction of the Polish element in the eastern 
borderlands and betrayal of the noble and Romanticized idea of independent Poland. 
Additionally, the rise of the Lithuanian nationalism is generally explained by linking it 
to the failure of the uprisings and the tsarist de-Polonization measures. The uprisings of 
1830-1831 and 1863-1864 are recognized and remembered as the symbols of the 
national unity and struggle for freedom and restoration of Poland. The uprisings in 
Lithuania are typically regarded as fighting for the same cause, siding together or being 
part of the Polish uprisings against tsarist despotism. Polish textbooks, however, do not 
discuss in any more extensive fashion the complex structures of Polish national identity 
or the status of Lithuania in the restored Poland, pursued by the leadership of the 
uprisings. The distinction between patriotism of the Commonwealth and nationalism of 
modern Poland, which we can come across in Polish historiography, is not clearly 
identified in history textbooks. 
 
4.5 Lithuanian rendering of the “Vilnius Question” 
 
To begin with, some introductory remarks should be made in order to sketch out 
the general historical context in which the so-called Vilnius Question arose. The period 
of 1918-1920 in Lithuanian historiography is usually called the Lithuanian Wars of 
Independence, or Freedom Struggles. Established in 1918, during the period of its two 
first years of existence, the independent Republic of Lithuania had to contend with the 
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Bolshevik, Bermontian (the West Russian Volunteer Army, created and supported by 
Germany) and Polish armies.  
Bolsheviks were attacking Lithuania after the withdrawal of the German army in 
1918, seeking to create a marionette Lithuanian government, dependent on Soviet 
Russia. However, the Lithuanian army managed to defeat Bolsheviks and signed a 
peace treaty with the Soviet Russia on July 12, 1920, by which it recognized Lithuania’s 
independence and its rights to Vilnius and its surrounding region. Since the Polish-
Soviet war was taking place at the same time, the Soviet Russia’s decision to attribute 
Vilnius to Lithuania could be regarded as a diplomatic maneuver, aimed at ensuring 
Lithuania’s benevolence to the Soviet Russia in its conflict with Poland. 
The Bermontian army, led by Pavel Bermondt-Avalov, was created by Germany to 
win back the territories of the newly established Baltic countries, which Germany had 
taken during World War I. Lithuania achieved some important victories against the 
Bermontians in 1919, after which the Entente demanded to stop the clashes and ordered 
the withdrawal of the German troops. 
Lastly, the conflict with Poland began already in 1919, during the Polish-Soviet 
war, which also took place in the territory of Lithuania. The Lithuanian and the Polish 
army fought against each other and each against the Soviet Russia as well. Mistrust and 
contention around the issue of Vilnius was so strong between Lithuania and Poland that 
the armies of the two countries never coordinated their struggle against Russia, but 
instead kept fighting over Vilnius by military and diplomatic means. 
The main issue at stake in this disagreement was that of to which country – Poland 
or Lithuania – Vilnius and its surrounding area should belong. The League of Nations 
and the Entente acted as mediators in the conflict trying to find a compromise that 
would  satisfy  the  ambitions  of  the  two countries.  The  agreement  between Poland  and  
Lithuania was finally reached on October 7, 1920 in Suwalki. Vilnius and its 
surrounding area were allotted to Lithuania and a new demarcation line was established. 
However,  before  the  Suwalki  Agreement  came  into  force  legally  (October  10),  the  
Polish General ?eligowski’s army took over Vilnius on October 9, 1920. The seizure of 
Vilnius was portrayed by the Poles as General’s ?eligowski’s mutiny and disobedience 
to the Polish government, which served as an excuse for Poland, facing sanctions by the 
League of Nations. Pi?sudski, Chief of State of Poland, later acknowledged that, when 
Vilnius  was  seized  by  the  Polish  army,  ?eligowski  acted  on  his  orders.  However,  
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despite the demands by the League of Nations that Poles evacuate Vilnius and its 
surrounding area and retreat behind the demarcation line of October 7, no strict 
measures or sanctions were taken. Two years later, Vilnius and its surrounding region 
were annexed to Poland.  
The clash over Vilnius grew out directly of the two conflicting modern 
nationalisms. Lithuanian nationalism, overall, espoused strong anti-Polish sentiments 
due to the fact that Polish culture and language as well as the domination of the Polish-
speaking gentry in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were considered to be guilty 
of the loss of the old Lithuanian traditions and grandeur of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania. In addition to historical antagonisms, asymmetry of political influence and 
international standing stemming from the vast differences in population size further 
contributed to the Lithuanian resentment against Poles183. On the other hand, modern 
Polish nationalism, embodied by Roman Dmowski and his dominating party of National 
Democrats, did not recognize the sovereignty of the Lithuanian state and sought to 
create an ethnically homogeneous Greater Poland with the Commonwealth’s borders of 
1772. For him, Vilnius and its surrounding area could only be an integral and 
indistinguishable part of Poland, whereas all non-Polish populations of these territories 
had to be Polonized. Clearly, his idea of the restored Commonwealth had little in 
common with the original constellations of ethnic diversity in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. An alternative project for Polish-Lithuanian cohabitation was proposed 
by  Józef  Pi?sudski,  Chief  of  State,  Marshal  and  leader  of  Poland.  Pi?sudski,  who  was  
himself born in Lithuania, advocated the idea of a federation of the sovereign Polish, 
Lithuanian and Belarusian nations. However, this idea had never received much support 
in Poland or Lithuania, which was little surprising given the strong positions of fierce 
Lithuanian and Polish nationalisms at the time. Pi?sudski had to give in to the popular 
demands to seize Vilnius by force, as he had probably seen no other option to take 
control of Vilnius. The figure of Pi?sudski remains very controversial in Lithuania, 
whereas in Poland he is reminisced about as a national hero of Poland. In Lithuania, on 
the other hand, Pi?sudski is first and foremost associated with the “occupation of 
Vilnius”.  
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Here we come to one of the most persistent points of disagreement between 
Lithuania and Poland, which is why I also use the term of “occupation by Poland” in 
quotation marks. Lithuania claims Poland’s act of aggression to be the “occupation of 
Vilnius  and  its  surrounding  region”,  while  Poland  rejects  the  use  of  the  term  
“occupation”. Two different lines of reasoning are behind such claims, which are deeply 
intertwined with the questions of historical tradition and national identity in the 
ethnically and culturally diverse area of the former Polish-Lithuanian state with multiple 
identity constellations. The Polish and Lithuanian interpretations and views on the 
“Vilnius Question” have formed in the interwar republic period and, “conserved” by the 
absence of discussions on the issue during the Soviet rule, had extended to the present 
day.  
To illuminate the differences of viewpoints, two quotes follow – the first is by the 
Polish Democrat Ludwik Abramowicz184 and the other is by Antanas Smetona, a key 
public figure and president of interwar Lithuania. Abramowicz stated that “...Jews and 
the  Russians  aside,  Vilnius  is  a  purely  Polish  city.  [...]  the  Lithuanians  are  willing  to  
consider Vilnius the centre of their motherland and cannot reconcile themselves to the 
changes brought by the centuries... collecting statistical material on the Poles in 
Lithuania would be better than high-sounding phrases. After all, numbers are so 
eloquent...”185. Abramowicz emphasizes the importance of numbers and statistics, 
claiming that Vilnius, aside from the majority of Jews, was dominated by Polish 
population, from which follows that Vilnius should be considered to be a Polish city 
and, as a result, the annexation of Vilnius region to Poland cannot be described as 
occupation.  
Meanwhile, Antanas Smetona responds to such claims: “Vilnius is the cornerstone 
of  Lithuanian  life.  It  can  also  be  a  Byelorussian  centre.  We  shall  never  wrangle  over  
Vilnius with Byelorussians, we shall be able to coexist, because none of us harbour any 
aggressive ambitions. The Poles are different; they were and still are aggressors. They 
have driven out the Lithuanian language from the Lithuanian churches, and when 
                                                             
184 One should note here, though, that Ludwik Abramowicz did not support the aggressive nationalism of 
Polish National Democracts and was himself a member of Lithuanian Polish party which supported the 
idea of a Polish-Lithuanian federation. Therefore, his ideas do not represent the most aggressive or fierce 
Polish standpoint towards the question of Vilnius, as is the case with the National Democrats and their 
leader Roman Dmowski. 
185 Abramowicz, L., Wolne g?osy w sprawie litweskiej. Kwestya litewska w praise polskiej. Warszawa: 
1905, 47-48. 
72 
 
Lithuanians require its return, they are declared chauvinists and imperialists”.186 The 
loss of Vilnius is portrayed by Smetona as a great grievance for the Lithuanians which 
they  consider  to  be  their  historical  capital  from  the  times  of  the  Grand  Duchy.  His  
viewpoint on the Vilnius Question is all the more important when we take into account 
that Smetona, after the coup d’état in 1926, became an authoritarian head of state and 
within several following years of his regime a marginal nationalistic political party, the 
Lithuanian National Union, led by Smetona, became the main and only political power 
in the country. In the above quoted passage, Smetona also highlights the confrontation 
between Lithuanians and Poles over the language used in churches in the first decades 
of the 20th century, which was especially commonplace in the ethnically mixed areas on 
Lithuania’s eastern fringes and in some parishes led to riots where the Russian 
authorities had to intervene187. As Kiaupa points out, many priests in the Vilnius diocese 
looked down on the Lithuanian language and considered Polish to be the only suitable 
language of the Church188. This, in turn, heightened the tensions not only between the 
Lithuanian and Polish peasants, but also between the intellectuals and priests who began 
to politicize the language issue, leading to increasingly pronounced confrontations 
between the two groups. 
How is the Polish-Lithuanian conflict over Vilnius portrayed in Lithuanian history 
textbooks? Several key observations follow. Typically, Poland is depicted as an 
aggressor, bigger and thus more powerful and influential neighbor of Lithuania, which 
opposed Lithuanian statehood, claimed Vilnius to be an integral part of Poland189 and 
finally achieved its goal by occupying Vilnius treacherously through a sham mutiny led 
by the Polish General ?eligowski. Treachery is commonly exemplified by stressing that 
Poland broke the Suwalki Agreement already the next day after its signature, 
disregarded the League of Nations and pretended that Polish government had nothing to 
do with the “mutiny”190.  
The discussion of Suwalki Agreement, signed by Poland and Lithuania on October 
7, 1920, which attributed Vilnius and its area to Lithuania, is usually accompanied by 
additional emphasis on the fact that the peace agreement was achieved through 
                                                             
186 Smetona, Antanas, Rinktiniai raštai. Kaunas: Menta, 1990, 325. 
187 In 1909, both languages were given equal rights in the Vilnius diocese. However, with the outbreak of 
World War I, the Lithuanian language was again removed from the churches. Kiaupa, Zigmantas, The 
History of Lithuania. Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 2004, 222-223. 
188 Kiaupa, 222. 
189 Kamuntavi?ius et al, 364. 
190 Ibid, 366. 
73 
 
mediation of the League of Nations and registered by the Secretariat of the League of 
Nations191. The latter point can be considered as an insistence from the Lithuanian side 
to prove the legality of the agreement and its violation by Poland one day after the 
agreement had been signed. When Poland broke the agreement, it is highlighted that the 
international community as well as the League of Nations protested against such Polish 
actions, but later, when Poland diplomatically declared of having no relation to the 
mutiny, accepted the fait accompli192. Lastly, Poles are also blamed for spreading 
negative propaganda in the diplomatic circles of Western Europe regarding the newly 
established Lithuanian state, aiming to create its image as of a dubious and 
impermanent state and merely a Bolshevik or German intrigue, which severely impeded 
the Lithuanian diplomats’ efforts at lobbying in the League of Nations and the 
Entente193. 
In the textbook, published in 2001, Poland is placed next to the Soviet Russia and 
Germany as an equally threatening enemy of Lithuanian sovereignty and statehood: 
“Soviet Russia sought to keep Lithuania under its influence at any stake, Germany 
drafted plans of how not to lose its power in Lithuania, while Poland openly sought to 
annex Lithuania and re-establish a Polish-Lithuanian state”.194 Poland is paralleled to 
two other major threats to Lithuanian sovereignty – Germany and the Soviet Russia. 
Thus, the historical heritage of the common state for over 200 years is overshadowed by 
the struggle of two nationalisms, which results in a situation where Poland, instead of 
being considered as a potential ally against Germany and Soviet Russia, is regarded as 
one of the major threats to Lithuanian independence. The image of Poland as an 
aggressor is further strengthened by describing how after the seizure of Vilnius and its 
surrounding area Polish army started an offensive to the Lithuanian territories beyond 
the Vilnius region and deeper into the ethnographic Lithuania195. Lithuanian army 
managed to resist the attacks and started approaching Vilnius, but the advance was 
stopped  when  the  Entente  demanded  to  halt  the  warfare  and  sign  an  armistice.  In  
addition, one of the history textbooks comments on the seizure in the following way:  
“Poles of Vilnius met ?eligowski’s army very congenially; Lithuanians expressed very 
hostile reactions, while Jews and Belarusians did not show either support or rejection. 
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Polish soldiers soon began Jewish pogroms in Vilnius”196.  No  further  explanation  
follows, but the latter statement clearly adds more negativity to the already overall grim 
image of the Polish army. 
Further, the Republic of Central Lithuania, created by General ?eligowski, and the 
elections of Sejm (National Assembly) of Central Lithuania that took place in 1922 are 
described as illegal and fictive, discriminative against non-Polish population of the 
occupied Vilnius region. It is stated that the elections to Sejm were organized under the 
conditions of oppression, only fluent speakers of Polish could be elected and only 
64.7% of those who had the voting right were included into the voters’ lists197. 
Therefore, the process of incorporation of ?eligowski’s Central Lithuania is presented 
as fictitious, based on false and discriminative procedures and intended to cover up the 
illegality of Poland’s seizure of the Vilnius region. The Entente states agreed with the 
territorial change in 1923, but their ruling was not confirmed by the League of Nations, 
which, according to the textbook, shows that Poland was considered to be an occupant 
and aggressor by the League of Nations198. Lithuania has never accepted the annexation. 
Consequently, the history textbook for 11th and 12th grade  emphasizes  that,  from  the  
perspective of the international law, for such a territorial change to be legally valid, both 
states should have officially agreed on the border, which was not the case199. The fact of 
occupation of Vilnius by Poland thus appears as legally and morally undeniable, which, 
as we shall see, is contradictory to the Polish perspective. 
Strong tensions between Poland and Lithuania remained throughout the interwar 
period. History textbooks typically mention that, in 1926, Lithuanian Ministry of 
Education passed the decision to establish 75 new schools with Polish as the language 
of instruction, which received a very negative outcry in society, as, at the same time, in 
the occupied Vilnius region, Poles were massively closing down Lithuanian schools200. 
Another example would be Lithuania’s decision to call back its diplomatic mission from 
Vatican in 1926, which was a sign of protest against Vatican signing a concordat with 
Poland earlier than with Lithuania, despite Lithuania’s long-term negotiations with 
Vatican201. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs Rainys sought to normalize the 
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relations with Vatican that same year, he was officially accused of conceding Vilnius to 
Poland  and  had  to  resign202.  Lastly,  one  of  the  more  recently  published  history  
textbooks gives even more emphasis on the wrongs done to the Lithuanian culture and 
education by the new Polish government in the Vilnius region, including closing down 
Lithuanian schools and de-Lithuanizing churches203. 
The position of Lithuanian historiography with regard to the “Vilnius Question” 
has stepped into the process of transformation over the past 10-15 years. However, the 
long-standing tradition in Lithuanian historiography, which precedes the 
aforementioned transformation, but still often dominates the popular opinion, was to 
treat the interwar conflict with Poland over Vilnius as being only Poland’s fault and 
caused only by Polish aggression, fierce nationalism and opposition to Lithuania’s 
statehood. In such renderings of the history, portrayed in the classical works of Šapoka 
or Daugirdait?-Sruogien?, Poland emerges as a treacherous and predatory country, 
while Lithuanian Poles are depicted as disloyal, Polonized Lithuanians (in a derogatory 
meaning), who looked down on the efforts of Lithuanians to build a new state. To 
illuminate this point, in the”History of Lithuania” by Daugirdait?-Sruogien? we find the 
following description of the beginning of the war with Poland in 1920:  
“On 19th of April, 1920, Poles, led by Juozas Pilsudskis, who himself originated 
from Lithuania, seized our capital and all southern Lithuania. Poles in our country got 
agitated: many maintained bonds with the Polish government and, having important 
contacts there, sought to harm Lithuania whenever possible, especially in the Versailles 
Peace Negotiations […]. Local Polonized Lithuanians, looking down on Lithuanians and 
their “peasant-like, rude and boorish government”, enrolled in the Polish army or, 
otherwise, in the Lithuanian army with the aim to spy on our authorities, and some were 
simply awaiting to find out which side it would be more useful to join. There were also 
quite many of those, who sincerely supported Lithuanians and worked for the benefit of 
our country. In many families severe divisions emerged, when brothers would happen to 
join different sides and support different viewpoints”204. 
Daugirdait?-Sruogien? goes on to extensively describe the workings of a secret 
Polish organization which had its network all over Lithuania – Polish Military 
Organization (PMO; in Polish, Polska Organizacja Wojskowa). She argues that PMO, 
closely working with the Polish government, supported a network of spies in Lithuanian 
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institutions and was planning a coup d'état, after which it would have announced that 
the Lithuanian nation abandoned the false wish to establish an independent Lithuania 
and instead wanted to be a part of Poland205. However, Lithuanian intelligence service 
found out about the organized coup d’état and prevented it. Typically, Lithuanian 
history textbooks usually also briefly describe the Polish Military Organization, its 
espionage and the secret plot of coup d'état, this way further strengthening the negative 
image of Poland. Moreover, throughout the chapter on the conflict with Poland,  
Daugirdait?-Sruogien? places emphasis on how Poles disregarded the demarcation 
lines, established through Polish-Lithuanian negotiations; how, while fighting against 
Bolsheviks, Poles prevented Lithuanian army from taking over Vilnius in July, 1920, 
and rather let the Bolshevik army first invade the city; how, after the occupation of 
Vilnius by ?eligowski’s army, Polish government adopted cruel discriminatory 
measures against Lithuanians – closed down Lithuanian newspapers, schools, started 
arresting those who would dare to publicly speak in Lithuanian or Belarusian.206 
Šapoka‘s ”History of Lithuania” is another emblematic work of history written in 
the interwar period, first published by the Lithuanian Ministry of Education in 1936. 
Šapoka depicts the attitudes of the Lithuanian Poles in the following way:   
“[…] in Lithuania, there had always been a strong stratum of Polonized Lithuanian 
landlords. They looked at the Lithuanian national movement with distrust and dreamt 
about liberation from the Russian rule in union with Poland. […] They were the strongest 
support for the Polish government which sought to recreate their state with the old borders 
of the Republic. […] Because Poland have always had the support of France, the struggle 
for the new-born Lithuania was especially hard, particularly because the Entente distrusted 
Lithuania and was afraid that this tiny weak state would create perfect conditions for the 
spread of Bolshevism. Meanwhile, after escaping from Lithuania, landlords ranted and 
raved that the “boorish” state was already Bolshevik”207.  
Thus, Šapoka portrays the Lithuanian Poles, or ”the Old Lithuanians”, whose 
identity has been already discussed, as “traitors of the Lithuanian nation and state”, who 
did  everything  to  help  restore  the  Polish,  but  not  the  Lithuanian  state.  The  following  
excerpt  from the  diary  of  Mykolas  Römeris  (Micha? Römer),  a  prominent  Lithuanian-
Polish lawyer, professor at the University of Lithuania and public figure, will further 
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illuminate the situation and tough identity choice facing the Lithuanian Poles in the 
context of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict: 
“[…] the position of Lithuanian Poles, or Lithuanians of Polish culture: those Poles 
who, like me, still remain honest citizens of Lithuania, hold Lithuania their homeland and 
are friends of Lithuanians, but at the same time also have some national Polish sentiments 
– today they are in between the hammer and the anvil in Lithuania. They have been let 
down by Poland, because it does not fight for people’s freedom, but comes to Lithuania to 
get what it considers to belong to Poland, and seeks to appropriate it as its own. It comes to 
Lithuania motivated by purely egoistical aims, hostile to Lithuania. On the other hand, 
Lithuanians do not regard the Lithuanians of Polish culture and their own cousins in a 
friendly way. Lithuanians have many complaints directed at Poland and often well-
grounded ones, as they have already experienced many harmful actions taken by many 
Lithuanian Poles, especially by Poles of Vilnius, therefore, they see conspiracy everywhere 
and they consider  every Pole to  be Poland’s  spy and their  secret  enemy.  Further,  we are 
regarded here as citizens of the second category, suspicious people. […] This is hard to 
bear for those who sincerely love Lithuania and it encourages many to choose instead the 
road of Polish nationalism”.208 
Furthermore, in a similar manner as Daugirdait?-Sruogien?, Šapoka condemns the 
secret  plot  of  the  Polish  Military  Organization  to  take  over  Lithuania  on  the  night  of  
August  29,  1919,  and  later  assist  the  Polish  army  to  occupy  all  of  its  territory209. 
Likewise, he calls ?eligowski’s offensive to seize Vilnius to be a ”march of deception 
and violence which corrupted the possibility of normalizing relations between Poles and 
Lithuanians”210. For him, this act of the Polish government, covered up as a mutiny of 
?eligowski’s army, was insolent and unforgiveable.  
Throughout the Soviet occupation era in Lithuania (1940-1990), Šapoka‘s ”History 
of Lithuania” was forbidden and held in the so-called spetsfonds211. Despite its 
historical research being outdated, Šapoka‘s work became ”the embodiment of popular 
discontent“ with the official Soviet historiography212. Moreover, the book for many 
Lithuanians represented the ”true history of Lithuania”213, as opposed to the forfeited 
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history written by the Soviet historians, which is probably why after the re-
establishment of Lithuanian independence in 1990, when the book was published the 
second time, many Lithuanian families saw it necessary to own one copy of the book. 
Thus, by its perceived opposition to the corrupted Lithuanian history of the Soviet era, 
Šapoka‘s book, presenting strong anti-Polish sentiments and an explicitly 
Lituanocentric narrative, became the idolized ”true history of Lithuania”, which 
portrayed Poles as mostly hypocritical and treacherous enemies of the Lithuanian 
statehood. 
Some important transformations in the evaluations of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict 
in Lithuanian historiography could be noticed in the last 10 or 15 years. Bumblauskas 
has been one of those who started questioning the overwhelming self-righteousness 
often dominating Lithuanian historical narratives when all the blame for the conflict was 
always attributed to Poles. Bumblauskas argues that both Lithuanian and Polish 
nationalism with its full-force egoism have contributed to aggravating the interwar 
conflict, and, if Poles should be ashamed of the National Democrats, Lithuanians, 
likewise, should be ashamed of flirting with Bolsheviks and signing the secret appendix 
to the 1920 treaty with Soviet Russia, which allowed Bolsheviks to cross Lithuanian 
territory in their war with Poland; he also calls Lithuanian historians to reconsider the 
personality and goals of a fierce anti-Bolshevik Lithuanian-born Pi?sudski, especially 
his role in liberating Vilnius and its surrounding area from Bolsheviks214.  
Rimantas Miknys is another contemporary Lithuanian historian who pointed out 
that the general view of Polish politicians in the interwar period and earlier that 
Lithuanian movement was just a Russian “intrigue” was not completely without a 
foundation215. Miknys also deeply regrets that in the midst of the aggressive Polish and 
Lithuanian nationalisms, the rational thinking of the democratic krajowcy216 political 
group in Lithuania, which emphasized the priority of historical consciousness and 
sought for restoration of the historic federation-like state of equal and sovereign 
Commonwealth nations, was bound to be rejected217.  
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Algis Kasperavi?ius highlights how the conflict with Poland over Vilnius was 
extensively used by various Lithuanian political parties in the 1920s to gain popular 
political support and present oneself as the defender of the Lithuanian nation against 
“vicious Poles”, which, as a consequence and according to the observers of those times, 
created an intense atmosphere of hatred toward Poles and Poland218.  
Despite these new accounts of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, however, the new 
generation of Lithuanian historians still treats the seizure of Vilnius by Poland as an 
occupation, which is a crucial factor in maintaining the deeply contradictory points of 
view between Poland and Lithuania over what “really happened” in the interwar period. 
Using the term “occupation” also places the heavier share of the blame for the 
disruption of peace on Poland, which is how it still is largely regarded in the popular 
Lithuanian national imagery of the historical past.  
Lithuanian history textbooks offer consistently negative depiction of Poland and its 
political aims, hostile to Lithuanian statehood. Poland is portrayed as a shamelessly 
treacherous political power which used the cover up of the army mutiny in order to 
occupy and annex “the heart of the Lithuanian life” and the historical capital of 
Lithuania – Vilnius. Moreover, Lithuanian Poles are seen as disloyal to the Lithuanian 
state, collaborating with the Polish government, as spies and traitors, enemies of the 
Lithuanian nationhood and statehood. The incorporation of Vilnius and its area after the 
1922 election of the local Sejm is presented as illegal and fictive, discriminative against 
the Lithuanian population remaining in the Vilnius region. Unfortunately, the tensions 
that grew into a conflict between Poland and Lithuania in the first quarter of the 20th 
century still serve as the greatest source of mutual adversary stereotypes. Perhaps the 
main factor that allowed these stereotypes to retain their popularity up until the present 
day was the lack of bilateral discussion between Lithuania and Poland throughout the 
years of the Soviet occupation. Having in mind the highly restricted conditions for 
public debate and scientific activities, many Lithuanian intellectuals were forced to join 
the Lithuanian Communist party, but would nevertheless find ways to contribute to the 
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preservation of the Lithuanity219.  This  mostly  took  the  form  of  the  cultivation  of  
historiography, in which the Lithuanian nation emerged as the victim of powerful 
neighbours220. As we could see, the latter imagery still persists in the Lithuanian history 
textbooks. 
I would like to complete this section by quoting Mykolas Römeris, a Lithuanian 
Polish lawyer and politician, whose life, spent oscillating betwen Poland and Lithuania, 
is an inconic example of the complicated and highly complex identity of the Polish-
speaking gentry of Lithuania in the first decades of the 20th century: 
“I get more and more convinced, how negatively Lithuanian-Polish relations are 
influenced by the fact that Poles took over Vilnius. According to Pi?sudski and the 
proponents of the Polish-Lithuanian state, the fait accompli of the seizure of Vilnius and of 
defeating Bolsheviks in the larger part of the country should have been the trump card in 
convincing Lithuanians that they need to seek for relations with Poland. However, the 
evidence shows the opposite. The fait accompli affects the relations only negatively; no 
nation likes when it’s addressed by the neighbor over the facts, which have already been 
accomplished in its territory, which, by the way, they consider to be inherited and legally 
owned”.   
Crucially, Römeris pins down what is at stake in the Polish-Lithuanian interwar 
conflict and how it affected the Lithuanian collective memory, in particular. The issue 
of  the  symbolic  ownership,  the  right  to  the  city  of  Vilnius  around  which  the  conflict  
centers ignited the hearts and minds, and left an imprint in the national collective 
memory and the attitudes toward Poles – as a legacy of the dead, instructing to not 
forget the wrongs done by Poles. 
 
4.6 Polish rendering of the “Vilnius Question” 
 
After having overviewed several Polish history textbooks that offer accounts of the 
dispute over Vilnius and its surrounding region, three particular textbooks seem to 
provide most detailed and nuanced storylines: “Historia. Burzliwy Wiek XX” by R. 
?niegocki, “Historia dla Maturzysty. Wiek XX” by A. Radziwi??  and W. Roszkowski, 
“Polskie Dzieje” by A. Dybkowska, J. ?aryn and M. ?aryn, and “Cz?owiek i historia. 
Cz??? 4” by J. Kochanowski and P. Matusik. The ”Vilnius Question”, so pivotal to the 
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Lithuanian Wars of Independence, in Polish textbooks emerges as an important, yet one 
of many territorial disputes that Poland had at the time with the neighboring countries. 
The description of the contending Lithuanian and Polish positions in the dispute 
resembles the one offered by Lithuanian textbooks: “in 1918, the Poles could not 
imagine independent Poland without Vilnius - the city of Mickiewicz - inhabited 
predominantly by Poles. At the same time, Vilnius, as the capital of the medieval 
Lithuanian state, was regarded by Lithuanians as a natural part of their independent 
state, even if only a few percent of Lithuanians lived in the city”221. 
Several key encompassing themes or elements could be distinguished in the 
narratives outlined in the aforementioned textbooks: first, what is common across all the 
textbooks is the consistent emphasis on the fact that the population of the Vilnius region 
was overwhelmingly Polish; second, on the whole, Pi?sudski‘s federalist conception, his 
wish to liberate and bring freedom to the eastern borderlands receives more attention 
than Dmowski‘s „incorporationist“ ideas; third, Pi?sudski‘s and ?eligowski‘s localness, 
attachment, symbolic belonging to the Vilnius region are highlighted, placing their 
policies and initiatives vis-á-vis the disputed area in a local cultural context; last but not 
least, Polish struggle for Vilnius is depicted as the liberation of the predominantly 
Polish populated area from the Bolsheviks. 
Typically, textbooks present and offer a general overview of both the federalist 
conception of Poland advanced by Józef Pi?sudski and the “incorporationist” vision of 
the  future  Poland  offered  by  the  leader  of  National  Democrats,  Roman  Dmowski.  
Pi?sudski was convinced that Poland could secure its independence and military power 
to defend itself from the Russian or German attacks only by establishing a federation, to 
which Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus should belong, and even possibly Latvia, Estonia, 
Romania, Yugoslavia and Hungary could be included as well. This way Pi?sudski 
expected to create a federal unit, named “Mi?dzymorze”, which translates as “in 
between seas”. Further, he intended to support the establishment of the independent 
states in Lithuania and Ukraine, as, according to one of the textbooks, he understood 
that the Lithuanians and Ukrainians would seek to establish their own states, in which 
case Poland’s support would have allowed for a smoother creation of a federal union of 
states  under  the  Polish  domination,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Lublin  Union  in  the  16th 
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century222. Raised in the spirit of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Pi?sudski’s 
federalism represented the nostalgia for the Jagiellonian idea of unity of Eastern and 
Central Europe. 
A starkly opposite vision of future Poland was maintained by the National 
Democrats (NDs) and their leader Roman Dmowski, who advocated for an ethnically 
homogeneous Poland, to which the eastern borderland areas of the former 
Commonwealth should be annexed and the inhabitants of those areas assimilated to the 
Polish nation. Any support from the Polish side to establish independent states on the 
eastern border of Poland was considered to be a mistake. Meanwhile Russia did not 
constitute a threat, according to the NDs, but rather had to be taken into account as a 
potential ally against Germany223.  
Lithuanian history textbooks do not acquaint students with the latter distinction 
between the federalist conception of Pi?sudski and Dmowski’s “incorporationist” 
standpoint, which could be regarded as further reinforcing the uniform, monolithic 
image of Poland as an aggressive nationalist state, blurring any existing differences of 
perspectives in the first decades of the 20th century as to what course of politics Poland 
should choose vis-à-vis its eastern neighbors. On the other hand, Polish textbooks 
identify this distinction, but later continue to depict the conflict over Vilnius and its 
surrounding area by explicitly highlighting the federalist conception and Pi?sudski’s 
politics, presenting it as an exclusive matter of Pi?sudski’s eastern policy. This choice of 
portraying events is, of course, largely shaped by the fact that Pi?sudski, Polish Chief of 
State and Marshal, considered the military struggle over the eastern borders of Poland to 
be the most important part of his political strategy224. Nevertheless, it is puzzling that no 
contextual connection is made between Poland’s eastern politics and the political 
activities of Dmowski and the NDs in Poland or the political standing, reputation and 
activities  of  Dmowski  in  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  In  other  words,  the  popular  
support receiving claims of the NDs in Poland – that the eastern borderlands should be 
annexed and made integral part of ethnically homogeneous Poland – is omitted from the 
picture or at least not clearly connected with Poland’s political strategy toward Vilnius 
in a direct causal relationship. 
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Throughout the textbooks, the federalist conception and Pi?sudski’s politics in the 
eastern borderlands receive much more attention than Dmowski’s ideas of “national 
egoism”. This is most clearly exemplified by the fact that the chapter in “Historia. 
Burzliwy Wiek XX” on Poland’s military struggles to secure its eastern borders is 
followed by three texts from different historical sources, all of which deal exclusively 
with  Pi?sudski’s  ideology  and  politics.  The  first  text  is  an  excerpt  from  S.  Cat-
Mickiewicz’s book and offers an analysis of Pi?sudski’s federalist concept. The second 
text is the famous Pi?sudski’s “Proclamation to the inhabitants of the former Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania”, which he announced in Vilnius in April 1919, after Polish army 
had taken over Vilnius for the first time during the Polish-Soviet War. Lastly, the third 
text is yet another excerpt from General ?eligowski’s memoires, which portrays his 
perspective on the seizure of Vilnius225.  
We learn from the first text that Pi?sudski’s federalism included two key elements, 
or goals: to weaken Russia by supporting multiple national separatist movements in its 
vast territories and, second, to liberate the states, bordering with Poland in the east, from 
the Russian oppression, this way aiming to increase Poland’s influence in the region 
and,  ultimately,  achieving  Polonization  of  these  territories  –  in  the  same way that  the  
gentry of the old Commonwealth Polonized Lithuania and Rus’ (present day Belarus 
and Ukraine) in the past226.  
The “Proclamation to the inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania” yet 
again reiterates the cornerstone of Pi?sudski’s political program in the eastern 
borderlands – bringing freedom and liberty to Lithuania and Belarus. In a similar vein, 
this is reiterated in “Historia dla Maturzysty”, where we find out that the seizure of 
Vilnius in 1920 was the outcome of Pi?sudski’s wish to provide the inhabitants of the 
Vilnius region the possibility of self-determination227. The message is reinforced by an 
excerpt from the actual proclamation, which, issued both in Lithuanian and Polish, 
stated that  
“for more than a century your country has known no freedom. It has been oppressed 
by the hostile forces of Germans, Russians, and Bolsheviks, who, whilst never consulting 
your wants interrupted your way of life. […] The Polish army brings liberty and freedom 
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to you all. It will expel the rule of force and violence, discard the governments which are 
against the will of people. I want to give you the opportunity to resolve internal – ethnic 
and religious – affairs, like you yourselves will determine, without any violence or 
oppression from the Polish side. That is why, despite the fact that on your lands the war is 
still rumbling and the blood is flowing – I am not introducing a military administration, but 
a civil one, to which the local people will plead, the sons of this land.”228 
Pi?sudski also pledged to organize elections based on secret, direct and universal 
voting and to defend everyone equally, irrespectively of one’s national or religious 
affiliation. However, for Lithuanians, as the textbooks highlights, Pi?sudski’s intentions 
appeared to pose a threat of another effort at Polonization of these areas and imposition 
of Poland’s political and economical sovereignty229. The negative attitude of Lithuania 
toward Poles and their political strategy in the eastern borderlands, reluctance to accept 
the idea of the federal union, thus, is identified as one of the key reasons why Pi?sudski 
finally decided to start a military operation and annex Vilnius, “situated in his native 
areas”, to Poland230. 
The discussion of “nativeness” of Pi?sudski to the Vilnius region and Lithuania 
directs us to another emerging theme in the Polish textbook narrative. This element of 
the narrative is the most obvious in ?niegocki’s textbook. The fact of Pi?sudski or 
General ?eligowski being born and having lived in Lithuania and in Vilnius, their 
symbolic localness and belonging to the Vilnius region are strongly underlined, 
invoking a sense of justification for the seizure of Vilnius. The main argument here 
would be that the emphasis on the symbolic belonging and localness of Pi?sudski and 
?eligowski as well as their symbolic status of “Vilniusites” supports the Polish 
historical narrative with a strong emotionally-loaded basis for ultimately legitimating 
Poland’s act and presenting it as a conflict not solely between Poland and Lithuania, but 
also as a dispute between the Lithuanians and the autochthon, local Poles. The 
explanation of Poland’s role in the conflict meanwhile is more focused on its intentions 
to liberate the region from the Bolshevik oppression. Therefore, the seizure of Vilnius 
cannot  be  seen  as  an  act  of  occupation,  following  the  Polish  historical  reasoning,  for  
Vilnius was in part taken over by the “local Poles” who felt strong emotional 
attachment to the disputed area. The latter point is only further strengthened by 
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consistent reiteration that the Polish army division, which seized Vilnius – the 
Lithuanian-Belorussian division – was formed entirely from the local Polish men231.  
The textbook offers an excerpt from ?eligowski’s memoires, which once again 
stresses the noble intentions of the general as well as the sense of his emotional 
belonging to Lithuania: 
     “I registered at the car in which the Marshal lived. It was easy to talk, both of us talked 
in Vilniusian categories. Marshal assessed the situation. The Bolsheviks gave Vilnius to 
the Kaunas government. Poland cannot do anything here, as it would not be allowed by the 
coalition, and because at Spa Vilnius was commissioned by the Polish government to 
Lithuania. If we do not rescue Vilnius now, history will not forgive us. And not only 
Vilnius. We must restore Lithuania. This can be done only by the people themselves - the 
sons of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Division. It is necessary that someone took upon himself 
the whole thing. Marshal believed that only I can do it. Only it has to be kept in mind that 
everyone is against us, even the Polish society, which does not understand the Lithuanian 
case. [...] 9 October 1920, at the head of troops, composed of the sons of Lithuania and 
Belarus, Vilnius was taken not by the Polish General ?eligowski but by the Lithuanian 
?eligowski, the one who, being a small boy, came from ?upran to Vilnius for the exam 
and slept on benches of the city garden.”232 
The fact that Vilnius was taken by “the Lithuanian ?eligowski” is of crucial 
importance here, as it shows the stark mismatch between the Lithuanian perspective, 
where ?eligowski is merely a Polish general, sent by the Polish Chief of State and 
Marshal Pi?sudski to seize Vilnius, and the Polish perspective, in which ?eligowski 
appears  as  a  Lithuanian,  though  of  Polish  culture,  and  to  whom  the  definition  of  the  
Lithuanian identity and nationhood is not delineated by the linguistic and cultural 
identification. Essentially, two different standpoints on what elements constitute the 
Lithuanian national identity come into conflict here, which brings us back to the 
aforementioned distinction, identified by some Lithuanian historians, between the “Old 
Lithuanians” and the “Young Lithuanians”. Unfortunately, the identity of “Old 
Lithuanians” – Polish-speaking, loyal to the spirit of the Commonwealth, but 
increasingly drawn to the Polish nationalism and unsupportive or even despiteful of the 
rising Lithuanian national movement – and that of the “Young Lithuanians”, who felt 
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deep resentment and distrust of the Polish influence in Lithuania, were mutually 
exclusive.  
Lastly, as the quotation of ?eligowski’s memoirs implies, the seizure of Vilnius 
was an act of “rescuing” the city and possibly all Lithuania from the Bolsheviks, who 
invaded the country after the German troops had begun retreating. In a similar vein, the 
seizure of Vilnius as liberation of the city and the surrounding area from the Bolsheviks 
emerges in the textbook “Polskie dzieje”. Here, a section on the Polish eastern military 
offensive in 1919 is titled “Liberation of Vilnius from the hands of the Bolsheviks”. 
Further, we read that “[i]n early 1919, the Bolshevik army (the Red Army), starting to 
march westward, took over Vilnius, inhabited mostly by Poles, proclaimed there the 
establishment of Lithuanian-Belorussian Socialist Soviet Republic and gave the 
authority in it to its Lithuanian supporters”233. The emphasis on the Lithuanian 
supporters of the marionette LitBel state somewhat stands in opposition to the 
Lithuanian national narrative, which typically portrays the Bolshevik Lithuanian 
government, led by Kapsukas, as an essentially illegitimate Russian-Bolshevik creation, 
aggressive toward and acting against Lithuanian statehood and independence. Further, a 
lot of focus in “Polskie Dzieje” is placed on the fact that Lithuania acquired Vilnius and 
its region from the Bolsheviks after signing the peace treaty in 1920. Thus, after the 
Bolshveiks had taken control of Vilnius again, “Lithuanians did not join the military 
actions against the Red Army. But they signed a peace agreement with Bolsheviks, 
under which General Tukhachevsky gave Lithuania the Vilnius region, in return for 
permission of passage of his troops, fighting against Poland”234.  The  same  point  is  
reiterated in the next page, where the description of ?eligowski’s “mutiny” is preceded 
by  an  assertion  that  “[a]ccording to the agreement of general Tukhachevsky with the 
Lithuanian government of Kaunas, Vilnius region had become a part of the Lithuanian 
state”235. This is then followed by a statement that “Lithuanians, having the support of 
the League of Nations and Bolsheviks, would not agree to conduct a plebiscite in the 
region of Vilnius, as demanded by the Poles. […] In this complicated situation, in mid-
October 1920, general Lucjan ?eligowski separated from the main Polish forces and 
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seized the entire Vilnius region, forming Central Lithuania236 in this area”237. An 
important observation of how ?eligowski’s act was received by Poles and Lithuanians 
is offered in “Historia dla Maturzysty”: For the majority of the Poles of this region, he 
became a hero who restored the Polish government in the area. For Lithuanians, both 
then and now, he is a symbol of Polish perfidy”238. The comparison demonstrates the 
remaining contradictory evaluations of ?eligowski’s act. 
Another difference between the Lithuanian and Polish accounts is that Polish 
textbooks either do not mention or mention very briefly the Suwalki Agreement, which, 
as stressed in the Lithuanian account, was officially registered and recognized by the 
League of Nations and by which Poland, two days prior to the Vilnius offensive, 
assigned the city to Lithuania after bilateral negotiations, mediated by the Entente. 
Lithuanian textbooks stress the crucial importance of this agreement, as a validation of 
the injustice and unlawfulness of Poland’s act of aggression. Meanwhile, only in 
“Historia dla Maturzysty” we find a clear acknowledgement that “[n]ot respecting the 
agreement on the military demarcation line, signed on September 7, 1920, in Suwalki, 
which assigned Vilnius to Lithuania, Pilsudski commanded general ?eligowski to 
simulate rebellion and invade Vilnius with his subordinate forces”.239 
Similarly,  the  creation  of  the  Central  Lithuania,  the  elections  to  its  Sejm  and  its  
later decision to incorporate Central Lithuania into Poland, the fictitious character of 
which is consistently emphasized in Lithuanian textbooks, are typically briefly 
mentioned in the Polish textbooks as events that expressed the will of the local 
population and that do not require more detailed exploration. What is emphasized 
instead is the official confirmation of Poland’s eastern borders by the League of Nations 
in 1923, which demonstrated that the League of Nations finally recognized the decision 
made by the majority of the population in the region. 
If we look to the Polish historiography, there is undoubtedly an agreement that the 
seizure of Vilnius was secretly ordered by Marshal Pi?sudski and that the whole military 
operation was presented as an army mutiny in order to prevent the sanctions on the 
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Polish government by the Entente. Pi?sudski’s sentiments to the Vilnius region, his 
devotion to the federalist idea and the rejection of his political ideas by the Lithuanians 
typically emerge as main factors which all contributed to the final decision of taking 
over Vilnius by war. Furthermore, when it comes to the issue of the annexation of 
Vilnius and its surrounding area to Poland, Halecki, for instance, stresses that the 
Lithuanians would never acknowledge the incorporation, even if “it followed in March 
1922, after the elections in all the disputed territory, at the request of the Wilno Diet. A 
year later, on 15th March 1923, the Conference of the Ambassadors of the western 
Powers definitely recognized the eastern boundary of Poland”240. Thus, Halecki grounds 
the legitimacy of the annexation by emphasizing that the decision had been made by the 
local  Diet  and  was  additionally  confirmed by  the  western  Powers,  which  should  once  
again prove the legal validity of the act. However, in the Lithuanian historiography, we 
can find counterarguments to Halecki’s claims, which highlight that the League of 
Nations has never officially recognized the creation and incorporation of the Central 
Lithuania into Poland or point to the discriminatory practices toward non-Polish 
population of the Vilnius district during the elections. 
Suwalki agreement, of which there is so little mention in the Polish textbooks, 
similarly escapes the attention of Polish historians. Halecki refers to the agreement only 
indirectly when he states that “on the 9th October ?eligowski took the town, although 
the Polish plenipotentiaries had quite unnecessarily agreed, two days previously, to a 
temporary line of demarcation leaving it on the Lithuanian side”241. The mismatch of 
the importance the agreement is given in the two accounts is obvious: Suwalki 
agreement in Lithuanian historiography is considered to be a crucial peace agreement 
between Poland and Lithuania, officially recognized and registered by the Secretariat of 
the League of Nations, whereas Halecki identifies it as an agreement made by “Polish 
plenipotentiaries” on a temporary and rather unimportant line of demarcation.  
Although Polish historians generally avoid identifying the seizure of Vilnius as an 
“occupation”, a few exceptions can be observed in the following accounts. For instance, 
Wereszycki claims that “Polish troops under the General ?eligowski occupied Wilno 
with the area of “Central Lithuania”242 and comments on Poland’s military struggle in 
the east by pointing out that “the defense of Poland was confused with the desire to 
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expand beyond the ethnic frontiers to the eastern borders of the former Commonwealth, 
inhabited in the main by Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians”243. Similarly, 
Garlicki takes note of the fact that “Pi?sudski had already, in the second half of August, 
started making preparations for the occupation of Wilno” and that “contrary to the 
expectations after the occupation of Wilno, relations between the two nations steadily 
worsened”244. He also mentions that the Lithuanian-Belorussian division, formed from 
14000 local men from the Vilnius district and led by the General ?eligowski to take 
over Vilnius, was reinforced by another 65000 soldiers from Poland245, which 
contradicts  the  common  portrayal  of  the  seizure  in  the  Polish  textbooks  and  
historiography as distinctly carried out by the local, autochthonous Lithuanian Poles.   
Lastly, J?druszczak points out that the Polish government in fact controlled Central 
Lithuania already before it was formally annexed to Poland in 1922, as right after the 
creation of Central Lithuania its Governing Commission asked the Polish government to 
send some army troops for military assistance and protection246. The Polish government 
officially condemned the army mutiny, but expressed its understanding of the intentions 
of the soldiers of the Lithuanian-Belorussian division and agreed to send the troops to 
Central Lithuania, this way gaining factual control of Central Lithuania, before its 
formal incorporation247. However, such instances when Polish historians place more 
emphasis  on  the  facts  which  portray  the  seizure  of  Vilnius  as  an  act  of  occupation  by  
Poland or emphasize Poland’s involvement in the process of the annexation of Central 
Lithuania remain rare. 
A different perspective on the popularity and contents of the federalist ideas in 
Poland and in the eastern borderland of the former Commonwealth is offered by 
Dziewanowski, according to whom, “the period from 1918 to 1920 was the heyday of 
federalism in Poland”248, whereas “federal, or quasi-federal, schemes were also 
preached by the Polish landowners in the eastern borderlands”249. However, he 
highlights that “they advocated a sui generis federalism which in reality was closer to 
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incorporation and which they were ready to use as an instrument of their class 
interests”250. Dziewanowski’s point is crucial in showing the widespread attitudes of the 
Polish landowners in the eastern borderlands, who preferred Polish nationalism to the 
Lithuanian one, the latter being born out of the peasantry movement and, thus, 
considered as threatening the landowners’ socioeconomic status. At the same time, it 
reveals that Pi?sudski’s federalist program with its noble aims of bringing freedom and 
liberty to the oppressed nations of the eastern borderlands of the former Commonwealth 
had in fact relatively minor relevance as a motivating factor behind the decision to 
incorporate the Vilnius region into Poland. 
Dziewanowski describes in great detail the clashes between the National 
Democrats and the Leftists and their different visions of future Poland. If in Polish 
historiography Poland’s quest in the eastern borderlands is typically associated with 
Pi?sudski’s personality and, thus, in turn with his political ideas and values, 
Dziewanowski focuses more on showing how the assimilationist and incorporationist 
position of the National Democrats was increasingly gaining ground both in Poland and 
among the Polish landowners in Lithuania or Ukraine, who would nevertheless still 
present themselves as federalists. Essentially, Dziewanowski indicates a distinction 
between the leftist federalism, which was “willing and even eager to sacrifice the age-
old hegemony of Poland in the eastern borderlands”251, and the conservative landowner 
federalism, “camouflaging its selfish class interests with empty federalist slogans and 
[…] being interested in straight annexation”252.  
These realities are not taken into account neither in Polish, nor in Lithuanian 
textbooks. Polish textbooks are void of any straightforward connection between the 
dominant position of the political ideas of the National Democrats and its influence in 
Poland’s eastern policy, submersing the latter entirely under the noble Pi?sudskian 
federalism, which seeks for freedom via voluntary federation of equal and sovereign 
states of Eastern Europe. Meanwhile Lithuanian textbooks offer a monochromic picture 
of Poland’s political realities by failing to identify distinctions between the contents of 
competing ideologies of Pi?sudski and Dmowski. The variety of perspectives toward the 
question of eastern borderlands in Poland is completely ignored, while the focus is 
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primarily and rather simplistically placed on a generalized Poland’s desire to occupy 
Vilnius – an embodiment of Dmowski’s political ideas. 
In both Lithuanian and Polish textbooks there is a certain amount of reticence to 
acknowledge the more complex realities and diverse political constellations in the early 
1920s conditioning the conflict over Vilnius. Lithuanian narrative largely tends to 
overlook Pi?sudski‘s and ?eligowski‘s anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik predispositions, 
their role in preventing Bolshevik occupaton of the city, their emotional ties with 
Vilnius as well as complicated national identity structures. The voices of the leftist 
federalism are also completely ignored in the Lithuanian textbooks, not to mention the 
stark and crucial differences in political ideology of Dmowski and Pi?sudski, which are 
ignored too. Polish perspective, likewise, prefers to present the conflict over Vilnius by 
associating it primarily with Pi?sudski‘s eastern policy, his sentiments and emotional 
attachment to Vilnius as well as Poland‘s mission to rescue the area from the Bolshevik 
threat, while somewhat leaving aside the aggressive nationalism of the NDs. Lastly, the 
mismatch between the two narratives clearly appears when it comes to the evaluation of 
the importance of the Suwalki agreement as well as the legitimacy of the establishement 
of Central Lithuania and its annexation to Poland. 
 
5. Interview analysis 
 
The initial task was to determine to what extent the historical narratives of Polish 
minority members reiterate or diverge from Lithuanian and Polish official historical 
storylines. Particular attention was thus paid to descriptions of or references to the three 
events/periods of the common Polish-Lithuanian historical narratives whose portrayal in 
the textbooks has been outlined above. However, the analysis of interviews, which 
appeared to be so rich with various references to history and memory, was not limited to 
these precategorisations. In fact, certain historical references proved to be strongly 
associated with themes of identity, belonging as well as political claimsmaking, 
providing further insights into the collective dimension of historical interpretations of 
the Polish minority members. 
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5.1 Meaning of Polish-Lithuanian unification 
 
In Lithuanian historiographical tradition, Lublin Union, which brought the Polish-
Lithuanian rapprochement, has been predominantly considered to have accelarated 
cultural Polonization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and has been associated with the 
loss of the Duchy‘s grandeur and long-standing traditions. Similarly, as we have seen, 
grim perceptions of the Commonwealth are prevalent among Lithuanians, as the survey 
on Lithuanian collective memory in 2005 revealed – only 4% of respondents considered 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to be relevant to their national identity. 
A different perspective, however, emerges from the interview data. The historical 
period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was largely perceived by the 
informants as the source of the highly valued rich cultural heritage and traditions of 
multiculturalism, which, in turn, served as a basis for claiming that Poles and their 
history are a part of Lithuanian history. One informant commented that  
”these were the times of prosperity. All the cities and manors appeared during this 
period. I’m following the discussion among Lithuanians. There are two tendencies – to 
accept and treat it all as heritage or to either reject it. […] Should we destroy and reject all 
these manors, paintings? […] This past ought to be accepted as one’s own instead of 
rejecting it and calling it Polonization or loss of one’s national identity”(I7).  
A similar view is pursued by another informant who talks about the local dialect of 
Polish language:  
“the tuteishi language has developed here since the times of the Grand Duchy. It was 
the official state language of the Duchy. So Poles here use and speak the old state language 
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. […] We are the real Lithuanians (laughs). But I’m being 
purposefully spiteful here so as to cause some annoyance”(I6). 
A somewhat differently placed emphasis, however, was made by an informant who 
argued that  
“in terms of culture, language, yes, it was dominated by Polish culture, already since 
16-17th century. But this was still Litwa (emphasis), Lithuania, Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 
Those who were coming here from Warsaw, they were coming to Litwa” (I4).  
He also stressed the differences in historical knowledge or learnedness of local 
Polish intelligentsia and the “common people”:  
“In my environment, intelligentsia environment, we are more familiar with such 
historical facts, but an average Pole does not know those things. I know how Jogaila took 
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the throne, what kinds of games were played here. In fact, Poland always sought to take 
control of Vilnius, of the bishop’s throne. Poles always held this expansionist idea. 
Lithuanians were good at protecting themselves against it and Poles respected it. They 
tolerated this specific standpoint of ours (emphasis – R.K.). […] We know this, but the 
majority of Poles identify with the Polish interpretation of the past. Although the local 
Poles know more than the other Poles – historical past is more important for us.” (I4). 
With regard to collective memory, the passage reveals some important distinctions 
both within the local Polish community and between the local and the “Polish” Poles. It 
also demonstrates how informant’s interpretation actually overlaps with the popular 
Lithuanian historical narrative in the way the informant argues about Poland’s 
expansionist attitude toward the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Moreover, while talking 
about Polish-Lithuanian relations in the past, he clearly aligned himself with the 
Lithuanian side, treating Lithuanian history as his history, too. 
As a result, although more interviewees espoused views that endorsed the cultural 
heritage and multicultural traditions of the Grand Duchy, arguing that these ought to be 
accepted by Lithuanians as an authentic and valuable part of their history, some 
contradictory ideas were also voiced which, though not rejecting the heritage of Polish 
culture, reiterated the Lithuanian interpretation of the past by highlighting the 
independence and separateness of the Grand Duchy as well as Polish cultural 
expansionism. On the other hand, the informant drew attention to the differences of 
collective memory within the Polish minority, distinguishing between the local Polish 
elite and the remaining body of community. Importantly, 4 informants (I4, I6, I7, I12), 
however, when speaking of the Polish past of the Duchy, identified it as an inextricable 
part of Lithuanian history thus grounding their sense of belonging to the Lithuanian 
historical tradition. 
 
5.2 Memories of the plural identities of the 19th century 
 
Two main themes can be distinguished in informants’ views when they refer to the 
19th century events of Polish-Lithuanian history – Lithuanian national revival with the 
ensuing aggravation of interethnic tensions and, in relation to this, a more general topic 
of integration which is mostly employed as a means to generate historical parallels 
between the 19th century dilemmas and the more contemporary discussions of 
integration of national minorities in Lithuania. 
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One of the interviewees, when commenting about the sources of commonly held 
mutual perceptions of Poles and Lithuanians, assessed the situation as follows:  
“everything began long long time ago, probably starting from the times of the Lublin 
Union, when Polish culture started gaining ground in Lithuania. […] But I think it 
intensified especially at the end of the 19th century, when the so-called “Young 
Lithuanians” appeared and the national revival began. Poles held the view that the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania should keep its old form and remain in the union with Poland, whereas 
here there emerged a strong resistance seeking to create a separate state. Perhaps 
everything began from these contradictions. By the way, apart from the “Young 
Lithuanians”, there were also those who held different views and who were in favor of the 
union with Poland.”(I1)  
Two overriding themes emerge in this passage. Firstly, the informant considers the 
19th century to have brought the crucial transformations in national self-definition of 
Lithuanians which, in turn, caused more pronounced national tensions and which served 
as the basis for the development of mutual stereotypes. On the other hand, by pointing 
at the distinction between “Old” and “Young Lithuanians”, he is essentially seeking to 
demonstrate the plurality of views vis-à-vis the Lithuanian statehood in the 19th century. 
As we have seen earlier, this plurality of perspectives stemming from different identity 
constellations among Lithuanians has entered the accounts of contemporary Lithuanian 
historiography, but not the school history textbooks. In this sense, the informant is 
challenging the monolithic, ethnocentric storyline of national revival in Lithuanian 
textbooks. 
An interconnected theme which emerged in references to the Lithuanian national 
revival was the issue of integration. The informant, who perceived himself as 
representing the intelligentsia of the Polish community, claimed that the process of 
linguistic integration of the Lithuanian Poles should be focused not so much on raising 
the levels of formal Lithuanian language requirements, but on widening the scope of 
cultural contents in language teaching – by promoting appreciation of and respect for 
the fathers of Lithuanian national revival Basanavi?ius, Vyd?nas (I4). Essentially, he 
argues for a stronger presence of certain symbols of Lithuanian national historical 
narrative in the language teaching process as a means to effective integration process. 
A recurrent figure throughout the different interviews was Adam Mickiewicz, 
symbolic of the 19th century and the identity transformation processes that took place in 
it. Rather overwhelmingly, different informants referred to Mickiewicz by highlighting 
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his “Lithuanianess” as well as his deserving to be recognized as a Lithuanian. One of 
the respondents, when speaking about the issue of integration and explaining in which 
sense the local Poles could be regarded as Lithuanians, asserted that 
 “neither Mickiewicz, nor Pi?sudski, nor S?owacki said that they were Poles. All of 
them thought of themselves as Lithuanians” (I10).  
Another informant, arguing for the inclusion of Polish part of Lithuanian history 
into the official Lithuanian historical narrative, drew attention to the fact that 
 “Mickiewicz, but also Kraszewski wrote the whole of Lithuanian history. If they 
lived today, they would be greatly offended, for they loved this land, worked for it, and 
now they are regarded as occupants, Polonizers”(I7).  
The  latter  quote,  in  particular,  reveals  how  Mickiewicz  is  virtually  used  as  a  
symbol of Lithuanian Polish identity and as an embodiment of claims of the Polish 
minority for symbolic inclusion into the Lithuanian “mnemonic community”. The 
boundaries of Lithuanian collective memory, which determine what is to be 
remembered or forgotten, are challenged here as the informants seek to ground and 
legitimate their rightful attachment and belonging to the Lithuanian history and state, 
instead of being regarded as Polonizers or occupants. In other words, the figure of 
Mickiewicz is employed as a powerful symbol to contest the ethnocentric Lithuanian 
collective memory. 
Throughout the interviews, the 19th century and Lithuanian national revival 
emerged as a turning point in the Polish-Lithuanian history and was perceived as a key 
to capturing what is at stake in the present day tensions between Poles and Lithuanians. 
In addition to that, the identity of “Old Lithuanians”, not reflected in the textbook 
contents, stood out as a meaningful symbol legitimating the pleading for inclusion of 
plural pasts into the Lithuanian collective memory. 
 
5.3 Memories of the Polish-Lithuanian interwar conflict 
 
Out of all different periods in Polish-Lithuanian history, the interwar conflict 
received by far the most attention and emphasis among all interviewees in all age 
groups. Reflection on the seizure of Vilnius surfaced within a wide array of topics, most 
prominently related to family history, issues of localness and identity, minority 
claimsmaking and institutional responses to it. 
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5.3.1 Family memory and contestation of the “occupation” narrative 
 
A predominant point of view, although with varying degree of emphasis across the 
different interviews, was focused on highlighting the ethnic composition of the Vilnius 
region at the time of its seizure by ?eligowski’s army which, in turn, is treated as 
evidence of the crucial fact that the term “occupation” is not suitable in the portrayal of 
the interwar events. One of the informants emphasized that  
“an important aspect is the ethnic composition of the population in Vilnius. If they knew 
what it was, the uncertainty would immediately subside – 60% Poles, 40% Jews and 3% 
Lithuanians (sic!). If there had been a plebiscite, it would have been obvious. But they didn’t 
choose this path, both sides – Lithuanians and Poles – were very stubborn”.(I7) 
In a similar vein, a 22 year old informant stressed that  
“when we talk about history and Vilnius, Lithuanians either do not know or forget 
who were those living in Vilnius at the time. Around a half of the population was Jewish, 
then there were Poles,  Russians,  Belarusians and only then there was 1% of  Lithuanians.  
Meanwhile,  they  perhaps  think  that  everything  used  to  be  in  the  past  as  it  is  these  days.  
That is why they think that there came bad Poles and occupied Lithuanians. But Vilnius 
was not as Lithuanian back then, although many do not want to admit this. […] That’s why 
it is wrong to either talk about some kind of cruel occupation or, on the contrary, claim that 
there hadn’t been anything wrong done at all. Neither one nor the other point of view is 
right. Vilnius has always been the capital of Lithuania, but Poles have been living here all 
the time too.”(I13)  
The latter passage shows that the opposition to the term “occupation” is also 
expressed by a young informant who graduated from high school already in the 2000s, 
which might be regarded as a persistence of a certain historical narrative transmitted 
intergenerationally.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  evident  that  she  attempts  to  find  a  middle  
ground  reflecting  on  the  interwar  conflict  and  does  not  adhere  to  any  extreme  
viewpoints on the topic. Equally significant is her remark that “Vilnius had always been 
the capital of Lithuania” – a point so stressed in Lithuanian historical narrative. This 
passage demonstrates how certain elements from both Polish and Lithuanian narratives 
merge generating a new storyline in which both sides of the narrative are looked at 
critically. The past, being recollected in the contemporary context, is, as a result, 
transformed by reconfiguring one’s memory and consolidating elements of two clashing 
storylines into one coherent and more encompassing narrative. 
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Another crucial dimension which emerged in relation to the interwar conflict was 
the history of one’s family, of one’s parents and grandparents. I would claim that to a 
large extent the interwar history appeared to be so relevant to many interviewees 
because of its intrinsic connectedness to the memory inherited from the family which, 
as a result, loaded this period with emotional significance and meaningfulness. One of 
the informants commented:  
“Can I ask you: whose grandparents were occupied – mine or yours? How many 
people in Vilnius can you find whose parents or grandparents were occupied by 
?eligowski’s army? So ?eligowski came and occupied my grandparents and parents? They 
remember this period differently (emphasis  –  R.K.).  Perhaps  it  should  be  evaluated  in  a  
different light.”(I3).  
A central theme in this excerpt is the memory of the informant’s grandparents and 
parents of the interwar events which is attributed a special status – it is a memory of 
those who have experienced the actual events in question and who therefore hold a right 
to question and challenge the officially legitimated story of “occupation”. The 
significance of family memory and history emerges similarly in the story told by a 22 
year old university student:  
“In the first or second year of studies, we had a history lecture and discussion on the 
seizure of Vilnius. Some of my classmates talked a lot on the topic – how terrible it was 
and the like. I observed the discussion passively… I thought to myself that there is no point 
in trying to argue. I will better sit quietly and listen to what they speak. It was interesting to 
observe that one girl was especially active in trying to prove how terrible it was, that it 
shouldn’t have been this way, that it was an occupation, that Poles are bad. Then she turns 
to me and one more Polish girl in the group and says: “Don’t you two worry. It’s not about 
you. It’s not you who did it”. I tell her then that it is really very nice that you embrace us in 
such a friendly way, but if not us, perhaps then our grandparents or grand grandparents 
could do this. How can you know?”(I13).  
This demonstrates how memory and history of one’s family may contain elements 
which stand in opposition to the officially maintained national narrative, causing 
resistance to being integrated into the larger mnemonic community which adheres to the 
commonly approved storyline. Espousing this official narrative would pose a threat to 
the unity and coherence of the family or minority collective memory which serves as the 
basis for the very existence of the group. In this regard, memory dissonance performs as 
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a counter-influence to construction of more encompassing identities based on shared 
national memory. 
 
5.3.2 Challenging the “Lithuanocentricity”: localness and belonging 
 
The earlier analysis of Polish textbooks demonstrated how one of the recurrent 
themes in Polish textbooks was the localness of Pi?sudski and ?eligowski, their 
attachment and symbolic belonging to the Vilnius region, their “Lithuanianness”. As we 
could see in the previous section, the “Lithuanianness” was highlighted in the context of 
Mickevi?, Kraszewski and other prominent 19th century  figures  too,  as  a  claim  to  
reconsider “Lithuanocentricity” of the official narrative. However, it should be 
highlighted that “Lithuanianness” here does not denote cultural or linguistic attributes, 
but is rather associated with a historical and political tradition of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania, in which one’s national affiliation was not predetermined by culture or 
language. In effect, official Lithuanian narrative and collective memory of Lithuanian 
Poles are predicated on different understandings of what constitutes “Lithuanianness”, 
creating ground for collective memory dissonances. 
In the words of a 22 year old informant, “Lithuanian Poles are unique. They aren’t 
the same as the Poles in Poland – they are a part of Lithuanian history” (I12). Similarly, 
commenting on the interwar conflict, a 41 year old informant suggests:  
“There is no single answer in this situation. On one hand, this could not be an 
occupation, as the majority of population was Polish-speaking. On the other hand, the 
biggest Lithuanian of all, who always claimed he was a Lithuanian, was Józef Pi?sudski. 
He understood this early in his life. He understood that without Poland there can be no 
Lithuania. He said he was a Lithuanian, but he went to Poland and attempted to reestablish 
Polish army there.[…] But Pi?sudski failed to achieve an agreement. He sought to create a 
federation, as he saw this to be the only possible way to protect ourselves from Russia and 
Germany. But he failed. I think he was really wrong when he sought to realize his ideas by 
force, when ?eligowski with his army came to take over Vilnius. This was not anymore 
politics of arguments. It was politics of force. But that’s really not what he had wished for. 
Those soldiers who died in the conflict, they died in the war of brothers”(I5).  
Pi?sudski’s localness to Vilnius, his identification with and attachment to Lithuania 
are here employed to justify and explain what reasons led him to seize Vilnius. 
Nevertheless, the informant criticizes the “politics of force” in the take-over of Vilnius. 
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By and large, the passage reiterates the Polish textbooks in its emphasis on Pi?sudski’s 
symbolic belonging to Lithuania and the role of the latter in shaping his political 
decisions. On the other hand, perception of the conflict as the brothers’ war brings in yet 
another dimension, based on the belief that the conflict took place between the “new” 
and the “old Lithuanians”. A similar perception of the events can also be observed in the 
following passage:  
“occupation is an occupation of another nation. Well, yes, it was a territory…They 
say that, when ?eligowski returned home after war, Lithuanian soldiers did not let him in 
and said that this was Lithuania now. And he replies, “How can you not let me in? That is 
my property.” After all, we have been always living here. There was no Poland, no 
Lithuania. They lived here, they were from this area, they returned home.”(I6). 
The doubt which briefly emerged in the reflection of “occupation” – “well, yes, it 
was a territory (of Lithuania – R.K.)” – reveals informant’s awareness of the opposing 
perspective on the seizure of Vilnius. However, the recollection and description of the 
past in the interview context, as a process of mnemonic consolidation of history, 
requires the informant to convey a coherently organized, uniform and meaningful 
narrative which excludes those elements that do not easily fit into one’s rationalization. 
On  the  whole,  the  theme  of  localness  and  “Lithuanianness”  of  the  Lithuanian  
Poles’ history runs strong throughout the interview data and emerges in multiple 
contexts. 
 
5.3.3 “Vilnius was Polish, but Vilnius – that’s Gediminas” 
 
The rejection of the term “occupation” based on Pi?sudski’s “Lithuanianness” as 
well as on the predominant demographic and cultural position of Poles in the region was 
not so pronounced in all interviews. A slightly different set of views could be observed 
in some interviews, where there emerged a stronger emphasis on the claim that Vilnius 
was historically and politically Lithuanian, even if culturally it was predominantly 
Polish. In other words, the cultural dimension was outweighed by the dimension of 
political history in rationalizing one’s views about the past. As a result, this brings a 
different perspective on the seizure of Vilnius, which to a considerable extent reiterates 
the official Lithuanian narrative. For instance, the claim that Vilnius has always been a 
capital of Lithuania, which earlier appeared in a 22 year old informant’s reflections 
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(I13), echoes in the observations of informants in their late 40s and 60s. A 49 year old 
informant argues:  
“But it was an occupation. I don’t claim that this is the most suitable term to 
describe it, but practically you took something that does not belong to you. It has 
always been Lithuania here. It was spoken around here in Polish, there was Polish 
culture here, but in political terms it was Lithuania. And you took control over it 
politically, not culturally. You took what’s not yours. It would be different if you 
closed down a university, but you have brought on a political change”(I4).  
A striking feature of this passage is how much the rationalizing of the informant 
resembles the official Lithuanian narrative which highlights that Vilnius has been a 
historical capital of Lithuania. In a similar vein, a history teacher in a Polish secondary 
school points out that  
“Vilnius used to be one of the largest cultural centers. It was Polish, there were few 
Lithuanians. At the beginning of the 20th century there were only 2% of Lithuanians. Later, 
of course, Pi?sudski contributed to that too. He was born here, studied, lived – he was 
unwilling to give Vilnius away. He wanted to create Rzeczpospolita253. Meanwhile 
Lithuanians did not agree to it, thus he acted as Poles insisted – at least to take over 
Vilnius. And the majority of population was Polish. This would not work these days. 
?eligowski came and that’s all. Obviously it was an occupation. Why? Because Vilnius – 
that’s Gediminas. And you can’t do anything about it. And how it became that Poles 
happened to live here, that’s history, the Lublin Union and other things”(I9). 
The two informants, when reflecting on the nature of the interwar conflict, shift the 
emphasis from the dominant position of Polish culture and ethnic composition in the 
Vilnius region to historical and political dimensions of symbolic ownership of Vilnius. I 
would argue that this perspective, though echoing the official Lithuanian historical 
narrative in using such powerful symbolic landmarks as the Lithuanian grand duke 
Gediminas  who  is  said  to  have  founded  the  city,  still  retains  its  specific  Lithuanian  
Polish character. The latter is constituted by the distinction made between the Poles in 
Poland and the local Poles. This is evident, for instance, when the informant mentions 
that  Pi?sudski’s  decision  to  seize  Vilnius  was  the  result  of  pressure  from Poland.  The  
same idea surfaced earlier when an informant claimed that the politics of force 
employed in the take-over of Vilnius was not what Pi?sudski had wished for and that he 
initially sought for a peaceful agreement (I5).  
                                                             
253 A Polish term for Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 
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The latter narratives represent more internally diverse interpretations of the past 
which manage to subtly reconcile the key aspects of the two contending storylines. At 
the same time, this demonstrates the existence of multiple versions of Polish collective 
memory when a certain storyline is individually transformed by integrating new 
elements or symbols and merging competing views. Such narratives of the past are 
equally espoused by a 22 year old, a 49 year old and a 67 year old, each of whom holds 
a quite different socio-economic status. In effect, one may draw a hypothesis that, rather 
than being a peculiar feature of a specific age or social group, this might be attributed to 
the impact of the social context which requires one to re-evaluate and re-construct one’s 
historical narrative in order to retain coherence and meaningfulness of the past in the 
face of the changing contemporary realities. 
 
5.3.4 Mnemonic socialization at school and continuity of historical memory 
 
The passage, in which the informant – a history teacher in a Polish school in 
Lithuania – reflects on the take-over of Vilnius, provides some insights into how 
historical past concerning such sensitive topics can be taught in Polish schools. As one 
of the informants commented,  
“Lithuanian textbooks, approved by the Ministry of Education and Science, are 
obligatory in Polish schools. If Polish textbooks are used, they can only be used as an 
addition to the main Lithuanian textbooks. The identity of kids, thus, mostly depends on 
the teacher. He or she might tell that Lithuanians think this way and that doesn’t concern 
us or that we don’t agree with them. He might also say that there was an occupation.”(I3).  
In other words, since the textbooks, even if translated into Polish, represent the 
Lithuanian version of the past, the teacher’s role in presenting the teaching material 
from a certain angle and this way shaping pupils’ national identity becomes crucial. 
School constitutes one of the principal environments of mnemonic socialization where 
history education, by conveying a certain perspective of the past, is employed as an 
identity building tool. However, the same informant shares a story, in which we can 
observe a dissonance between family memory and the narrative outlined in the school 
history curriculum:  
“I once heard a story where a child, 13 or 14 years old, returns home from a Polish 
school and asks his mother, “So are we occupants? Is it really so?” He felt uncomfortable 
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about this. So the mother then started telling him all about the history of her parents, 
grandparents, explaining him how this “occupation” happened.”(I3).  
This passage is important in showing how a certain narrative of the past, based on 
family history and opposed to the school narrative, is transferred within a family circle. 
In effect, this produces a memory conflict which may potentially deepen dividing lines 
between different communities of memory unless a more encompassing storyline enters 
the school history curriculum which would be more inclusive to plural memories. As 
one informant argues, “I cannot tell my children that their grandfather was an occupant” 
(I7). A possible solution to handling such diversity of memory is offered: 
 “I know that in Czech Republic there has been a history textbook written in such a 
way  that  the  same  fact  has  been  described  from  two  different  perspectives  –  the  first  
interpretation in one page, the second in the other page. I don’t believe that there could or 
should be only one interpretation, that there could be one denominator.”(I7). 
An equally important observation of how the history of the interwar conflict was 
taught in the Soviet schools comes about in the following excerpt:  
“the attitude to Poles as to occupants or “Panska Polska”, which was the enemy of the 
Soviet government, was shaped in the Soviet period too. I know this. I went to school back 
then.”(I3).  
This provides some support to the above mentioned research of Vyšniauskas as 
well as to my own pre-assumptions that throughout the Soviet period the basic structure 
and the main elements of the narrative depicting the conflict over Vilnius retained its 
continuity from the interwar period, despite the imposed ideological clichés. On the 
other hand, another informant draws attention to the fact that,  
“in our times (the Soviet period – R. K.), the history curriculum was dominated by 
Russian history and perhaps only 30% of it was made up of Lithuanian history. Us, Poles, 
we have learned our history from the literature classes as everything has been described in 
literature. Only because of that we knew our history, as from history lessons we didn’t get 
anything.”(I7).  
The history curriculum in the Soviet period, whether depicting Russian or 
Lithuanian history, did not constitute a meaningful narrative with which she could 
identify with. As a result, the informant preferred to rely on other sources of historical 
knowledge, such as literature which offered some information on the Polish history. 
Going further back to the interwar period, an informant argues,  
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“this current evaluation (of the interwar Polish-Lithuanian conflict – R.K.) came from 
the interwar Lithuania, Kaunas’ Lithuania, where there existed many stereotypes about 
Poles and Poland” (I3).  
She takes note of the source of the contemporary perspectives on the events by 
pointing out how the widespread negative attitudes toward Poles developed in the 
interwar Lithuanian republic. An analogous observation is made by another informant 
who speaks about the popular contemporary portrayal of Polish minority:  
“Emphasis on the “Polish problem” has old traditions. In the interwar Lithuanian 
republic, too, there used to be a “Polish problem”, a “Vilnius region problem” which was 
made the centre of public attention when the government needed to distract the nation from 
the real problems”(I2).  
This, to some extent, allows us to infer that there has been a continuity of certain 
elements of Lithuanian historical narrative which emerged in the interwar period, 
persisted throughout the Soviet era and remained in the collective memory, with 
additional  contribution  of  political  (mis)use  of  history,  after  the  reestablishment  of  
Lithuanian independence in 1990. In this regard, the continuity of an undemocratic form 
of political regime in Lithuania throughout most of the 20th century (1926-1990) should 
be taken into account as a contributing factor to the endurance of certain forms of 
collective memory, which essentially hindered the rise of alternative storylines. 
 
5.3.5 Other environments of mnemonic socialization 
 
Apart from schools, the function of mnemonic socialization of Polish minority 
members is also performed by various Polish organizations. Among my interviewees, 
there  were  a  few  who  belonged  to  the  Lithuanian  Polish  Scout  organization  and  who  
shared their reflections on different commemorative practices and rituals enacted 
annually. One of the informants spoke about how history is taught through various scout 
activities:  
“we mark all the Polish celebrations. We try to show the children the surroundings of 
Vilnius  and  the  traces  of  Polish  soldiers.  Of  course,  we  don’t  always  explain  that  
Lithuanians killed those Poles, although there have been such casualties – Poles attacked 
Lithuanians, Lithuanians burned a village for this. There have been such things, but I think 
we should provide children with the truth and they will have to choose later anyway.[...] 
We’re trying to foster traditions. We respect the Lithuanian land, all the Lithuanian traces 
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as well, but also ours – Poles’ – graves, soldiers, those who died. It is important that some 
of them (children – R.K.) return – even, for instance, to the heart of Pi?sudski in the Rasos 
cemetery. […] From Lithuanian celebrations, I would lie if I said we mark the Lithuanian 
Independence Day, we don’t. We mark Polish celebrations: the 3rd of  May,  the  11th of 
November. These are the most important. But they have all the rights to take part in those 
public celebrations in Vilnius on 13 January, 11 March and 16 February. Nobody tells 
them that they cannot or should not participate in them” (I11).  
As we can see from this passage, scouts are highly involved in nurturing respect for 
Polish history – its local traces in the surroundings of Vilnius as well as larger 
landmarks of history, such as Polish Independence Day. 
On the other hand, the local history of Lithuanian Poles, the history of the Vilnius 
region  outweighs  the  significance  of  Polish  national  history  as  the  following  passage  
suggests:  
“In the first place, we seek that children who come to our organization would be 
educated not simply as patriots of Poland or Lithuania, but as patriots of this area in which 
they live, as patriots of their fatherland. In my opinion, fatherland is the place where we 
live, where our parents, grandparents and ancestors have been living. We want them to be 
proud of this land in which they live. When we started researching on the earlier scouting 
history in this region, we found out we could be very proud of how those people fought for 
this land and sought to bring prosperity to it”(I5). 
Meanwhile, the Polish Independence Day, 11 November, is marked by Polish 
scouts for the last 15 years by a marathon from the Zalavas village, where Pi?sudski was 
born, to his heart, buried in Rasos cemetery in Vilnius. The informant described an 
uncomfortable situation which emerged when the marathon was organized the last time 
and the official approval had to be acquired from the municipality administration:  
“I was asked whether we were trying to teach the youth to repeat the events of 1920 
and take over Vilnius. I replied, “Do you think we will try to take over it for the 15th time? 
We tried to seize it for 14 times and it failed.” It was a joke. I didn’t take our conversation 
seriously, but I saw that it caused a hurtful reaction.”(I11).  
This reveals that historical memory connected to the interwar conflict, even if it 
erupts at the informal joke level, still retains its presence and is brought up as part of 
historical analogies between past and present. The following section provides further 
insights on this. 
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5.3.6 Contemporary fears and historical analogies 
 
Lithuanian anxiety and uneasiness about Polish presence in Vilnius region, 
occasionally encountered by some of the informants, is placed into wider historical 
context by an informant who compares it to similar Polish anxiety that she had observed 
in Wroc?aw:  
“You know, I visited Wroc?aw in 1986 or 1987. I spoke to Poles living there. They 
were all afraid to renovate their flats in the old town because they were not sure whether 
the Germans wouldn’t return. There was fear. It seemed so strange to me. It was autumn of 
1987. […] It was strange to me. I was a Pole and I had never heard from my parents or any 
other people that somebody would wish that Poles would return to Vilnius. I grew up here 
and I have never encountered such fantasies. And when I think why they were afraid – 
everywhere there were public signs in German, German kindergartens, the number of 
pupils in German schools was increasing – it serves to me as an example how such fears 
can rise, like they rose here.”(sic)(I3). 
Lithuanian uneasiness with the Polish past of Vilnius, on the whole, was identified 
by many respondents as a strong factor in shaping institutional responses to Polish 
minority claims. For instance, one informant explained the much delayed process of 
land restitution as follows:  
“it is obvious that this has been a political decision – not to recover the property rights 
to  those  who  ask.  Because  politicians  are  afraid  that  if  the  land  property  is  returned  to  
them, the situation will resemble the 1939”(I8).  
Thus, the problem is articulated by means of an historical analogy wherein the 
decisions of Lithuanians politicians are assumed to be shaped by historical fears 
stemming from the interwar experience. The perception of such institutional responses 
to minority claims-making permeated by historical considerations is also evident in the 
following passage: 
“Poles have been living here for thousands of years and they have been living in their 
own land. If we looked at how local people perceived the current politics of land 
restitution, the widespread point of view is to treat it as a “new colonization”. I understand 
that this concept is wrong in political terms, because it is one centralized state here, but 
from the perspective of these people who live in these villages or areas, they see it as a 
“new colonization”. They live in their land, they did not come from anywhere abroad”(I1). 
The same viewpoint resurfaces in another informant’s critique of the land 
restitution process: 
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“We did not arrive from anywhere, as, for instance, I have read in Delfi254 that Poles, 
who live now in Lithuania, arrived from Poland in the interwar years. That’s nonsense. It 
really hurts to hear that the land property should not be restored to Poles because they 
arrived during the occupation. Especially in my case, when I know that my family has been 
living here for 500 years, since 1600, and I know that not only they owned this land, but 
they took care of it, cultivated it.”(I5) 
Once again, the emotionally compelling themes of localness and symbolic 
territorial attachment are used to legitimate political claims and challenge the dominant 
Lithuanian collective narrative of “occupation”. At the same time, the dynamics of 
minority politics appear to be considerably affected by cultural explanations and 
rationalizations of opponents’ reactions in terms of historical parallels with the interwar 
period. 
 
5.3.7 Interview analysis: conclusion 
 
The multitude of opinions, involving informants from different age and social 
status groups, could be broadly grouped into two main segments. First, a more 
pronounced view on the past combines the following elements: i) emphasis on the value 
of multicultural and diverse past of Lithuania, ii) contestation of “Lithuanocentricity” of 
the Lithuanian narrative and iii) rejection of the term “occupation”, based on the cultural 
presuppositions – the dominant position of Polish culture and language in the Vilnius 
region, symbolic belonging and “Lithuanianness” of the local Poles. Typically, those 
informants who strongly argued against the “Lithuanocentric” historical narrative and 
stressed the multicultural aspects of the Lithuanian past were also most opposed to 
treating the interwar events as an “occupation”. While the opposition to the term of 
“occupation” with regard to the interwar events is in accord with the official Polish 
narrative conveyed by the textbooks, the former two elements (i and ii) do not neatly 
adhere to either Polish or Lithuanian textbook narratives. They should rather be 
considered as an expression of claims for inclusion of plural pasts into Lithuanian 
collective memory and hence as claims for symbolic enfranchisement into the 
Lithuanian “imagined community”.  
                                                             
254 One of the major news portals in Lithuania, www.delfi.lt. 
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The second strand of views, on the other hand, does not exclude assertions about 
the historically dominant position of Polish culture in Lithuania or the cultural 
dimension  of  the  interwar  conflict,  but  at  the  same time places  more  emphasis  on  the  
political and historical continuity of the Lithuanian state and highlights a long-standing 
symbolic connectedness of Vilnius and Lithuania, thus, striking a middle way between 
the Polish and Lithuanian interpretations of the past.   
A  strong  identification  emerged  with  the  local  history  of  the  region,  its  local  
landmarks and historical figures, which serves as a basis for maintenance of a distinct 
Lithuanian Polish identity. The significance of local history for one’s identification is, 
in turn, highly interwoven with respect for the history and memory of one’s family, 
parents and grandparents. However, reconciliation of the official Lithuanian narrative 
with the local Polish history and family memory requires one to tackle the mnemonic 
dissonance by re-evaluating and re-consolidating the historical narrative so as to merge 
the clashing storylines. 
Mnemonic socialization, as expected, appears to take place within a wide range of 
environments – family, school, various minority organizations, associations and clubs, 
which all contribute to the transmittal of collective memory through means of 
commemorative acts, practices and rituals. Textbooks constitute only one of the 
multiple sources of historical knowledge which influence informants’ perceptions of the 
past. In some cases, as we have seen, school history has been largely outweighed by 
literature classes which are considered to be a significant source of information on 
Polish history. This, in part, explains why historical narratives of some informants 
contain and merge elements of different storylines encountered within a multitude of 
social contexts. 
On the other hand, the data also provides some support for claims that certain 
elements of Lithuanian and Polish minority narratives persist and retain their 
importance in the context of collective memory despite the political regime 
transformations. The fact that some elements of the narratives persist while others are 
transformed by combining them with alternative explanations of the past opens new 
possible paths for further investigation into the processes of collective memory 
transformations and the ways in which these link to personal involvement in different 
social environments or groups. 
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The main points of the different narratives emerging from the textbooks, national 
historiographies and interviews are summarized in the table below. The latest 
developments in national historiographies show that historical narratives of the common 
Polish-Lithuanian past increasingly incorporate more multiperspectivity, challenge and 
critically reconsider some of the long-standing, established elements of the national 
historical narratives. However, certain mismatches between the narratives outlined in 
the textbooks and in national historiographies illustrate that the new perspectives of the 
contemporary generations of historians are not reflected in the textbooks published 
within the last 20 years and, thus, do not easily enter the school history curriculum. The 
stability of the textbook narratives is nonetheless counteracted by the diversity of 
sources of historical knowledge which affects the historical memory of the informants. 
 
Table 2: Narratives in textbooks, historiographies and interviews 
 Lithuanian rendering Polish rendering Narratives of 
informants Textbooks Historiography Textbooks Historiography 
The Lublin 
Union and 
Polish-
Lithuanian 
unification 
“The lesser of 
two evils”; 
opposition to 
Lithuania’s 
incorporation 
into Polish 
Kingdom and 
to the terms 
set by Poland; 
Polish cultural 
expansionism 
and territorial 
interests; 
dualism of the 
Commonwealt
h; 
Lithuania’s 
equal standing 
and 
institutionalize
d separateness 
in the union. 
Dualism of the 
Commonwealth; 
Lithuania’s 
sovereignty and 
institutionalized 
separateness in 
the union; 
separate 
political 
identity; new 
historiographica
l tendencies to 
regard 
Polonization as 
Lithuania’s 
integration into 
the Western 
civilizational 
field (as 
opposed to the 
traditional 
perspective 
where 
unification is 
regretted as the 
loss of 
Lithuanian 
culture). 
Unification as 
expansion of the 
Jagiellonian 
dynastic rule; 
Krewo union is 
attributed equal 
importance; less 
emphasis on the 
duality of the 
Commonwealth 
and the 
separateness of 
the Grand 
Duchy of 
Lithuania in the 
most recently 
published 
textbooks. 
Unification 
results from 
voluntary 
mutual 
agreement; 
opposition of 
Lithuanian 
nobility caused 
by power 
struggles, not by 
efforts to 
preserve 
independence; 
new 
historiographica
l tendencies to 
acknowledge 
Lithuania’s 
separateness and 
sovereignty in 
the union (as 
opposed to the 
older 
perspective 
where 
unification 
meant complete 
Lithuania’s 
incorporation). 
Identification with 
and emphasis on 
the cultural 
heritage and 
multicultural 
traditions of the 
Grand Duchy; 
political 
separateness of 
the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania, 
dualism of the 
union; Polish past 
of the Duchy as 
an inextricable 
part of Lithuanian 
history. 
19th 
century: 
uprisings 
and 
Lithuanian 
Emphasis on 
the national 
revival and 
“Young 
Lithuanians”; 
Distinction 
between “Old 
Lithuanians” 
and “Young 
Lithuanians” 
Lithuanian 
uprising treated 
as part of the 
Polish uprising; 
the goals of 
Lithuanian 
national 
awakening as an 
obstacle to the 
goals of the 
19th century and 
Lithuanian 
national revival 
perceived as a 
turning point in 
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national 
revival 
“Old 
Lithuanians” 
are not 
distinguished 
as such and 
when 
mentioned, 
mostly treated 
as Poles; 
evidence of 
separateness 
and 
Lithuanian 
resistance to 
overbearing 
Polish 
governance in 
the uprisings; 
Lithuanian 
political 
parties 
fighting with 
Polonization; 
negative 
Polish 
reactions to 
the Lithuanian 
national 
revival. 
raised by a new 
generation of 
historians; “Old 
Lithuanians” 
distinguished 
from the Poles; 
different 
attitudes to the 
Lithuanian 
national revival 
and 
independence, 
including 
support, are 
revealed; 
identity 
transformation 
and multiple 
identity 
constellations 
are 
acknowledged; 
more 
multiperspectivi
ty in the latest 
historiography. 
uprisings 
presented as 
self-obvious – 
independent 
Poland; 
uprisings as 
proof of 
national unity 
and patriotism; 
Lithuanian 
aspirations for 
independence as 
an obstacle to 
the re-
establishment of 
Poland; multiple 
identity 
constellations 
and 
transformations 
in the eastern 
borderland 
mostly 
overlooked. 
uprisings and 
re-establishment 
of Poland; the 
loss of the 
Polish element 
in the East as 
caused by 
Lithuanian 
nationalism; 
modern 
Lithuanian 
nationalism’s 
betrayal of the 
Romanticized 
idea of 
independent 
Poland; national 
identity 
transformations 
within the 
territory of the 
former 
Commonwealth 
receive little 
attention. 
the Polish-
Lithuanian 
history; 
Mickiewicz as a 
symbol of 
Lithuanian Polish 
identity; 
distinction 
between “old” 
and “new 
Lithuanians”, 
utilized to 
demonstrate the 
plurality of views 
vis-à-vis the 
Lithuanian 
statehood in the 
19th century; 
challenging the 
ethnocentricity of 
the Lithuanian 
historical 
narrative. 
The 
interwar 
conflict 
and the 
“Vilnius 
question” 
Vilnius – a 
historical 
capital of 
Lithuania; 
Poland as one 
of the 
aggressors, 
next to Russia 
and Germany; 
the seizure of 
Vilnius – 
occupation, 
Pi?sudski and 
?eligowski – 
occupants; 
importance of 
Suwalki 
agreement 
preceding the 
occupation; 
illegal and 
fictive 
elections of 
Sejm in 
Vilnius; illegal 
annexation of 
Vilnius to 
Poland; 
discrimination 
of Lithuanians 
In older 
historiography, 
Poland 
described as a 
treacherous 
political power 
aggressive to 
Lithuanian 
statehood; in 
post-Soviet 
historiography, 
more 
multiperspectivi
ty and critical 
evaluation of 
both sides in the 
conflict. 
Emphasis on the 
fact that the 
population of 
the Vilnius 
region was 
overwhelmingly 
Polish; 
Pi?sudski‘s 
federalist 
conception 
receives more 
attention than 
Dmowski‘s 
„incorporationis
t“ ideas; 
Pi?sudski‘s and 
?eligowski‘s 
localness, 
attachment, 
symbolic 
belonging to the 
Vilnius region; 
Polish struggle 
for Vilnius as 
the liberation of 
the 
predominantly 
Polish populated 
area from the 
Bolsheviks. 
Reluctance to 
regard the 
seizure of 
Vilnius as 
occupation; 
little emphasis 
on Suwalki 
agreement; in 
portrayal of 
Polish strategy 
in the eastern 
borderland 
emphasis on 
Pi?sudski and 
his federalist 
ideas, with some 
exceptions 
where the 
influence of 
assimilationist 
and 
incorporationist 
ideas is equally 
taken into 
account. 
A more 
pronounced view 
on the past – 
emphasis on the 
value of 
multicultural and 
diverse past of 
Lithuania, 
contestation of 
“Lithuano-
centricity” of the 
Lithuanian 
narrative, 
rejection of the 
term 
“occupation”, 
based on the 
overwhelming 
presence of Polish 
culture in the area 
and territorial 
attachment; the 
second strand of 
views does not 
exclude assertions 
about the 
historically 
dominant position 
of Polish culture 
in Lithuania, but 
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in the Vilnius 
region.  
also places more 
emphasis on the 
political and 
historical 
continuity of the 
Lithuanian state, 
historical 
connectedness of 
Vilnius and 
Lithuania; 
importance of 
family memory 
which 
interweaves with 
the local history. 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
“And those who longed for the Kingdom took refuge like me in the mountains to become the last heirs of 
a dishonored myth” (Czes?aw Mi?osz, “How it Was”) 
 
“To see” means not only to have before one's eyes. It may mean also to preserve in memory. “To 
see and to describe” may also mean to reconstruct in imagination. A distance achieved, thanks to the 
mystery of time, must not change events, landscapes, human figures into a tangle of shadows growing 
paler and paler. On the contrary, it can show them in full light, so that every event, every date becomes 
expressive and persists as an eternal reminder of human depravity and human greatness. Those who are 
alive receive a mandate from those who are silent forever. They can fulfill their duties only by trying to 
reconstruct precisely things as they were, and by wresting the past from fictions and legends.”  
(Czes?aw Mi?osz, from Nobel lecture) 
 
Memory is a never-ending process of reconstruction in imagination. It ascribes 
meaning to experience and narrates the past by transforming our recollections to adhere 
to the ever-changing present. Alas, my doubts whether we are capable of “wresting the 
past  from fictions  and  legends”,  to  use  the  words  of  the  last  citizen  of  the  old  Polish-
Lithuanian  Commonwealth,  as  every  attempt  at  reconstruction  of  the  past  is  partly  in  
itself an act of myth-making.  
What remains forgotten and what goes on living in collective and individual 
memory is largely dependent on the present circumstances of the social context in 
which the past is re-thought, re-told and re-imagined. Memory is inherently linked to 
the present needs and future expectations.  
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Memory, individual or collective, in which certain events of the past are 
established as facts of identification and importance, is intersubjective. It evolves, in a 
myriad of diverse and overlapping ways, from a dialogical relationship between self and 
other, bringing about multiple versions of the past. In that sense, memory is a contingent 
and contested process of narrating and reconstructing the past in new meaningful ways. 
Forcing these multiple memories into one monolithic memory narrative would deprive 
collective memory of many alternative pathways of reconfiguring and reconciling 
competing storylines. 
Yet, even if we seek to step beyond the simplistic one-sided interpretations of the 
past, some level of a common ground for a collective conception of the past, which 
would be regarded as “objective” by members of the national mnemonic community 
and which would accommodate both local (and/or minority, family) and national 
memories, still needs to be established as a basis for social unity and civic loyalty.  One 
possible solution is reflected by a group of interviewees (I4, I9, I13) who, rather than 
strictly aligning themselves with either one of the contending narratives, are capable of 
reconciling the opposing storylines by merging peculiar elements of both and hence of 
producing a more encompassing and inclusive historical narrative of the past, which 
nevertheless manages to embrace the most emotionally compelling views about the 
common Polish-Lithuanian history. The particular ways in which these interviewees 
remembered the past may serve as a model in the pursuit of an inclusive and, in that 
sense, “objective” national historical narrative. 
Even if we cannot strictly speak of any monolithic and uniform collective memory 
of Polish minority members, some aspects of the imagined past were recollected and 
mediated in a more pronounced way, perhaps reverberating the present actualities which 
ascribe the importance to certain historical facts and events. Historical rootedness of 
one’s family, long-standing historical affinity and emotional attachment to Lithuania 
and its history might be perceived as an expression of contestation of an ethnocentric 
Lithuanian narrative, stemming from the felt symbolic exclusion and separation from 
what is supposed to constitute the continuous, stable and ever-present subject of 
Lithuanian history. 
Although internal diversity of Lithuanian Polish collective memory is partly a self-
evident  finding,  due  to  the  fact  that  memory  of  each  of  the  group member  is  affected  
and altered by subsequent encounters of other narratives, changing contexts and 
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environments of social remembrance, it is important to acknowledge this plurality, 
especially having in mind that “for local Poles historical past is much more important 
than to an average Pole”(I4). Recognition of the plurality of collective memory is 
particularly relevant in the debates surrounding the issue of minority integration – in 
identifying the factor of collective memory as important in the process of integration in 
the first place and in preventing the misrepresentation of the level of cultural integration 
stemming from broad and imprecise assertions about group’s collective memory. 
Contestation of the boundaries of Lithuanian collective memory, which emerged in 
the interviews, is indicative of the underlying identification processes in which one’s 
self-distinction, tied to peculiar characteristics of Polishness, is complemented with the 
need to be approved of as a member of the Lithuanian mnemonic community. On the 
other hand, the present political and social realities encourage, in some cases, a search 
for  more  encompassing  and  internally  diverse  accounts  of  the  past  which  serve  as  
catalysts of newly transformed identifications.  
The attempts to merge different interpretations of the past,  to find some common 
ground for re-thinking and re-imagining one’s identifications and national affiliations 
requires the plurality of competing memories to be inscribed into the everyday 
democratic life, into textbooks, professional historical accounts and public discussions. 
Instead of fixed and uncritical inculcation, the reconstruction of the past via history 
education should be a self-reflective process open to multiple contending voices and 
perspectives. Looking at the Lithuanian and, to some extent, Polish textbooks, we can 
observe that history curriculum, traditionally perceived as an identity building tool, still 
largely excludes the more substantially diverse aspects of history in portraying 
multicultural pasts. Though pride in the multicultural past is acknowledged, the 
narrowly ethnocentric historical narrative with its normative ascriptions of what is to be 
remembered still dominates over the voices of parallel “others”. To some extent, this is 
explained by the changing historical circumstances, regime shifts and the ensuing need 
to  re-assert  and  ground  group  identity.  However,  20  years  after  the  fall  of  the  Soviet  
Union,  one  may wonder  whether  the  time has  come to  critically  reassess  the  past  and  
allow for more encompassing and plural narratives to emerge. 
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